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Executive summary 
 
Aim 
This study aims to assess the effectiveness and potential improvement of the Milk 
Package provisions, as regards the functioning of producer organisations (POs) and their 
role in collective negotiations with milk processors. 
The specific objectives are to: 
1. Evaluate the functioning of existing POs and associations of producer organisations 
(APOs) formally recognised under the Milk Package. 
2. Evaluate the potential for POs where they have not been constituted yet. 
3. In the light of the analysis, draw up recommendations to improve the usefulness of 
the Milk Package provisions. 
Legislation on POs in the dairy sector is provided in the Common Market Organisation 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1308/2013). According to this Regulation, Member States 
shall recognise POs in the milk sector formed on the initiative of producers and pursuing 
a specific aim, which may include (Article 152(3) of Regulation 1308/2013): 
(i) ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of 
quantity and quality; 
(ii) concentration of supply and the placing on the market of products produced by its 
members; 
(iii) optimising production costs and stabilising producer prices. 
 
Approach 
The results of this study are based on surveys of POs, farmer organisations (FOs) and the 
dairy processing industry, which are complemented with in-depth interviews. 
The data and information for this study are retrieved from three sources: 
1. A desk study analysing the provisions, public information and studies on the Milk 
Package. 
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2. Three electronic surveys, in local languages, approaching: 
a. Almost all existing POs in the EU. The overall response rate was 23% (63 
POs). In Germany, where most POs are established, 15% (22 POs) 
responded. The response rates in other countries were between 25% and 
100%. Two POs deal with ewe milk; all others deal with cow milk. 
b. FOs in the EU. The response rate was 48% (out of 118 FOs), covering the 
24 Member States (MSs) with the largest milk production. 
c. Members of the European Dairy Association (EDA). Nine out of the 28 EDA 
members responded. This questionnaire was available only in English. 
3. In-depth interviews — the majority in local languages — conducted with 31 POs and 
33 FOs. 
 
Selected results 
It appears from the survey among POs that the core activities of POs are negotiating 
prices, delivery volumes and payment conditions, and information exchange (Figure S.1). 
Results of negotiations are usually binding for the members (73% of the POs answering 
the survey) and often oblige members to deliver a fixed proportion of the milk that each 
member produces (65%). 
 
Figure S.1 Core activities of POs 
 
Source: Electronic survey of POs  
 
Next to the main requirement of delivering the milk through the PO, paying a fee and 
being located in a certain region are often requirements for farmers to become a member 
of a PO. Almost all of the POs have ‘one-member-one-vote’ rules and a board of directors 
consisting of only farmers (94% of the POs participating in the survey). Most POs have 
less than two paid staff members. POs are generally successful in coming to agreements 
that are supported by their members. Engagement of members is fairly high, but 
participation in PO decision-making is also seen as time-consuming (see Figure S.2 for 
details). A small majority of the POs’ managers surveyed indicate that the PO reduces 
the administrative burden for its members. 
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Figure S.2 Opinions on PO management 
 
Source: Electronic survey of POs  
 
According to the POs and the FOs, the motivation for establishing a PO is strongly based 
on getting a better price for the milk delivered (Figure S.3): about 80% of the 
responding POs consider achieving better prices to be important while about 30% largely 
or fully agree that this objective has been achieved (see Figure S.4). In addition, 
improving the position in the chain was mentioned many times as a major reason for 
establishing a PO and more than 40% of the POs largely or fully agree that this objective 
has been achieved. Assuring milk collection (i.e. ‘all milk collected’) is realised for 95% of 
the POs that indicate this as important.  
While some of the potential PO objectives are not mentioned as (important) motivations 
for establishing a PO, they were nevertheless reached (e.g. information for taking 
production decisions or efficient use of inputs), indicating that POs contribute to a variety 
of services for the members beyond the principal ones identified in the legislation. 
 
Figure S.3 Motivations for establishing POs 
 
Sources: Electronic surveys of POs and FOs 
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Figure S.4 Achievement of motives for initiating a PO 
 
Source: Electronic surveys of POs 
a Percentage of POs that fully or largely agree that their motives for initiating a PO are achieved and fully or 
largely agree with the statement that the objective was important in establishing the PO 
 
The main reasons for having no PO or only a few POs are a lack of success stories, 
insufficient information on possible benefits, shortage of training on how to organise 
farmers and establish a PO, and recent changes in prices.  
 
Summary of the main findings 
Initiation of POs by producers 
About 40% of the responding POs do not meet the requirement that POs recognised 
under the Milk Package shall be initiated by producers, our survey shows. In these cases, 
others have initiated the PO on behalf of the milk producers. 
 
Maximum volume of raw milk covered by contractual negotiations 
The legislation restricts the volume of raw milk to a maximum of 33% of national 
production and not exceeding 3.5% of European Union production covered by contractual 
negotiations. This requirement has been met for all the cases analysed.  
 
Criteria with respect to minimum number of members or minimum marketable 
production volume 
The criteria for recognising a PO differ across MSs. There are wide variations in the 
defined minimum number of members (between 5 and 200) and minimum marketable 
production (between 35 and 200,000 tonnes). Some MSs that define high minimum size 
requirements seem to favour large-scale POs. 
 
Objective i: Production is planned and adjusted to demand 
With respect to the objective, that production is planned and adjusted to demand, survey 
results do not provide strong evidence that their activities ensure matching supply and 
demand. Quite a number of POs in the sample find better market information of 
paramount importance and many do negotiate how much to deliver (which is the result 
of matching demand and supply). In addition, the POs deliver all the milk contracted 
under Article 149 of the CMO to the processor, which may indicate that supply matches 
demand well. Meanwhile, though, POs do not seem to supervise the volumes delivered 
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very strictly. The POs’ role in controlling quality is also modest in most countries, as the 
existing quality assurance system is generally more than adequate to guarantee high-
quality milk delivery. Still, POs do play an important role in either maintaining or 
improving the quality of the produce in niche markets (e.g. Italy) and in several of the 
MSs that joined the EU in or after 2004 (EUn13). 
 
Objective ii: Concentration of supply and placing on the market  
This objective of establishing POs is to bring together individual supplies in a collective 
selling milk to a processor to enhance farmers’ position in the supply chain. Every PO 
realises concentration of supply compared with the individual farmer. Yet at national level 
POs do so only to a limited extent. The survey shows that the degree of concentration of 
milk supply varies greatly between MSs. In only two was the total marketable production 
of PO members similar to the maximum amount of milk that is allowed to be covered by 
collective negotiations. In all other MSs where POs were active, the 63 POs covered in 
the survey produce 10.2 million tonnes of milk, which is a mere 7%  of the EU’s total 
milk supply. Whereas POs are unlikely to influence the aggregate EU dairy market, the 
concentration of supply may have an impact nationally and regionally, since 
concentration can also occur at those levels (e.g. spatial competition).  
According to their self-assessment, the surveyed POs have been successful to different 
degrees in assuring that the milk of their members is collected and processed and in 
enhancing the position of producers in the value chain. Of the POs for which assured milk 
collection was an important reason for their establishment, almost all indicate that this 
objective was achieved.  
 
Objective iii: Optimising production costs and stabilising producer prices 
Improving and stabilising the producer price can be considered to be key objectives of 
POs under the Milk Package, even though they may also simultaneously pursue other 
goals. However, only between 25% and 30% of the POs claim that a higher and more 
stable price has been largely or fully realised. This suggests that, alongside successes 
that are achieved, there is ample room for improvement in the functioning of POs in this 
regard. 
 
Conclusion with respect to the potential for POs where they have not been constituted 
yet 
Based on the evidence obtained from the surveys, there are some hints of major reasons 
for having only a small number of POs in most of the MSs. The analysis of the answers of 
existing POs and FOs indicates that often the value added by establishing a PO is not 
clear, especially in countries where many farmers are member of a dairy cooperative. 
Starting a PO implies costs (time and money) and the benefits might come only over 
time but are not guaranteed. Success stories are lacking, which might also be because 
the regulation is only recent and market circumstances (low prices due to oversupply) 
are difficult. Moreover, potential members of POs lack information about and awareness 
of how PO could work for their benefit. The historical connotations of collectives make 
farmers in eastern MSs reluctant to get organised. This is a special hurdle that supporters 
of POs must surmount in putting forward possible gains from a PO. A policy 
recommendation for further promoting the use of POs is to reduce the information and 
awareness gap by targeted communications and information activities, including profiling 
success stories. Offering training (e.g. in bargaining techniques) to potential PO 
managers may also contribute to improving the competence of PO staff and hence the 
functioning and success of POs.   
The measures established by the Milk Package will apply until mid-2020. As part of a 
discussion on extending and/or adjusting the Milk Package, this raises the question of 
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whether or not the legislation on POs and APOs should be extended. This study has a 
limited scope (see next section) and provides a preliminary assessment of POs, but 
nevertheless offers some relevant insights into answering this question. This research 
shows that POs partly contribute to the objectives for which they have been initiated. As 
it appears from the surveys, POs have not been successful in fully achieving all their 
objectives. Moreover, there are several MSs where POs have not caught on at the time of 
writing (mid-2016). This could be related to the start-up costs of a PO, but also to 
alternative organisational arrangements being available that are also able to address the 
needs of the producers. The latter possibility has not been addressed in this research. 
Although there are still a number of open questions, there is also evidence that POs have 
made a positive contribution to achieving one or more of the three objectives. For this 
reason, our recommendation is to extend the legal provision for POs and schedule a more 
in-depth evaluation, to help gain more definite insights into the functioning of POs. 
 
Limitations of the study  
The study contributes to generating new information on the POs and how different 
aspects are evaluated by the POs themselves, by FOs and by dairy processors. 
Nevertheless, the study also faces a number of limitations. A general limitation relates to 
the potential differences between stated preferences (what respondents say or claim) 
and revealed preferences (how respondents act) or observed information (e.g. objective 
measurement by comparing realised prices with a benchmark (counterfactual) and then 
concluding to what extent ‘better’ or ‘more stable’ prices are achieved). Other limitations 
that need to be kept in mind are that surveys on the POs and their functioning have been 
sent to and answered by the managers of the POs and not to their members, so it was 
not possible to cross-check to what extent PO managers and PO members have a shared 
position in answering the survey questions. Finally, given the size of the sample at MS 
level, the analysis of the functioning of the POs is only preliminary. Nevertheless, despite 
these limitations the study is believed to provide valuable information on the functioning 
of Milk Package provisions as regards POs and collective negotiations in the EU.   
  
11 
Analyses of the functioning of Milk Package 
provisions as regards producer organisations and 
collective negotiations 
 
 
 
Jo H.M. Wijnands,1 Jos Bijman,2 Tanja Tramnitzke3 
 
 
1Wageningen Economic Research 
2Wageningen University, Management Studies 
3Thünen-Institut 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
A series of regulations were adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2012 
and 2013 to implement the ‘Milk Package’ (261/2012; 511/2012; 880/2012). They were 
incorporated in the new common market organisation (CMO) in agricultural products 
(1308/2013). The Milk Package’s objective is to strengthen the position of dairy 
producers in the dairy value chain and to prepare the sector to operate in a more 
market-driven environment, especially with the end of the quota system. Among other 
things, it allows Member States (MSs) to decide ‘that every delivery of raw milk in its 
territory by a farmer to a processor of raw milk must be covered by a written contract’ 
(Article 148 of Regulation EU 1308/2013), and it allows farmers to negotiate contract 
terms collectively through producer organisations (POs). It also sets out new specific EU 
rules for associations of producer organisations (APOs) and inter-branch organisations1. 
In 2014, 263 milk POs were recognised in the EU. Table 1.1 presents an overview of POs 
per country. The overview shows that the number of milk POs is significant in only a few 
countries. 
 
                                          
1 Inter-branch organisations are out of the scope of this study and hence not further discussed. 
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Table 1.1 Number of milk POs  
Country Number of POs in 2014 
Germany 149 
France 51 
Italy 42 
Spain 9 
Belgium 3 
Bulgaria 2 
Croatia 2 
Romania 2 
Czech Republic 1 
Portugal 1 
United Kingdom 1 
Total 263 
 
1.2 Objectives 
This study aims to assess the effectiveness and potential improvement of the Milk 
Package provisions, notably as regards the establishment and recognition of POs and 
APOs and their role in collective negotiations with milk processors. 
The specific objectives that this study must meet are the following: 
1. Evaluate the functioning of existing POs and APOs formally recognised under the Milk 
Package. 
2. Evaluate the potential for POs where they have not been constituted yet. 
3. In the light of the analysis, draw up recommendations to improve the usefulness of 
the Milk Package provisions. 
 
1.3 Approach: data, information and their interpretation  
The data and information for this study have been retrieved from the following sources: 
1. Publicly available statistics (mainly Eurostat and the Milk Market Observatory) and 
reports that provide the key features of the EU milk and dairy sector in terms of 
production and structure. 
2. EU legislation and reports to present the Milk Package provisions as regards POs and 
collective negotiations, and the criteria for PO recognition in each MS. This 
information is used either for the questionnaires or to embed the findings in existing 
knowledge. 
3. Three electronic surveys: one sent to all POs in the EU, one to a selection of farmer 
organisations (FOs) in the EU and one to members of the European Dairy Association 
(EDA), the association of milk processors. These surveys provide original data on the 
functioning of POs or the causes for the absence or low numbers of POs in a specific 
country.  
4. In-depth interviews with selected POs and FOs that responded to the electronic 
survey. These provide mainly qualitative information such as motivations, opinions 
and experiences of the functioning of POs or the low number of POs in specific 
countries.  
The answers to the questions in the surveys and in-depth interviews are the basis for 
assessing the functioning of existing POs and APOs formally recognised under the Milk 
Package and evaluating the obstacles to establishing POs (what are the potentials for POs 
where they have not been established yet). To answer the research questions we use a 
framework that links indicators and answers from survey questions to the functioning of 
POs under the Milk Package.  
Assessing the functioning of POs implies examining to what extent they achieve their 
objectives. The key objective is to enhance or improve the position of dairy producers in 
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the value chain. From the legislation (Regulation (EU) 1308/2013) it follows that more 
specific objectives that a PO may pursue may include: 
(i) ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of 
quantity and quality; 
(ii) achieving a concentration of supply and placing on the market of products produced 
by its members; 
(iii) optimising production costs of its members and stabilising producer prices. 
 
Note that, since POs have the freedom to choose one or a combination of the three 
specific objectives mentioned above, it is enough for a PO to be successful if it 
contributes to achieving (at least) one of these objectives. So, in assessing the 
functioning of POs, the specific objectives should be assessed separately. 
POs are thus instruments to improve the position of their members in the dairy value 
chain and to contribute to the good functioning of markets. Just like the cooperative 
movement, they rely on the principle that by collective action a countervailing power can 
be created to (re)balance economic interest in more fairly than without this collective 
action. Another key principle underlying POs is that of tailoring production optimally to 
the needs expressed in the market (in terms of quality and quantity). A third principle is 
to rely on cooperation and collaboration among dairy producers to rationalise production 
and optimise the costs of production, as this can potentially be better achieved by 
cooperation rather than by each producer acting on its own (Falkowski and Caian, 2016). 
From the economic theory of imperfect competition, it is known that, if competition in the 
dairy value chain is imperfect (e.g. oligopsony power in the downstream processing 
industry), it will lead to economic rents for a specific actor in the value chain at the cost 
of others, which might result in lower purchase prices or limit deliveries from milk 
producers. In such a case, POs can contribute to rebalancing market power and push for 
a more competitive equilibrium (potentially including a better milk price and a larger 
amount of milk collected). The extent to which imperfect competition plays a role is 
difficult to assess, but there are indicators which are at least informative, such as the 
structure of the dairy industry (e.g. cooperative versus private or size distribution within 
the dairy-processing industry), the market asymmetry between different stages of the 
value chain (e.g. number of dairy producers per processor or its reciprocal, the number 
of dairy processors or buyers of raw milk per farmer).  
Transaction costs theory focuses on the transaction costs associated with contracting. 
Collective action through POs will involve transaction costs. Such costs, when they are 
expected to outweigh the benefits, can act as a barrier to POs entering the dairy value 
chain. Moreover, when start-up costs are high, while the benefits are limited, uncertain 
and spread over a long time horizon, the effect may be similar. The start-up cost barrier 
might be reduced by public support for producer cooperation and the setting up of POs 
(as is envisaged in the Common Agricultural Policy). The transaction cost aspect also 
includes costs associated with achieving consensus among members, the perceived 
administrative burden, the effort associated with managing the PO and the negotiations 
with parties buying the milk.  
From the theory of value chains (here interpreted to be an integration of insights from 
the fields of industrial organisation and industrial economics), it turns out that 
collaboration within and across different stages of the dairy value chain can contribute to 
achieving efficiency gains, implementing innovations and tailoring actions taken at 
different levels in the value chain to each other (e.g. commitments to deliver a certain 
volume of milk which match the sourcing objectives of processing industries; applying 
quality standards along the value chain). This also includes (contractual) agreements 
about the application of a milk-pricing formula and the distribution of (price volatility) 
risk along the different stages of the value chain. 
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1.4 Report outline 
The report has the following structure. Chapter 2 presents a concise overview of some of 
the key features of milk production and contractual agreements, and the structure of the 
milk producers and dairy industry in the EU. This chapter has two objectives: first, to 
give a general insight into the concentration of milk production in the EU, in geographical 
and economic terms, and, second, to indicate to what extent imperfect competition and 
an imbalance of bargaining power exist in the dairy value chain in some EU MSs. The 
provisions of the Milk Package legislation, its aim and its requirements are highlighted in 
Chapter 3, including how EU legislation is applied in the EU MSs. Chapter 4 sets out the 
data collection and sampling methods with regard to the survey and in-depth interviews 
with each of the groups of stakeholders involved in the study. Chapters 5 and 6 present 
the results of the surveys, with a focus on assessing the functioning of the POs (and 
APOs). In Chapter 5, the focus is on the functioning POs, while Chapter 6 focuses on 
answers to questions addressing the potential for establishing POs where they do not yet 
exist or low numbers have been constituted. In Chapters 5 and 6, boxes are added to 
briefly illustrate and highlight some of the specific comments made by the respondents. 
Chapter 7 brings together all the input from the surveys and in-depth interviews and 
compares  the information from these sources with the objectives of the Milk Package 
provisions. Chapter 8 summarises key findings and concludes.  
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2 Production and structure 
This chapter provides some background information on the EU’s milk and dairy market 
and the structure of the European dairy sector, with the aim of giving a general insight 
into the concentration of milk production in the EU, in geographical and economic terms. 
The concentration of milk processing in a few large dairy companies might indicate 
imperfect competition and an imbalance of bargaining power in the dairy value chain. 
The latter could be an argument for establishing POs, although in some MSs 
concentration in the supply chain could also be due to existing cooperatives owned by 
farmers.  
Section 2.1 presents a concise overview of the amount of milk collected in EU MSs from 
different animal species, the contractual arrangements under which the milk is sold. 
Subsequent sections in this chapter show the farm and firm sizes of milk producers and 
processors respectively. The structure highlights the size of producers and processors in 
EU MSs.  
 
2.1 Milk collection and contracting arrangements 
EU milk production is mainly cow milk: in 2014, 148 million tonnes (Figure 2.1), which is 
97.8% of all milk collected in the EU (Eurostat: apro_mk_pobta). The remaining part is 
collected from ewes (1.2%), goats (0.9%) and buffaloes (0.1%). Over 2003-2014, the 
collection of goat milk (1.5%) grew faster than that of cow milk (1.1%). The collection of 
ewe milk showed the lowest increase (0.7%). Buffalo milk grew the fastest, however the 
volume remained low. 
 
Figure 2.1 Milk collection per animal species in the EU28 
 
Source: Based on Eurostat (apro_mk_pobta) 
 
EU cow milk production is geographically concentrated. The three MSs with the largest 
proportions of EU milk production (Germany, France and the UK) account for almost 50% 
of the total milk collection, and 85% of the cow milk is collected in 10 MSs (see Figure 
2.2). In contrast to cow milk, which is collected in all MSs, milk from other animal species 
is collected in only a few countries. Over 90% of the ewe milk is collected in four MSs: 
Greece, Spain, Italy and France. A similar observation can be made for goat milk: 90% is 
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collected in France, Spain, the Netherlands and Greece. Almost all EU buffalo milk (98%) 
is collected in Italy. 
Figure 2.2 indicates the milk collection per MS per animal species. The countries are 
arranged in decreasing order (see note to figure), first according to the number of POs in 
the MS (resulting in countries with and without POs) and then according to the total 
quantity of milk collection. POs exist in 11 MSs (see Chapter 4 for more details). As the 
figure shows, there is no clear link between the size of the milk collection and the 
existence of POs: POs exist in countries producing large and small volumes of milk. 
 
Figure 2.2 Milk collections per animal species in EU Member States 
 
Source: Based on Eurostat (apro_mk_pobta) 
Note: Countries are arranged in decreasing order, first according to the number of POs in the MS (indicated as 
MS with POs) and then according to the total quantity of milk collection. MSs without a PO are indicated as MS 
without POs. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows by which type of contractual arrangement the milk is collected in each 
of the EU28 MSs. The figure shows that there is much variety between the MSs in terms 
of to whom farmers deliver the milk that they produced. At the EU level, though, farmers 
deliver most (64%) of the milk produced to collecting or processing cooperatives (EC, 
2014). Cooperatives are enterprises jointly owned by the member-farmers, established 
for the purpose of providing goods and services to those member-farmers. Processing 
cooperatives are active in most of the 10 MSs where most of the cow milk is produced. In 
the UK and Spain (which are in the top 10 milk-producing countries), the private 
processors collect and process the largest proportion of milk. The presence of 
cooperatives might be a reason for not establishing POs, given the assumption that 
farmer-owned cooperatives would act in the interest of their members and as a 
countervailing power against (private) processors. Cooperatives are particularly strong in 
the Netherlands, Poland, Ireland, Denmark, Austria and Sweden, all countries without 
any POs. However, in Germany, France and Italy, the three countries with the largest 
numbers of POs, cooperative contractual arrangements also have a significant proportion 
(above 50%). Looking at this issue from the other perspective, in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania all contractual arrangements are with a private processor, yet there are only 
two POs in each of these countries. Thus, these figures tend to suggest that POs play 
their role where private processors are strong, whereas in the main milk-producing 
countries with strong cooperatives no POs exist. 
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Figure 2.3 Percentage of cow milk deliveries by type of contractual 
arrangements 
 
Source: Based on EC (2016)  
Note: Countries are arranged in decreasing order, first according to the number of POs in the MS (MS with POs) 
and then according to the total quantity of milk collection. MSs without a PO are indicated as MS without POs. 
 
2.2 Specialist dairy farms  
Most milk in the EU is produced by specialist dairy farms2. In 2013, the 28 EU MSs 
counted 570 000 specialist dairy farmers that had 18.6 million dairy cows, resulting in an 
average of 31 cows per holding. The average number of cows per holding was above 100 
in Denmark (163), the UK (132) and Cyprus (119). The number of cows per holding was 
below 10 in Romania (3), Latvia (6), Bulgaria (7) and Croatia (9). The average number of 
cows per holding in MSs with POs was 34, slightly higher than the EU28 average. In MSs 
without POs, the average number of cows per holding was 26. 
The annual milk production per cow in 2013 ranged between 3.4 tonnes in Romania and 
9.0 tonnes in Denmark (DG-AGRI, 2016). Those countries are also the two extremes in 
the number of cows per holding. The EU average is 6.5 tonnes per cow. An average dairy 
holding in Denmark supplies 1 460 tonnes annually, whereas the average holding in 
Romania supplies only 10 tonnes, compared with an EU average of 206 tonnes per 
holding. The countries with lowest average levels of milk production per holding are 
Romania (10 tonnes), Bulgaria (26 tonnes) and Croatia (33 tonnes); these three MSs 
have two POs each. 
 
                                          
2 Defined as farms in which at least two-thirds of the standard gross margin comes from the production of milk. 
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Figure 2.4 Numbers of holdings, cows and cows per holding for EU specialist 
dairy farms 
 
Source: Based on Eurostat [ef_olslsuft] 
 
Figure 2.5 Estimated average milk production per specialist dairy farm 
 
Sources: Calculation based on Eurostat (apro_mk_pobta) and DG AGRI (2016). 
Note: Milk production per holding is number of cows (Eurostat: apro_mk_pobta) times the average milk 
production per cow (DG AGRI, 2016). 
 
2.3 Milk processors 
Another indicator that provides information on the market structure (and hence the 
extent to which market imperfection may play a role) is the dairy-processing firm size 
distribution3. There are quite a number of indications that the dairy industry is dominated 
by a small number of big companies. For instance, some of the largest European dairies 
are among the 10 largest dairies of the world, each having a turnover of more than 
EUR 5 billion (Hanisch et al., 2013). Moreover, the top 20 companies processing milk in 
the EU process over 70% of EU milk (Promar International, 2017). Another perspective 
for depicting the market structure is to point out the number of processors to which a 
farmer can choose to deliver milk. In the EU, over 12,000 milk processors were active in 
2013, of which 3,420 were in Italy (see Figure 2.6). Most countries have between 10 and 
                                          
3 Based on NACE classification NACE10.5 (EC, 2008). 
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hundreds of milk processors. These numbers seem rather large. However, given the 
definition, farms processing their own milk are also included in these numbers. 
Nevertheless, based on these numbers, Figure 2.6 indicates that the number of 
processors is generally higher in countries with POs than in countries without POs. Hence, 
in countries with POs, farmers seem to have more options regarding to whom to deliver 
their milk than in countries without POs. From that observation, one might conclude that 
the establishment of POs in the countries where they are recognised was not caused by 
farmers having (too) few options to sell their milk to. However, to conclude that dairy 
processors do not exercise market power — because there are so many — may be too 
hasty, as to evaluate the processor’s position in the value chain one also has to look at 
the size distribution of dairy processors in the EU. 
 
Figure 2.6 Number of milk processors in 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat SBS. 
* Except milk processors in FR, IT and ES; these are shown on the secondary vertical axis. 
 
 -
 500
 1,000
 1,500
 2,000
 2,500
 3,000
 3,500
 4,000
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
D
E
F
R IT E
S
B
E
R
O
B
G
H
R
U
K
C
Z
P
T
N
L
P
L
IE D
K
A
T
S
E F
I
H
U L
T
G
R
S
K
L
V
E
E S
I
L
U
C
Y
M
T
MS with POs MS without POs
D
a
ir
y
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
o
rs
  
F
R
, 
IT
  
&
 E
S
D
a
ir
y
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
o
rs
*
20 
Figure 2.7 Lorentz curves of % dairy processors and % turnover in 2013 per MS 
 
Source: Based on Eurostat SBS. 
 
This size distribution of dairy and food processors is rather skewed: a large number of 
processors have a small proportion of any MS’s total turnover, and a small number of 
processors have a large proportion of turnover (Wijnands and Verhoog, 2016). Figure 2.7 
shows the situation in MSs with at least 1% of EU total turnover and sufficient data. 
Some differences between MSs can be observed. In Italy, 90% of processors account for 
25% of the country’s total turnover, while in the Netherlands 90% of the processors 
account for 7%. In other words, 10% of processors count for 75% of national turnover in 
Italy and 93% in the Netherlands. Hence, these figures indicate that in quite a number of 
countries dairy processing is dominated by a few big companies. This holds for countries 
with and without POs. This suggests that there is no clear link between dominance of 
large dairy processors — an indication of market imperfection — and the establishment of 
a PO. 
 
2.4 Dairy farms and milk processors 
In the previous sections, we discussed the average size of the specialist dairy holdings 
and the structure of the milk-processing sector. The bargaining power of producers 
depends on the number and size of raw milk suppliers and the number of the processors. 
To give some insight into this, we expressed the number of specialist dairy holdings over 
the number of milk processors. The result is that on average 47 farms exist per milk 
processor in the EU. Figure 2.8 shows that in nine countries this ratio is more than 100 
farms per processor. The processing scale in Lithuania is large, which means that the 
ratio is almost 700 farms per processor. At the other end of the spectrum — in Italy, the 
Czech Republic, Greece and Cyprus — the ratio is below 10 farms per milk processor. 
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Figure 2.8 Number of specialist dairy farms per milk processor in 2013 
 
Sources: Calculations based on Eurostat databases. 
 
We have already discussed the skewed size distribution in the milk-processing industry. 
The Eurostat statistics allow comparison of the numbers of specialist dairy holdings and 
of milk processors with a certain number of employees. For this purpose, we took the 
largest processors, namely those employing more than 250 persons. These large 
processors generally have more than 50% of the total dairy industry turnover in an MS 
(see Figure 2.9; note that there are data for only 17 MSs). For these large processors, 
bundling of milk supply will lower their transaction costs. The costs of collecting and 
negotiating will be lower per unit of quantity, if larger quantities can be supplied. 
However, opportunities for farmers to negotiate depend on the number of processors in 
their region. 
 
Figure 2.9 Number of specialist dairy holdings per milk processor and 
percentage of MS’s total turnover in 2013, for processors with more than 250 
employees 
 
Sources: Calculations based on Eurostat databases. 
 
The analysis of the milk and dairy-processing sector shows that in each of the EU MSs 
the sector consists of a large number of farmers producing milk and many dairy-
processing firms purchasing this milk, although in some MSs processing is rather 
concentrated in one or a few firms. However, looking at the number of possible 
purchasers of milk in each MS, there is no evidence of farmers having so few options to 
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sell their milk that dairy companies could possibly exercise a monopolistic type of 
behaviour such as controlling farm prices.   
23 
3 Producer organisations in the dairy sector  
 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted before, the aim of this study is to assess the functioning of POs and APOs as 
they are formally recognised under the Milk Package.  
POs already have a long history: in the fruit and vegetable sector, they were already 
established in the 1960s (Regulation 159/66/EEC). Recognition by the MSs became 
required in 1996 (Regulation EU 2200/96).  
To address issues in the dairy sector (milk crisis) a High-Level Group (HLG) was created 
in 2010 to discuss the need for medium- and long-term arrangements in the milk and 
milk products sector in the context of abolishing the milk quota, which was planned for 1 
April 2015. The objective was to reflect on new arrangements that would contribute to 
stabilising producer income and enhancing transparency in the market (EC, 2012). One 
of their recommendations regarded the need to increase the bargaining power of primary 
producers within the dairy value chain. In addition, the European Council mentioned that 
the low concentration in milk supply could be a reason for the low bargaining power of 
primary producers of milk (EC, 2012).  
It is against this background that the Milk Package was adopted in 2012. The Milk 
Package contains several measures, including a provision for compulsory written 
contracts between milk producers and processors, the possibility of negotiating contract 
terms collectively through POs, new specific EU rules for inter-branch organisations, 
allowing actors in the dairy value chain to engage in dialogue and carry out certain 
activities, and a series of measures enhancing transparency in the market. The measures 
established by the Milk Package will apply until mid-2020.  
In this chapter, the POs and APOs, as they are applied in the dairy sector, will be further 
discussed, with a focus on their main characteristics (Section 3.2). MSs have to define 
certain requirements with respect to POs. The implementation options they have made 
are discussed in Section 3.3.  
 
3.2 Regulation on POs and APOs  
For the dairy sector, legislation on POs is provided in the Common Market Organisation 
Regulation (EU) 1308/2013. According to this regulation, MSs shall recognise POs in the 
milk sector on the initiative of producers and pursuing a specific aim, which may include 
(Article 152(3) of Regulation 1308/2013): 
(i) ‘ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms 
of quantity and quality; 
(ii) concentration of supply and the placing on the market of products produced by its 
members, including through direct marketing; 
(iii) optimising production costs and returns on investments in response to 
environmental and animal welfare standards, and stabilising producer prices’. 
MSs can lay down criteria about the minimum number of members of POs and/or the 
covering of a minimum volume (Article 154 of Regulation EU 1308/2013). See Section 
3.3 for further details. 
Through POs, dairy producers can collectively negotiate contract terms with milk 
processors or raw milk buyers. With respect to the volume of milk that a PO can 
negotiate, clearly defined restrictions apply (Article 149 of Regulation EU 1308/2013): 
1. ‘the volume of raw milk covered by such negotiations does not exceed 3.5% of total 
Union production,  
24 
2. the volume of raw milk covered by such negotiations which is produced in any 
particular Member State does not exceed 33% of the total national production of that 
Member State, and 
3. the volume of raw milk covered by such negotiations which is delivered in any 
particular Member State does not exceed 33% of the total national production of that 
Member State.’ 
An MS may, on request, recognise an APO in the milk and milk products sector if the MS 
concerned considers that the association is capable of carrying out effectively any of the 
activities of a recognised PO (Article 156 of Regulation EU 1308/2013), and that it fulfils 
the conditions laid down in Article 161(1). Little information is available on APOs. Criteria 
have been set by six MSs: Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria and Romania. 
Only Germany states that it has three APOs (EC, 2016). 
 
3.3 Minimum criteria for POs 
MSs can set minimum criteria for recognition as a PO in the milk sector (Table 3.1). 
Ireland and Malta have no legislation on minimum criteria. National legislation on POs 
already existed in Germany, France and Portugal before 2012.  
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Table 3.1 Minimum criteria set by MSs with recognised POs 
 
MS 
National 
legislation 
(planned or 
adopted) 
Minimum 
number of 
farmers 
Minimum 
marketable 
production 
(1,000 
tonnes)a 
Minimum 
contract 
durationb 
Additional or other criteria 
M
S
 w
it
h
 P
O
s
 
DE Nov 2013 5 –c No  
FR 
Existing before 
2012 
200 Or 60 5 Y 
PDO/PGI cow milk 25 farmers or 7,000 
tonnes if 55% is delivered to the same 
buyer 
IT Dec 2012 5 3 1 Y  
ES Nov 2011 – 200 1 Y 
Ewe and goat milk 30,000 tonnes; 
Balearic and Canary Islands and certain 
quality marks, cow milk 10,000 tonnes 
and ewe/goat milk 1,000 tonnes 
BE 
Dec 2012/Aug 
2013 
40/20 – No 
Flanders, 40 farmers or 10 organic 
farmers; Wallonia, 20 farmers 
RO Q1 2014 5 0.035 6 M  
BG Jan 2015 5 – 6 M  
HR 
Jun 2013/ 
update 2015 
7 3 6 M 
 
UK Apr 2013 10 6 No  
CZ Oct 2012 10 – No  
PT 
Existing before 
2012 
12 
See last 
column 
6 M 
EUR 8 million for cow milk and 
EUR 1 million for ewe and goat milk 
M
S
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
P
O
s
 
NL Oct 2014 15 – No  
PL Nov 2013 12 2 ?  
IE     No information available 
DK Early 2013 5 3 No  
AT Oct 2012 20 Or 3 No  
SE May 2013 10 6 No  
FI May 2012 15 3 No  
HU 
Dec 2012, 
changed Jan 
2016 
– 
See last 
column 
6 M 
15,000 tonnes for cow milk, 600 tonnes 
for sheep milk and 500 tonnes for goat 
milk  
LT Oct 2012 20 1 No duration 20 farmers and at least 200 cows 
GR Sept 2013 5/20 0.5/5 -  
SK Dec 2012 5 – No duration  
LV Jan 2013 10 0.125   
EE Sept 2012 – 
See last 
column 
 
5% of domestic production 
SI Feb 2014 20 2 1 Y  
LU March 2014 10 –   
CY June 2013 35 20 1 Y  
MT     No information available 
Source: EC (2016). 
M, months; PDO, protected designation of origin; PGI, protected geographical indication; Y, years. 
a Cumulative with the requirement for numbers of farmers, unless indicated otherwise. 
b ‘No’ means no written contracts/offers compulsory.  
c ’-‘ not a criterion 
 
One criterion is a minimum number of farmers, for most MSs ranging between 5 and 20 
farmers. A few MSs have no lower limit for the number of members. However, several 
MSs set higher threshold levels: 35 in Cyprus, 40 in the Flanders part of Belgium and 200 
in France4. The second criterion, cumulative with the first (except for a few countries), is 
the minimum marketable production. Some countries have no minimum amount; most 
other MSs have levels between 35 and 6,000 tonnes. Higher levels are found in Hungary 
(minimum 15,000 tonnes), Cyprus (20,000) and France (60,000), and the highest 
minimum level, 200,000 tonnes is implemented in Spain. The criteria can be different for 
organic farmers, ewe or goat milk producers and producers in a specific geographical 
area (EC, 2016). 
                                          
4 For exceptions in Belgium and France, see Table 3.1, column ‘Additional or other criteria’. 
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In 13 MSs, written contracts are compulsory, notably in MSs with a limited number of 
‘cooperative structures’. The duration of the contract ranges mainly between 6 months 
and 1 year. France is an exception, with a minimum contract duration of 5 years (EC, 
2016). National legislation in the UK and Belgium mentions ‘codes of best practices on 
contractual relationships’ as additional guidelines for PO contracts with buyers. Note that 
in Germany, for deliveries negotiated through POs, model contracts are commonly used, 
which, in addition to quality, price parameters and duration, will also comprise more 
details on the milk volume in future (EC, 2014). In addition, a derogation from the 
obligation of written contracts is possible. That is relevant in MSs where cooperatives are 
important. Dairy cooperatives whose statutes, or the rules and decisions based thereon, 
have provisions with effects similar to those of the basic conditions for contracts laid 
down in this Regulation should, in the interest of simplicity, be exempted from a 
requirement that there be a written contract (Article 148 of Regulation EU 1308/2013). 
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4 Data collection: surveys and in-depth interviews 
This chapter sets out the data collection and the sampling methods on data with regard 
to the three groups of stakeholders involved in this study: 
1. recognised POs, whose answers are used to evaluate the functioning of POs 
(objective 1 of this study); 
2. FOs, whose answers are used to evaluate the potential of POs (objective 2 of this 
study); 
3. milk processors that will also provide important information required to evaluate the 
potential of POs (objective 2 of this study).  
The information gathered from these three groups will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Based on these analyses, recommendations are drawn on the improvement of the Milk 
Package provisions (Chapter 7). 
The information gathering for the POs and FOs took place in two rounds. First, an 
electronic survey was launched and, second, based on the responses to the survey, a 
number of POs and FOs were selected for in-depth interviews. Milk processors were 
contacted using an electronic survey only. 
The surveys and in-depth interviews were carried out in national languages. The original 
questionnaires, email invitations and European Commission (EC) recommendation letters 
were drafted in English. These were translated by the EC into the national languages of 
the MSs and used in the electronic surveys for POs and FOs. Several open questions 
invited respondents to add comments. Most of the in-depth interviews were held in the 
national languages, and the answers were then translated into English. 
 
4.1 Producer organisations 
Information on the functioning of POs was gathered in two steps: an electronic survey 
and in-depth interviews. 
1. Electronic survey 
Recognised POs were invited in their own language to fill in a questionnaire (Appendix 
1) addressing five topics: 
a. general information such as year of establishment, initiators, milk production, 
type of purchasers, motivations for establishing a PO and the extent to which 
these motivations have been realised (Section A); 
b. activities performed by the PO and its priority (Section B); 
c. aspects of contractual negotiations (Section C); 
d. organisation and governance such as requirements for becoming a member, 
voting rules, managing the PO and support (Section D); 
e. challenges and solutions (e.g. benefits, drawbacks and potential for more POs in 
the MS; Section E). 
The sample of POs covered by the survey is based on information provided by the 
Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI). This included 
information on email addresses of POs for sending the electronic survey, except in 
Germany and in Italy. In Italy, contact information was available for 25 out of the 42 
POs. In Germany, Bayern MeG contacted its members and provided the email 
addresses of 35 members. In addition, the Deutscher Bauernverband contacted all 
other POs in Germany by mail, making 149 POs covered in Germany. Overall, the 
response rate to the electronic survey was 23%. Germany had a relatively low 
response rate, although the number of the POs responding was the largest in any 
country. The German PO responses were mainly from the Bavarian region (16 out of 
22), which suggests a rather strong geographical bias. In Italy, 11 out of the 25 
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invited POs (44%) responded. The response rate was moderate in France (26%) and 
around 50% in Spain and Romania. All POs approached also responded in Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia and the United Kingdom, where the numbers of POs are quite small 
(see Table 4.1). The only PO in Portugal did not respond, though. In the Czech 
Republic, the invitation to take part in the survey was sent to the eight POs that had 
existed in 2013, but seven of them were no longer recognised as POs in 2014.  
In the analyses below, the POs from which data have been collected will be referred 
to as ‘Electronic survey POs’. No weighing will be applied; each observation will have 
the same weight irrespective of the number of responses and the amount of milk 
delivered by the PO or in the particular MS. Country-specific deviations will be 
highlighted in the analyses of the data. 
2. In-depth interviews 
Based on the response to the electronic survey, a limited number of POs were 
selected for in-depth interviews. The in-depth interviews were also held in the local 
languages, except for Croatia, Portugal and Romania, where they were in English or 
German. The number of in-depth interviews was fixed by DG AGRI: all POs should be 
orally interviewed if fewer than five exist in that MS, and in Germany, Spain, France 
and Italy five POs were selected (see Table 4.1). The Czech Republic was an 
exception: besides the PO that existed in 2014, four POs that were active in 2013 but 
stopped in 2014 were also interviewed, with a focus on the lessons to be learned from 
discontinuing POs. 
For countries with more than five responses on the electronic survey, the selection of 
POs to be interviewed was based on the valid responses available on 15 February 
2016. For the Czech Republic, we selected the existing PO and used the selection 
procedure on the seven POs that stopped in 2014 to select the additional four POs for 
the in-depth interviews. 
The interviewers followed a prescribed protocol in the in-depth interviews. At least 
the following three topics had to be addressed: 
1. organisational and legal circumstances and challenges: experiences of farmers 
in setting up a PO; 
2. the internal decision-making structures and processes of the PO; 
3. the benefits and challenges farmers obtain from being members of a PO. 
Furthermore, at least one other topic had to be discussed during the interview. This 
topic depended on the answers provided in the electronic survey. The reporting had 
to be structured around specific elements and in English. 
The information from these in-depth interviews will be referenced as ‘in-depth 
interviews POs’ (IDIP). 
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Table 4.1 Number of invited POs, responses, and sample and response of in-
depth interviews 
Country 
POs in 
2014 
Responses to electronic 
survey (%) 
In-depth interviews 
Planned Response  
Germany 149 22 (15) 5 5 
France 51 13 (25) 5 5 
Italy 42 11 (26) 5 4 
Spain 9 5 (56) 5 5 
Belgium 3 3 (100) 3 3 
Bulgaria 2 2 (100) 2 2 
Croatia 2 2 (100) 2 1 
Romania 2 1 (50) 2 0 
Czech Republica 1 3 (38) 5 5 
Portugal 1 0 (0) 1 0 
UK 1 1 (100) 1 1 
Total 263 63 (23) 36 31 
Sources: EU (2015) for number of POs in 2014; electronic survey POs and IDIP. 
a We invited all eight POs that had been recognised in 2013 in the Czech Republic; one still existed in 2014. The 
response rate is based on POs in 2014 except for the Czech Republic.  
 
4.2 Farmer organisations 
In countries with few or no recognised POs, information on the opinion of FOs was 
collected following a similar approach used for the POs, that is through an electronic 
survey and in-depth interviews. 
1. Electronic survey  
All FOs in the sample were sent a letter from the EC by e-mail, inviting them to fill in 
an attached questionnaire (Appendix 2) in their local language. The questionnaire 
addresses two topics: 
a. Reasons for the low number of POs. This topic corresponds to a question in 
Section E of the PO questionnaire. 
b. Reasons for farmers to join a PO. The question corresponds to a question in 
Section A of the PO questionnaire. 
The sample of FOs is based on several sources: 
1. All full members of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations and 
General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives (Copa-Cogeca) indicated on 
their website5 were selected, resulting in contact information for 59 organisations. 
In Lithuania, the national organisation distributed the questionnaires to others, 
notably regional organisations in the country. This resulted in two additional 
responses. These two were added to the number of invited organisations, 
resulting in 61 organisations from this source. 
2. The umbrella organisation of the European Council of Young Farmers (CEJA) in 
Brussels provided contact information for 22 organisations. 
3. A similar approach was used for the European Milk Board (EMB), resulting in 
contact details for 18 organisations. 
4. In addition, the EU office of La Via Campesina, the International Peasants’ 
Organisation, provided contact details for another eight organisations6. 
                                          
5 http://www.copa-cogeca.be/Main.aspx?page=CopaMembers  
6 La Via Campesina provided contact information for nine organisations. The organisation indicated in Spain was 
already on the list of Copa-Cogeca. That organisation is only included on the Copa-Cogeca list and not on the 
list of La Via Campesina. 
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5. The aforementioned organisations did not include organisations in Bulgaria and 
Romania. DG AGRI provided contact information for 10 organisations in these 
countries. 
The total number of organisations contacted was 119, covering all EU MSs. 
Almost half (57) of the contacted FOs responded to the questionnaire. 38 of them 
were FOs contacted through Copa-Cogeca. Detailed information is provided in 
Appendix 4 and an overview can be found in Table 4.2. The responses covered 24 of 
the 28 EU MSs, as no FOs from four small countries replied. In the presentation of the 
results, we shall make a distinction between FOs that are members of Copa-Cogeca 
and all others (indicated as ‘other FOs’). 
In the analysis, the data collected through the survey will be referenced as ‘Electronic 
survey FOs’. No weighting will be applied; each observation has the same weight 
irrespective of the number of responses and the amount of milk delivered. Deviations 
in specific MSs are presented in the analysis. 
2. In-depth interviews 
In countries with more than 0.9% of the EU total milk production, two in-depth 
interviews were planned. Countries with less than 0.9% of the total EU milk 
production are not covered in the sample because of their limited relevance at total 
EU level. The countries excluded are Estonia, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia. Furthermore, Germany is not included, as 
it has many POs and the objective of interviewing FOs is to understand the reasons of 
the low number or absence of POs. Data gathering in the remaining nine MSs was 
limited to electronic surveys. 
The local language was used in countries that have POs (except Croatia, Portugal and 
Romania) and in regions where they speak Dutch, German or Polish. All other 
interviews were in English. 
A protocol similar to the one used in the in-depth interviews of POs had to be followed 
by the interviewers. At least the following two topics had to be addressed:  
1. reasons for the low number of dairy POs in your country; 
2. relevance of the Milk Package provisions. 
Depending on the answers in the questionnaire, other topics could be discussed (not 
obligatory). 
In 12 out of 19 selected countries, at least two in-depth interviews were achieved. In 
the other seven countries, one interview was held. Not being able to get into contact 
with the spokesperson of the FO was the main reason. In addition, language barriers 
hampered getting into contact.  
The information from these in-depth interviews will be referenced as ‘in-depth 
interviews FOs’ (IDIF). 
 
4.3 Members of the European Dairy Association 
Information on the opinions of processors was collected through an electronic survey 
among members of the EDA. The EU office in Brussel invited the members to fill in a 
questionnaire (Appendix 3). The questionnaire was in English. The content of the 
questionnaire was largely in line with the questionnaire sent to the FOs, but phrasing was 
from the processors’ point of view. Besides some general information, the questionnaire 
addressed two topics: 
1. Reasons for the low number of POs. This topic corresponds to a question in Section E 
of the PO questionnaire and in the FO questionnaire. 
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2. Reasons for doing business with POs. The question corresponds to a question in 
Section A of the PO questionnaire (while taking a processor’s perspective). 
The EDA has 28 members in 21 MSs7. Of those members, nine responded (response rate 
32%) covering nine MS (also covering 32% of the EU28). Those nine countries are 
Germany, France, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. These nine countries account for 75% of total EU milk production. Of the EDA 
respondents, four are located in MSs with POs and the remaining five in MSs without 
POs. In this respect, the  sample is considered fairly representative. 
In the analysis below, the data collected through this survey will be referenced as 
‘Electronic survey EDA’. 
 
4.4 Categories of countries and organisations 
In Chapter 6, we divide the respondents into several categories with the purpose of 
analysing the questionnaire data in more depth.  
In a first step, we distinguish the target groups of the questionnaires: 
1. POs. We present first ‘all POs’ (63 respondents), next to the results of four specific 
MSs (Germany, Spain, France and Italy) and the rest of the MSs that have POs. 
2. FOs. If all surveyed FOs are presented, this will be indicated as ‘all FOs’. 
3. EDA members. These are the results of all respondents from the EDA. 
In a second step, we distinguished the following categories for further in-depth analyses 
regarding those MSs in which a large number of FOs responded to the electronic survey: 
1. The presence of POs in the MS: 
2. MSs with one or more POs are indicated as ‘MS with POs’. They account for 67% of 
EU milk deliveries. 
3. Countries without POs, indicated as ‘MS without POs’. They account for 33% of EU 
milk production. 
4. Aggregates for the European Union. 
5. The 15 MSs that joined the EU before 2004 are indicated as ‘EU15’. They account for 
86% of EU milk production. 
6. The remaining 13 MSs, which joined the EU in 2004 or after, are indicated as ‘EUn13’. 
They account for 14% of EU milk deliveries. 
7. Type of contractual arrangements 
We classify MSs according to the type of contractual arrangements, based on the 
importance of deliveries by farmers to cooperatives and private processors. MSs 
where milk deliveries to (collecting and processing) cooperatives are two-thirds and 
more (66.6%) of the total deliveries are classified as ‘cooperative’; while MSs with 
66.6% and more of milk deliveries to private processors are classified as ‘private’. 
The rest of the MS are classified as ‘mixed’, i.e. those where the proportion of milk 
delivered to private processors or to cooperatives is less than two-thirds of the total 
production. We acknowledge that the threshold of two-thirds is arbitrary. The result is 
as follows: 
8. ‘cooperative’: 14 MSs with 59% of EU milk production; 
9. ‘private’: 6 MSs with 12% of EU milk production; 
10. ‘mixed’: 8 MSs with 29% of EU milk production. 
11. The umbrella organisation of FOs that answered the questionnaire. This indication is 
not linked to countries. The categories are:  
12. members of Copa-Cogeca; 
13. others, indicated as ‘other FOs’. 
                                          
7 For names and addresses, see: http://eda.euromilk.org/about-eda/members.html 
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The different categories that are linked to MSs are included in Table 4.2. This table also 
provides information on the respondents of the surveys among FOs. 
 
Table 4.2 Sample FOs, responses, and sample and response to in-depth 
interviews 
 
Member State 
Predominant 
contractual 
arrangement 
EU15/ 
EUn13 
Electronic survey 
In-depth 
interviews Invited Response 
Response 
rate (%) 
M
S
 w
it
h
 P
O
s
 
Germany Cooperative EU15 5 2 40 * 
France Mixed EU15 7 5 71 1 
Italy Cooperative EU15 6 2 33 2 
Spain Mixed EU15 6 3 50 2 
Belgium Mixed EU15 7 4 57 3 
Romania Private EUn13 4 2 50 1 
Bulgaria Private EUn13 6 2 33 1 
Croatia Private EUn13 3 3 100 * 
United Kingdom Private EU15 4 3 75 2 
Czech Republic Mixed EUn13 4 1 25 2 
Portugal Cooperative EU15 3 2 67 1 
M
S
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
P
O
s
 
Netherlands Cooperative EU15 4 2 50 2 
Poland Cooperative EUn13 7 1 14 2 
Ireland Cooperative EU15 3 1 33 2 
Denmark Cooperative EU15 3 2 67 2 
Austria Cooperative EU15 4 3 75 3 
Sweden Cooperative EU15 3 1 33 2 
Finland Cooperative EU15 3 1 33 1 
Hungary Mixed EUn13 4 1 25 1 
Lithuania Mixed EUn13 8 7 88 1 
Greece Private EU15 1 1 100 * 
Slovakia Cooperative EUn13 2 0 0 * 
Latvia Mixed EUn13 8 6 75 * 
Estonia Mixed EUn13 3 1 33 * 
Slovenia Cooperative EUn13 2 1 50 * 
Luxembourg Cooperative EU15 3 0 0 * 
Cyprus Private EUn13 5 0 0 * 
Malta Cooperative EUn13 1 0 0 * 
Total Cooperative EU15 119 57 48 31 
Sources: Electronic survey FOs and IDIF 
* Not in sample. 
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5 Results on experiences and opinions of POs 
This chapter presents the results of the electronic survey of and in-depth interviews with 
POs. The electronic survey provides quantitative information and the in-depth interviews 
provide qualitative information. While this chapter focuses on describing the information 
retrieved, Chapter 7 interprets it in relation to the objectives of this study as well as to 
the functioning of the Milk Package. The topics discussed follow largely the structure of 
the questionnaire (Appendix 1). 
Results are presented for all POs in total, and separately for the POs in Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain, countries from which at least five POs responded to the invitation to fill 
in the electronic survey.  
 
5.1 Milk deliveries and production areas  
This section presents several features of the surveyed POs in terms of their milk 
production in total and in relation to the limitations of the production areas. This 
information, gathered from answers to survey questions in Section A of the questionnaire 
(general information), will also serve to discuss the representativeness of the sample of 
POs. 
A first step, though, is to show how much of their production the POs deliver under the 
collectively negotiated contracts. Table 5.1 shows that, even in the countries with many 
POs, total deliveries of POs in an MS negotiated under Article 149 of EU regulation 
1308/2013 never exceed 50% of the country’s total milk deliveries. The level of 
deliveries from POs in the Czech Republic in 2014 is based on eight POs. Since 2014, that 
level has been significantly lower, as only one PO continued to exist in 2015 (see Chapter 
4). 
 
Table 5.1 Volume of milk deliveries: total and negotiated under Article 149 CMO 
in 2014 
Country 
Animal 
species 
Total deliveries 
(1 000 tonnes)a 
Deliveries negotiated under 
Article 149 CMO (1 000 
tonnes)b 
Percentage 
Germany Cow 31,375 11,527 37 
France Cow 25,261 4,469 18 
Czech Republic Cow 2,370 1,053 44 
Spain 
Cow 6,647 840 13 
Ewe 457 71 16 
Sources: a Eurostat and b EC (2015) 
Note: EC (2015) did not provide information on deliveries negotiated for other MS  
 
The information in Table 5.1 is used to evaluate the representativeness of the survey 
responses presented in Table 5.2 below. In Germany, 15 POs in the survey deliver milk 
under negotiated contracts. These 15 are 10% of all POs in Germany, and they deliver 
10% of all the deliveries that are made under negotiated contracts in that MS. The 
sample seems to be representative for Germany. However, in France the percentage of 
POs in the survey in the total is higher than their percentage of the deliveries under 
negotiated contracts, suggesting that in France the relatively small POs responded. The 
POs of Italy and Spain (Table 5.2) have relatively large percentages of the deliveries 
under negotiated contracts. This indicates that mainly POs that deliver large quantities 
responded to the invitation. 
The 63 POs covered in the survey produced 10.2 million tonnes of milk, of which 35% 
(3.6 million tonnes) was delivered under collectively negotiated contracts (Table 5.2). All 
recognised POs in Germany, France, Italy and Spain together delivered 17.9 million 
tonnes (see Table 5.1, column 4). The POs in our survey from these countries delivered 
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1.9 million tonnes (the sum of the four countries as presented in column 6 of Table 5.2) 
under collectively negotiated contracts. That is 10% of the deliveries of all recognised 
POs. For the other MSs, the information on total milk deliveries by POs under contract 
has been incompletely reported. However, for the four MSs with complete information it 
becomes obvious that cow milk delivered under collective contracts never exceeds the 
marketable production of all respondents in the survey. 
 
Table 5.2 Total cow milk production and deliveries under PO contracts in 2015 
by POs in the survey 
MS 
Marketable milk production Deliveries under PO contracts 
Number of 
responses with 
values 
1,000 
tonnes 
Number 
of POs 
Percentag
e of all MS 
POs 
Total deliveries 
by POs in 
1,000 tonnes 
Percentage of 
milk delivered 
under PO 
contractsa 
DE 21 2,005 15 10 1,098 10 
FR 13 1,332 2 4 30 1 
IT 10 988 6 14 540 51 
ES 4 1,273 1 11 240 29 
BE 3 1,415 0 0 0 
 
RO 1 79 1 50 79 
 
BG 2 5 1 50 4 
 
HR 2 20 0 0 0 
 
UK 1 1,613 1 100 796 
 
CZ 3 1,451 3 38 778 
 
PT 0 0 0 0 0 
 
N.A. 3 
     
Total 63 10,181 30 11 3,565 
 
Source: Based on Electronic survey POs, questions 7 and 21. 
N.A., not available (information not filled in). 
a Based on source EC, 2015, The percentage is the percentage of total deliveriers by surveyed POs under 
contract negotiation and MS states total as indicated in Table 5.1. 
 
All except two POs that responded are involved in cow milk production. The exceptions 
are: 
 A ewe milk PO in Spain with five members and 35,000 tonnes of milk production. This 
production is just above the required minimum of 30,000 tonnes (see Table 3.1), but 
at the same time almost 50% of the total quantity delivered under PO contracts. The 
production is located in areas with structural limitations8 (Electronic survey POs). The 
five members are cooperatives with around 700 farmers, producing 76,000 tonnes of 
milk.  
 A ewe milk PO in Italy with 564 members and 19,113 tonnes of milk production. This 
PO produces mainly in areas with other structural limitations, and a small part in 
mountain regions. 
All the ewe milk produced by these two POs is delivered under negotiated contracts.  
Less than 50% (28 out of 60) of the POs delivering cow milk are producing in areas with 
structural limitations (Table 5.3). In addition, 12 of these POs produce in more than one 
area with limitations. In France, as well in other MS covered in the survey which are 
aggregated in the group “Rest”, most POs are producing in areas without structural 
limitations. In Germany, Italy and Spain, the majority of surveyed POs produce in areas 
with limitations. 
 
                                          
8 This term is used in the questionnaire as it was designed by the client, and is not further specified.  
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Table 5.3 Cow milk POs with members in areas with structural limitations 
Type of area All DE FR IT ES Rest 
Mountainous 20 8 1 7 2 2 
Natural constraints 14 8 1 1 2 2 
Other limitations 7 4 1 1 1 0 
2 or 3 areas with limitationsa 12 8 1 1 1 1 
Total POs in areas with limitationsa 28 12 2 8 3 3 
POs in areas without structural limitations 32 9 11 2 1 9 
N.A. 3 1 0 1 1 0 
Total 63 22 13 11 5 12 
Source: Based on Electronic survey POs, question 8. 
N.A., not available. 
a) 12 POs have production in two or three areas with structural limitations. The total POs in areas with 
limitations are all POs that produce in at least one area with structural limitations. This number is not the sum 
of previously mentioned categories, as some POs produce in several areas. 
 
The survey results show that the milk produced by the surveyed POs is mainly (83%) 
produced in areas without any limitations and this percentage is slightly lower than the 
percentage of members (87%, see Figure 5.1). Only 6% of members are active in areas 
with natural limitations and they produce 10% of the total milk production. The surveyed 
POs in Spain produce mainly in areas with natural constraints. As members can produce 
in more than one area with structural limitations, the number of members exceeds 100% 
only in Spain. 
Figure 5.1 shows that most individual members of the POs produce in only one area with 
structural limitations, in contrast to the finding that several POs produce in regions with 
more than one structural limitation. Only in Spain do several members of the PO produce 
in more than one area with structural limitations. The data did not make it possible to 
identify exactly how many produce in more than one area. 
 
Figure 5.1 Members of POs and cow milk production in areas without and with 
structural limitations within the selection of MSs (% of total of POs with cow 
milk) 
 
Source: Based on Electronic survey POs, question 8. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Tables A5.1 and A5.2  
Note: In Spain, several PO members produce in more than one area with structural limitation, resulting in a 
total of more than 100% 
 
The surveyed POs are not representative for the total EU dairy sector as the proportion of 
milk produced in mountainous regions in the EU is higher than the proportion in all 
surveyed POs (Table 5.4), except for Germany. 
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Table 5.4 Cow milk production in mountainous areas (% of total milk 
production) 
Source All DE FR IT ES 
Electronic survey POs 5 8 2 9 6 
Santini et al. (2013), p. 39 10 8 14 21 27 
Sources: Based on Electronic survey POs and Santini et al. (2013) 
 
For all surveyed POs, the milk production per member is higher in areas with structural 
limitations than in areas without limitations. This applies especially in Germany. In Spain, 
POs in areas without structural limitations have the highest production per member. 
These differences between MSs are remarkable.  
The average cow milk production per PO member in Germany is low compared with DG 
AGRI 2016 data (Section 2.2) on average production of specialist dairy holdings: 87 
tonnes per PO member compared with 427 tonnes per average specialist dairy holding. 
This indicates that the surveyed POs in Germany consist of rather small producers. In 
France, the difference between PO members and specialist dairy holdings is small. In 
contrast to Germany, the average milk production per PO member is larger than the 
Germany’s average of specialist dairy holdings. 
 
Figure 5.2 Average cow milk production per PO member (tonnes/member) 
 
Sources: Based on Electronic survey POs, question 8. Information based on Tables A5.1 and A5.2 in Appendix 
5. Per holding in MS based on Eurostat and DG AGRI (2016); see Figure 2.5. 
 
5.2 Establishing POs 
Survey results show that 71% of the surveyed POs were already constituted before 2012, 
the year that the Milk Package came into force (see Figure 5.3, left panel). Policies in 
specific MSs can explain the relatively large proportion of POs constituted before 2012. 
For example, in Germany, legislation on POs (Erzeugergemeinschaften, EZG) had already 
been in force since 1969 (Wendt, 2013).  
Quite a number of POs that were constituted before 2012 have also been recognised 
under the 2012 Milk Package regulation: Figure 5.3, right panel, indicates that 56% of 
the POs were recognised after the 2012 Milk Package legislation. The significant number 
of POs that answered that the PO was recognised under the Milk Package provisions 
before 2013 indicates that they may be not familiar with Milk Package provisions. In 
Germany and Italy, a relatively low proportion of POs have been recognised after 2012, 
which might be explained by the longer tradition of POs in these countries, where they do 
not find it necessary to adopt specific Milk Package requirements immediately, although 
in Germany the transformation of POs meeting the Milk Package requirements went 
smoothly and required little effort (Wendt, 2013). This might explain the large proportion 
 -
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of POs constituted between 2008 and 2012. In France, where national legislation also 
existed before 2012 and most POs were established before 2012, a relatively high 
proportion (over 60%) were recognised under the Milk Package legislation. 
 
Figure 5.3 Constitution and recognition of POs per period 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, questions 1 and 2. Tables A5.3 and A5.4 in Appendix 5 provide the numbers. 
 
Other survey outcomes report on the size of the POs. Almost 50% of the 60 cow milk 
POs have 101 to 500 members, 28% have between 101 and 250 members and 20% of 
the POs have between 251 and 500 members. The proportion of POs with fewer than 101 
members is almost 12%, and POs with more than 500 members account for 17%. The 60 
POs that provided information on the number of members have in total 40,411 members. 
That makes on average 674 members per PO. These statements refer to the aggregated 
numbers of all surveyed POs: Figure 5.4 provides further MS-specific details for 
Germany, France and Italy. 
 
Figure 5.4 POs by number of members 
 
Source: Electronic survey PO, question 7. ES is not included because the number of observations is too small. 
The observations are included in Others. 
 
The average number of members per PO is far higher than the number of specialist dairy 
holdings per processor as presented in Section 2.4. In Germany, the number is even 
above the number of specialist dairy holdings per large processor (i.e. processor with 
more than 250 employees; see Table 5.5). In France, the ratio between members of POs 
and specialist dairy holdings per large processor is about 1 to 3 and in Italy it is about 1 
to 8. This indicates that POs contribute to a concentration of milk supply. 
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Table 5.5 Number of members per PO, and number of specialist dairy holdings 
per processor 
Category DE FR IT 
Average number of members per PO 1,924 296 219 
Specialist dairy holdings per processor (Figure 2.8) 114 36 8 
Holdings per processors with more than 250 employees 1,438 954 1,754 
Sources: Electronic survey PO, question 7, Eurostat and DG AGRI (2016); see Section 2.4. 
 
Around 40% (24) of the surveyed POs are members of an APO, mainly in Germany (17; 
77%) and France (6; 46%). Eleven POs have no interest in establishing an APO; 14 are 
interested in doing so, mainly in France. The remaining POs did not fill in an answer 
(Electronic survey POs). 
In Article 152 of EU Regulation 1308/2013, the requirement is stated that POs ‘are 
formed on the initiative of the producers’. The survey revealed that 62% of POs covered 
in the survey were established on the initiative of farmers and 17% were initiated by 
traders (Table 5.6). The latter is mainly the case in Germany9. Trade unions are seen as 
representatives of producers; therefore, they are considered the same as FOs. 
 
Table 5.6 Drivers for establishing the PO (number of respondents) 
Initiative by All DE FR IT ES Rest 
Farmer(s) 39 11 8 5 4 11 
Cooperative 2 0 0 0 1 1 
Processor 4 1 1 2 0 0 
Trader  11 7 3 1 0 0 
Milk-collecting organisation 6 3 1 2 0 0 
N.A. 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Total 63 22 13 11 5 12 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 3. 
N.A., not available. 
 
Fifty out of the 63 POs (79%) indicated that they had no problems in getting recognition. 
The main obstacles to recognition had to do with difficulties in understanding or 
complying with formal provisions. In addition, the transformation of a cooperative to a 
PO and splitting a PO were mentioned (Electronic survey POs). 
The five German respondents indicated that recognition was not difficult: four out of five 
had been established for some time but also a newly established PO had no problems in 
becoming recognised (IDIP). 
Some POs interviewed mentioned administrative burdens and/or negotiations with the 
government as difficult. One mentioned this as a difficulty despite support from a trade 
union (IDIP).  
  
                                          
9 In German, ‘trader’ has been translated as Unternehmer, which is broadly speaking an ‘enterprise’. This might 
be a misunderstanding and it is possible that a processor or cooperative is meant. 
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Box 5.1 Czech case: from eight recognised POs in 2013 to one PO in 2014  
Source: Statements of Czech POs (IDIP). 
 
Finding members was no problem for 51 out of the 63 POs surveyed (81%). Some 
indicated reasons for not easily finding members, such as administrative work to fulfil all 
regulation requirements, mistrust among farmers and not being familiar with POs 
(Electronic survey POs). 
 
Box 5.2 Experience of getting members 
Source: Statements of specific POs (IDIP). 
 
5.3 Purchasers of milk 
From the 63 surveyed POs, 37 had no difficulties in finding purchasers. Four POs did not 
provide any information on this subject, while 22 POs pointed out one or more difficulties 
The Czech Republic is a special case, as seven out of eight recognised POs in 2013 were no longer 
registered as recognised in 2014. Four of these POs have been interviewed. The objectives of 
these POs are strengthening the position of the producers in the value chain, better prices and 
ensuring payments. All the four POs are still active and some are applying for recognition again. 
The reasons mentioned for withdrawing recognition include no benefits, large administrative 
burdens, higher prices if the producers negotiated individually, some members ceasing to produce 
milk, not being legally compliant as a cooperative and waiting for response from the authority 
about being recognised again. 
Other arguments for stopping are also mentioned: unfair competition practice by domestic 
retailers favouring foreign brands, not being allowed to sell the milk to intermediate traders, ex-
post price determination by buyers and unfair policies of other MSs. 
Recommendations that these POs made are to provide POs with financial support, advantages for 
members in applying for subsidies, free access to market information, stronger regulation of the 
milk market (e.g. reintroduction of the quota system) and the EU exporting excess milk as food 
aid. 
Overall, this Czech case raises several aspects that will be elaborated below and are not very 
different from the experiences in other MSs. However, the issues were apparently more severe 
and prompted or forced these POs to take the decision to terminate recognition.  
PO A 
Before the introduction of the Milk Package, there was a system of inter-professional associations 
dealing with the delivery conditions and prices. Small regions had prices and conditions that were 
the same for all farmers in that region. Half of the farmers delivered to a private company. 
Farmers delivering to a large processor had already started to work together unofficially and the 
crisis of 2009 strengthened the process. It was the initiative of farmers supported by a trade 
union to organise the PO, motivated by more economic thinking. The group started in 2010 and 
was recognised in 2012. The group functioned already as a kind of a PO and it was not difficult to 
find members. Farmers were already involved. 
PO B 
This PO declares: Our mission was to establish a single supply contract. We wanted to abandon 
the old contract between a single producer and the processor, and involve more suppliers. We had 
the attention of 30 to 40 potential members, thanks to a link with an old farmer association. We 
contacted them by phone and face to face, explaining the benefits of being a member of a PO. 
Then we had some meetings in which we explained the benefits of a single supply contract. As a 
result, we obtained a single supply contract and we succeeded in aggregating several producers. 
Members nowadays recognise the advantages of getting together with other producers. 
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that they had met. Causes of difficulties included the unwillingness of processors to 
negotiate with POs or APOs, mainly because processors prefer contracts with individual 
producers instead of POs. Also, POs claim that some purchasers seem to ignore the 
existence of POs, there are divergent opinions on milk contracting among members of 
POs, or oversupply meant that potential purchasers had little interest in buying milk 
(Electronic survey POs). 
The processors to which POs deliver their milk have mostly a regional or international 
dimension (Table 5.7). However, there are differences among the four major countries 
with POs. In Germany, for instance, regional processors are the main buyers of PO milk. 
In Italy the geographical dimension of the processors is rather balanced among all four 
levels, whereas in Spain most processors have a national dimension and in France most 
processors have an international dimension. 
 
Table 5.7 Geographical dimension of processors as purchasers of POs 
(numbers) 
Location of processors All DE FR IT ES Rest 
Local 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Regional 17 9 2 2 0 4 
National 12 1 0 2 4 5 
International 18 5 11 1 1 0 
N.A. 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total processors 50 16 13 6 5 10 
Not a processor 13 6 0 5 0 2 
Total POs 63 22 13 11 5 12 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 10. 
N.A., not available. 
 
When asked for the main type of purchaser, the respondents did not fill in the 
questionnaire consistently, as 29 POs indicated that this would be a processor (Table 5.8; 
based on question 9), while in  previous table  (Table 5.7, based on question 10)  50 POs 
filled in that they deliver to a processor. That is the reason why the numbers of POs that 
deliver to a processor are different in the two tables. Table 5.8 shows that, in France and 
Spain, POs deliver (almost) exclusively to milk processors whereas, in other countries, 
POs sell their milk to traders and cooperatives as well (Electronic survey POs). 
 
Table 5.8 Main type of purchaser of the PO 
Type of purchaser All DE FR IT ES Rest 
Processor 29 1 13 3 4 8 
Trader 18 15 0 1 1 1 
Cooperative 8 0 1 3 3 1 
Others 1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 or 3 types 5 0 1 1 2 1 
N.A. 13 5 0 5 0 3 
Total POs 63 22 13 11 5 12 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 9. 
N.A., not available. 
a Five POs deliver to two or three types of purchasers. In total 61 type of purchasers are mentioned, which is 
larger than the number of the 50 POs  
 
Overall, on average each PO has 4.4 purchasers (Table 5.9). The number of purchasers is 
the lowest in Germany (ranging from one to five purchasers per PO) and is slightly higher 
in France and Italy. In Spain, the average number of purchasers is more than 20. The 
Spanish POs that deliver to processors have on average 21 purchasers, with POs 
indicating numbers ranging from 3 to 35 processors. Other types are, for example, a 
41 
specific enterprise, self-processing (both mentioned three times) and a combination of 
collecting and processing (once) (Electronic survey POs).  
 
Table 5.9 Average number of purchasers per PO for types of purchaser 
Type of purchaser All DE FR IT ES Rest 
Processor 5.6 1.0 2.3 3.7 21.0 4.5 
Trader 2.2 2.0 N.A. 1.0 7.0 2.0 
Cooperative 2.1 N.A.  1.0 1.3 3.7 1.0 
Others 1.0 1.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Total average 4.4 1.9 2.4 2.7 20.4 4.3 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 9. 
N.A., not available. 
 
5.4 Motivation 
This section focuses on the motivations10 or reasons for establishing a PO. Motivations 
are interpreted as the main objectives that members of the PO were pursuing when the 
organisation was constituted. A follow-up question was to what extent these objectives 
have been realised. 
Ninety-two per cent of respondents indicated that getting a better price was their most 
important reason for establishing a PO (Figure 5.5). The next most important motives are 
a stable price (67%) and enhancing the position of producers in the value chain (63%), 
followed by assuring that all milk is collected (49%) (Electronic survey POs). A French PO 
confirms in the interview that price negotiations are often difficult, as sometimes one 
large processor is dominant in the region (IDIP) 
The extent to which the important objectives have been realised is evaluated as rather 
low: around a quarter of the respondents indicated that a better price, a stable price or a 
better position in the supply chain has been achieved ‘largely’ or ‘fully’ (Figure 5.6). POs 
in Germany and Italy appear to be more positive and French POs more negative than the 
average result of these opinions (Electronic survey POs). 
French POs are, however, very positive about assuring that ‘milk will be collected’; 92% 
of the POs indicated that this object is ‘largely’ or ‘fully’ achieved. German POs also 
report positively on the realisation of this objective: two-thirds of POs surveyed indicated 
that this objective is ‘largely’ or ‘fully’ achieved. The score for communication is also 
rather positive. However, information on this topic was collected only in Germany and 
Spain (Electronic survey POs). 
  
                                          
10 In the questionnaire, question 12 uses the word ‘motivation’. Motivation can be interpreted as objective if the 
realisation is assessed. However, in some case we have to stick to the word ‘motivation’. 
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Box 5.3 Small farmers as preferred suppliers for a specific customer 
Source: Statement of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
Fewer than half of all respondents filled in the questionnaire on the purchase of cheaper 
inputs, more efficient use of means of production, interim step for a cooperative or 
others. Over two-thirds of the POs mentioned that these topics were not motives for 
establishing a PO (Electronic survey POs). Some POs interviewed in the EUn13 had 
success in procuring cheaper inputs (IDIP). 
 
Figure 5.5 Motivation for establishing the PO (% rank 1 to 3 of all POs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.5 
 
The category ‘other motivation’ is rather diverse. Some mentioned having better 
negotiating options by establishing a PO, better possibilities of valorisation of the milk, 
having been treated badly by a purchaser, better exchange of information between 
purchaser and producers, meeting the regulatory requirements, changes in organisation 
of the previous purchaser or demonstrating that existing cooperatives intrinsically involve 
all functionalities of a PO (Electronic survey POs). 
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We wanted to organise the PO as an enabling tool for integrating and strengthening our local 
farmers in the milk distribution. First, we tried to get small-scale farmers (real players in our 
territory); second, we aimed at an average production of 900 tonnes a year; and finally, we 
wanted to obtain a suitable legal status according to the Community guidelines. We contacted 
suppliers and farmers already active in the territory. They talked with their customers, providing 
information on the PO. Meetings and face-to-face contacts helped a lot. One of the success factors 
in the PO establishment was explaining to potential members that the organisation would find new 
distribution channels. As a result, we increased the number of suppliers, got new members and 
brought down the fixed costs. Members now fully rely on the Producer Organisation for their milk 
collection. 
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Figure 5.6 Extent of realisation of the motivationa of the PO (% realised ‘Fully’ 
and ‘Largely’ of all POs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 13. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.6. 
a The question on better communication was translated and included only in the German and Spanish 
questionnaires. 
 
In Figure 5.6, we express the realisation as a proportion of all respondents, irrespective 
of whether they indicated the topic as a high or low priority. Below, we select the POs 
that, first, ranked the motivation (also interpreted as objective) as number 1 or 2 and, 
second, indicated that this objective was fully or largely realised. The objectives (treated 
as motivations) with regard to prices are seen as important, but only 29% of those 
representatives of POs who considered this the most important reason for establishing 
the PO indicated that these topics were realised fully or largely. In addition, many POs 
mentioned the position in the chain is an important motivation, yet only 39% of the POs 
considered this motivation fully or largely realised. The motivation ‘all milk collected’ is 
realised for 95% of the POs who indicated this as important. Of the POs that indicated 
‘better information for decision-making’ (9 out of 14) as an important motivation for 
setting up the PO, 64% are fully or largely satisfied with its realisation. 
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Figure 5.7 % of POs whose motivations are realised ‘Fully’ or ‘Largely’ and who 
indicated that motivation among top two priorities for establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12 and 13. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.7. 
 
5.5 Activities 
In line with the importance of ‘better prices’ for establishing a PO, price negotiations are 
the most important activities, ranked in first place by two-thirds of the POs (Figure 5.8). 
In France, all POs ranked this activity as 1 or 2. Activities related to ‘payment conditions’ 
and ‘delivery volumes’ are the next most important. In the fourth place in importance is 
‘exchange of information and experiences’ and almost as important are ‘delivery 
conditions’. Few POs indicate other activities as important. Other activities are largely in 
the field of activities already mentioned. Interesting activities are related to milk market 
intelligence, training of administrators and position of the conventional or organic sector 
(Electronic survey POs). 
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Figure 5.8 Core activities of POs (% rank 1 to 3 of all POs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 14. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.8. 
 
The ranking shows differences between the MSs. Negotiating milk price and delivery 
volumes rank high in France: in this MS, cooperative and private companies are both 
important in milk processing. In Italy, organising quality control, advice and milk 
collection are also rather important. The rest of the countries have overall high scores on 
several activities (Electronic survey POs). 
 
Box 5.4 Improving quality of raw milk 
Source: Statement of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
Interviewed POs also indicated better quality of milk as important: for one PO, it is a 
specific asset to improve the position in the value chain (IDIP). 
 
5.6 Contractual negotiations 
Between 60% and 75% of all POs carry out negotiations that are binding on members, 
oblige their members to deliver fixed amounts, and conclude contracts on behalf of their 
members. Germany has the highest percentages for these three activities, 80-90%, while 
these are relatively low in Italy. France has the lowest percentage of POs that conclude 
contracts for members. A significant number of POs (30%) observed that their members 
negotiate and conclude individual contracts without interference by the PO, especially in 
Spain (Electronic survey POs). One of the POs stated that the Milk Package provisions are 
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One of the POs interviewed achieved higher raw milk quality and analysis of raw milk. It defined 
parameters to make quality consistent between producers, consulted other stakeholders in the 
dairy chain and had meetings with the university and regional institutions. Eighty small-scale 
producers became members thanks to quality certification of milk resulting in high remuneration. 
Young farmers and smallholders recognised the advantages of being part of the PO. 
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not relevant to improving the position of milk producers in negotiations with processors 
(IDIP). 
 
Figure 5.9 Contractual negotiations (% of total respondents) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, questions 15 to 20. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.9. 
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Box 5.5 Beneficial relationship with processors by building trust 
Source: Statement of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
5.7 Organisation and governance 
The discussion of responses on the organisation and governance of the POs presented in 
this section covers the requirements for becoming a member of a PO. Questions on 
governance deal with management activities and the possible impact of PO members on 
these activities. 
Paying a fee is the main membership requirement for 65% of the POs; only in France 
does this hold for all POs (Figure 5.10). The second is ‘being established in a certain 
region’: this was again mostly in France, at 85% compared with 40% for POs in all 
countries. Third and fourth (both 27% of all POs), quality requirement (highest in 
Germany, 41%) and delivery to a specific processor (highest in France, 69%) are 
mentioned. Almost 60% of the respondents mentioned at least two requirements to 
become a member of the PO and 40% at least three. In France and Germany, at least 
half of the POs have three or more requirements. In the ‘Rest’ of the countries, 58% of 
the POs have just one requirement (Electronic survey POs). It is relevant that in 
Germany membership of an FO is mentioned whereas on the question ‘trade union’ no 
requirement is filled in. Furthermore, in Germany the processor has to agree (mentioned 
twice). 
 
The challenge was finding dairy processors willing to negotiate and do business with the PO based 
on contracts. A stable relationship with dairy processors is built on long-term contracts, regulating 
mainly total volumes, prices (mixed, indexed, reference levels, etc.) and quality, but also 
penalties for breach of contract. Furthermore, the PO initiated a cost optimisation project. The PO 
succeeded in concluding regular contracts with 20 milk processors (small cheese makers but also 
some of the biggest dairy producers). The 2015-2016 campaign included yearly contracts, and 
even one for 3 years’ duration has been achieved. All the milk produced by the PO members is 
sold, above the average market price. No farmers have left the PO, and three contract-breaching 
members have been taken to court, where the cases were won by the PO. 
The PO representative stated that public support of POs should be based on results rather than 
simply helping the constitution of a PO after meeting the national requirements. The PO 
representative supports the Spanish requirement of 200,000 tonnes per year, because the 
objective is to increase volume rather than create parallel regional and fragmented associations. 
As a concluding impression: a PO with a positive and entrepreneurial view. 
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Figure 5.10 Requirements for becoming a member of the PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 22. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.10. 
 
The voting rules are ‘one-member-one-vote’ for 86% of the surveyed POs (Figure 5.11). 
Eight per cent, mainly in Spain, have a voting system related to the quantity of milk 
deliveries (Electronic survey POs). 
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Figure 5.11 Voting rules (% of POs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 23. 
 
The boards of the POs mainly (94%) consist of farmers (Figure 5.12). The differences 
between the countries are negligibly small: a few POs in Spain and the ‘Rest’ also have 
non-famers on their boards. 
 
Figure 5.12 Boards of POs (% of POs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 24. 
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Box 5.6 Efficient management 
Source: Statement of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
Figure 5.13 Number of full-time equivalent paid staff (% of POs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 25. 
 
Twenty-nine per cent of the POs have no paid staff; in Germany, as many as 64% of POs 
do without (Figure 5.13). A similar proportion of POs, around 30%, have up to one full-
time paid staff member, in France even 85%. This high proportion of POs with no or up 
to one paid employees might be because volunteers, members or processors do the 
administration. Another 24% of POs have two paid staff members. In Spain, two out of 
five POs have five or six paid staff members.  
Over 80% of the POs mentioned that they received no support for establishing the PO: 
no financial support from national or EU authorities or from other public authorities. 
Three POs in Germany mentioned that they had gained financial support from public 
authorities before 2004. The UK PO, however, obtained support from the national 
authority. Six POs — one each in Croatia, France and Spain and three in Italy — received 
support from the regional authorities. The Croatian PO obtained support for office 
equipment and making a business plan. A Spanish PO got support but did not specify the 
authority (Electronic survey POs). A French PO expected financial support from the 
authorities, as it said that it had heard that in other countries this was given (IDIP). 
Several POs interviewed expressed their wish that more incentives and contributions to 
facilitate the establishment of a PO should be given (IDIP). 
One-third (21 out of 63) of the POs received support from private bodies: four from 
processors, 12 from professional organisations (mainly in France), one from a collector 
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Initiating a PO from scratch without an existing infrastructure or financial means often occurs with 
a group of individual farmers and not with an association. The objective of this PO was to reach 
self-financing, to build up sufficient human and physical capital for the PO to operate and to fulfil 
its mission. The interviews indicate that, in general, fees are requested to cover all the 
operational costs. 
Currently, this PO has three people working full time. Their tasks are keeping regular contact and 
transmitting information and decisions to the members (e.g. a weekly newsletter); regular checks 
of the invoices to see that the processors are fulfilling the contracts; and preparing contract 
proposals.  
Rather than getting subsidies to assist the formation and operation of POs, the spokesperson 
proposed measures that are seen to be more effective, e.g. ‘positive discrimination’, i.e. a 
positive differential subsidy for insurance fees, modernisation or investments, for those farmers 
who are members of a PO. 
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and one from members of the PO; three did not specify the source. The support was in 
kind (among others, provision of legal support) and sometimes a financial contribution 
for managing the PO was received (Electronic survey POs). 
Managing the PO is time-consuming according to 50% of the surveyed POs, which agreed 
fully or largely with that statement (see Figure 5.14). The French and Spanish POs are 
even more explicit: 85% and 80% of them respectively endorse that statement. At the 
other extreme, only 23% of the German POs state that managing the PO is time-
consuming (Electronic survey POs). All interviewed executives of POs in Germany 
understood the attitude of the members that the involvement of PO’s staff taking part in 
management was a welcome relief from problems of marketing their milk (IDIP). 
The statement that ‘All members participate in the management of the PO’ is often not 
confirmed; only a quarter of the respondents agreed fully or largely with this statement. 
The highest level of agreement can be found in Germany: 40% (Electronic survey POs). 
The respondents in the in-depth interviews of POs in Germany support this finding. 
However, there are differences, arising especially from very different membership 
numbers of the POs and the quantity of milk per member. It is easier to organise the 
involvement of many or all members in a PO with a low number of members than in a PO 
with 300 members or more. In POs with many members, the management (board and 
supervisory board) usually takes the decisions. The participation of members in these 
decisions takes place in the board of directors and the general assembly. From the 
perspective of the surveyed executive managers, this could be quite intensive (IDIP). 
This information might give rise to the thought that the question in the electronic survey 
is not well formulated or understood. Many POs in Germany answered that no paid staff 
are involved whereas according to the in-depth interviews the management performs 
several tasks. 
Around 50% of the surveyed POs agreed fully or largely with the statement that ‘the 
engagement of members in the PO is high’. Three out of four POs in Germany and France 
agreed with this statement (Electronic survey POs). 
‘Members easily come to an agreement’ is fully or largely the opinion of 70% of the 
surveyed POs. This overall high level is based on the high level in Germany: 95% of its 
POs endorse this statement. In addition, France has a rather high level: 77% (Electronic 
survey POs). 
That the PO reduces the administrative burden for members is fully or largely the opinion 
of 82% of the German POs surveyed. The POs in France, Italy and Spain have quite the 
opposite opinion. One-fifth to one-third share the German point of view (Electronic 
survey POs). 
Overall, the German POs are most positive on the management and engagement of 
members of the POs. This might be linked to the aforementioned long tradition of POs in 
Germany. Combined with the low level of paid staff — 64% have no paid staff — this 
might suggest that the POs themselves do not do the administration (Electronic survey 
POs). 
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Figure 5.14 Opinion on the management of the PO (% of total) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 30. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.11. 
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Box 5.7 Trust in the board of the PO 
Source: Statements of specific POs (IDIP). 
 
5.8 Developing into a processing cooperative 
In this section, the ambition of POs to evolve into a cooperative is discussed. Section 2.1 
showed that a significant proportion of milk is processed by cooperatives. A cooperative 
can be seen as a PO with processing facilities. 
 
Table 5.10 Developing the PO into a processing cooperative 
Member State Yes No N.A. Total 
DE 0 22 0 22 
FR 0 13 0 13 
IT 5 3 3 11 
ES 0 4 1 5 
Rest 6 5 1 12 
All 11 47 5 63 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 33. 
 
Three-quarters of the POs are not considering becoming processing cooperatives (Table 
5.10). In Germany, France and Spain, none of the surveyed respondents indicated 
changing to a cooperative as an opportunity. In Italy and the ‘Rest’ of the MSs, the 
majority consider it an opportunity (Electronic survey POs). 
The overall opinion is that developing the PO into a cooperative needs too much 
investment, without public financial support and entrepreneurial interest among the PO 
members (Figure 5.15). For some of the POs interviewed, the transition towards a 
processing cooperative is not considered an important issue; this explains the total 
number of five non-responding POs. The opinion on training varies strongly. The ‘Rest’ of 
the MSs are rather outspoken on all issues except for entrepreneurial interest. Eighteen 
POs indicated other reasons; several mentioned that it is not their aim to become a 
processor; several also mentioned that they have no position in the value chain or the 
know-how (Electronic survey POs). 
  
PO A 
We succeeded in obtaining more quality standards and we valorised all milk in the dairy supply 
chain, improving collaboration and relationships with other stakeholders. The internal decision-
making structure, run by the Board, is still nowadays one of the key assets in the good 
functioning of the PO. 
PO B 
An Executive Board is created where members’ representatives in each province take part, and 
which meets quarterly. The Executive Board takes decisions on the members’ fees, the board  
coordinates for negotiation (e.g. range of prices; allocation of volume among farmers). The 
director leads individual strategies for contractual proposals. A selection of  representative 
farmers delivering to specific processors have to agree. The director is satisfied but also cautious. 
He thinks that keeping the PO working needs constant attention and dedication. 
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Box 5.8 Developing from a PO into a cooperative 
Source: Statements of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
Figure 5.15 Reasons for not changing into a cooperative 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 33. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.12. 
Note: Responses of 47 POs that indicated that they would not consider such a development. 
 
The number of POs that looked favourably on the opportunities for developing into a 
processing cooperative (11 POs, fewer than 20% of the surveyed POs) is too small for 
analyses at country level. Opportunities for business development, better prices and 
enhancement of the producers’ position in the value chain are highly valued reasons for 
developing into a processing cooperative: 80% to 100% agreed fully or largely with 
these reasons (Figure 5.16). The two reasons ‘benefits for financial support’ and ‘develop 
local specialties’ are endorsed by of 45% of the 11 POs (Electronic survey POs). 
One interviewed PO moved in the opposite direction: from a processing cooperative to a 
PO. One of the main objectives was to become eligible to receive subsidies for POs. The 
structure of the organisation remained largely similar (IDIP). 
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We established a PO under the cooperative status. We are currently a cooperative that involves 
more than 200 members. We reached for sure a stronger position in the negotiation power and 
having agreements with buyers. We succeeded also in avoiding individualistic behaviour that was 
quite common in our territory. 
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Figure 5.16 Reasons for developing into a processing cooperativea) 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 33. 
Note: Response of 11 POs that indicated that they would consider such a development. 
 
5.9 Potential for more POs 
Around three-quarters of the respondents (46 POs) indicate that there is potential for 
more POs in their country. Twenty-five per cent (16 POs) indicated no potential and one 
PO did not express an opinion. Figure 5.17 does not include Spain separately, as only 
three POs indicated the possibility, and their responses are added to the ‘Rest’ group. 
Furthermore, in Figure 5.17 the ‘Not available’ (N.A.) answers are also counted. In the 
textual overview below, we present the proportion of POs that agreed fully or largely as 
percentage of the POs that provided an answer (hence excluding N.A.). 
POs were requested to respond to suggested reasons why the possibilities for 
establishing more POs in an MS were not exploited: 
 Sector is well organised. 
Only 20% (8 of 41 respondents that answered) are fully or largely of the opinion that 
the sector is well organised to exploit the full potential of POs. In Italy, not a single 
PO indicated that the sector is prepared to exploit the potential of POs (Electronic 
survey POs). 
 Value chain functions properly. 
Twenty-six per cent (9 out of 35) are of the opinion that the sector functions 
properly. More German POs agree fully or largely, and fewer POs in the ‘Rest’ of the 
MSs (Electronic survey POs). 
 Sector is insufficiently organised. 
This question refers to questions discussed under the first bullet point above. The 
answers indicate that the dairy sector is insufficiently organised and prepared to 
achieve the maximum benefits from POs. 
 Benefits are lower than costs. 
Twenty-nine per cent (10 out of 34) fully or largely agree that the benefits do not 
outweigh the costs. The remainder are of the opinion that POs are beneficial for the 
producers. The German POs endorse this opinion most strongly (Electronic survey 
POs). In addition, the in-depth interviews expressed the opinion that the POs offer 
their members support in the market when there is an oversupply of milk combined 
with low producer prices. Members already appreciate a small price premium of, for 
instance, EUR 0.001 (IDIP). Italian informants tend more towards the opinion that 
POs are not beneficial and the ‘Rest’ support each opinion 50-50 (Electronic survey 
POs). Several interviewed POs stated that POs are not considered an appropriate 
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instrument to influence the development of supply and demand in the global market 
(IDIP). 
 
Box 5.9 Milk Package reduces transaction costs 
Source: Statements of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
 Farmers are unwilling to cooperate. 
Forty-six per cent (15 out of 35) of the respondents are of the opinion that farmers 
are not willing to cooperate. In the ‘Rest’ of the MSs, as many as 60% are of this 
opinion. Put differently, overall a very small majority believes that farmers are willing 
to cooperate (Electronic survey POs). An interviewed PO considered from personal 
experience that farmers do not want to cooperate (IDIP). 
 Farmers prefer direct contact with purchaser. 
A possible preference for direct contact between farmers and producers is not a major 
reason for not exploiting the possibilities of POs: 30% (11 out of 37) mentioned it as 
a reason. In Germany, this proportion is only 14%; however, in France and the ‘Rest’ 
it varies between 40% and 43% (Electronic survey POs). 
 There is insufficient information/training. 
Insufficient information and training are indicated as important reasons for a low 
number of POs: 56% (20 out of 36) agree fully or largely. Germany is on the low side 
of agreement (36%), and France (63%) and the ‘Rest’ (80%) are on the high side 
(Electronic survey POs). 
 There is a lack of success stories. 
Sixty per cent of the respondents indicated that the absence of success stories of 
functioning POs strongly demotivates people to establish POs. The difference between 
Germany (21% agree) and all other countries (80-90%) is striking (Electronic survey 
POs). 
 Recent milk price developments do not encourage cooperation among farmers. 
Opinion on this is split almost 50-50 (17 out of 36 agree largely or fully) for all 
respondents; however, there are differences between MSs. Germany (29%) and Italy 
(17%) do not agree that this hampers the establishment of POs, whereas France 
(71%) and the ‘Rest’ (78%) strongly support this opinion (Electronic survey POs). 
 
The Milk Package provisions are intended to create benefits for the farmers, resulting in lower 
transaction costs for individual price negotiations, as purchase directors of the processor switched 
frequently. Furthermore, the processor has built up a focus group to discuss their different options 
for purchasing milk.  
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Figure 5.17 Potential for establishing POs 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34. Detailed information in Appendix 5, Table A5.13. 
Note: Responses of 46 POs that indicated potential. 
 
5.10 Supplementary information on challenges 
The questionnaire asked what benefits and drawbacks the members of the POs have. 
Alongside the closed questions, which are discussed above, there were also a number of 
open questions (see Section E of the survey; Appendix 1)11. Most answers to these 
questions are in line with what is stated on the motives for establishing a PO (Section 
5.3). Several other answers are just statements on the weak position of producers, the 
                                          
11 Some of the answers have been excluded because they were not readable or recoverable. 
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need for financial means or, positively, that the PO adds value (Electronic survey POs). In 
this section, we mention the number of POs that filled in these question and we 
summarise their statements. 
The POs could also indicate if they had ideas about preferred changes in the Milk Package 
provisions. Their answers relate to: 
 Contractual relations 
Fifteen POs suggested changes in contractual relations. They mostly refer to providing 
a more important position for the producers, encouraging other processors to follow 
voluntary codes for contractual relations, forbidding exclusivity between PO and 
purchaser, and favouring of collective contracts. Some underlined the positive 
contributions of the actual Milk Package (Electronic survey POs). They argue that such 
changes could lead to a strengthening of the position of POs and producer 
cooperatives (IDIP). 
 
Box 5.10 Suggestion for a voluntary code for contractual relations 
Source: Statement of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
 Producer organisations 
In addition, 15 POs provided some information about this. Overall, they consider that 
the role of POs has to be strengthened and that recognition by processors should 
become obligatory (Electronic survey POs).  
 Collective negotiation 
Nine POs suggested increasing the negotiation power of the POs and also providing 
more financial means for their activities (Electronic survey POs).  
  
Processors have no obligation to recognise POs, just a few adhere to this. Farmers have to 
coordinate themselves and spend money and much effort to form a PO, with the risk of being left 
empty-handed in the end. The interviewed PO signalled that action by the national authority is 
needed on: 
1. Introducing a label on dairy products, which indicates a fair value chain from 
producer to consumer. 
2. Obliging processors to recognise approved POs and work with them in all MSs. 
3. Helping farmers to extend such a code throughout the value chain, so they need to 
deal with only processors that are complying with the fair supply code. 
The PO suggested either making the fair value chain obligatory or introducing a ‘fair value chain’ 
label for market transparency and increasing the use of it. 
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Box 5.11 Promoting local product 
Source: Statement of a specific PO (IDIP). 
 
 Interbranch organisations 
Eleven POs provided some comments. They suggest more collaboration and also the 
possibility of intervention in case of crises (Electronic survey POs). 
• Regulation of supply for PDO (protected designation of origin)/PGI (protected 
geographical indication) cheese 
Five POs indicated no interest or that the regulation is not applicable to their 
country (Electronic survey POs). 
 
• General remarks on the Milk Package as a whole 
Eight POs provided some text. They state mainly that the Milk Package did not 
solve their problems. One, however, states that the position of the producers 
has been enhanced (Electronic survey POs).  
 
  
We wanted to improve the production and quality of an important local product, starting a 
dialogue with important local buyers. The (achieved) objective was to make a written contract 
that is able to recognise the quality of the local product as an added value for the territory. The 
PO contacted the largest local producers and agreed on compensation for suppliers and buyers. 
We established constant dialogues and monthly meetings, trying to plan expectations and 
benefits. We improved the production and the provision of raw milk in our territory, simply getting 
together as producers and establishing key agreements with main buyers. 
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6 Opinions of POs compared with those of FOs and the 
EDA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In several MSs, no or only a few POs have been established. The question arises what 
the reasons could be. The existing POs were asked to give their views, as were FOs and 
the EDA, on a set of prepared statements reflecting obstacles to starting a PO. Their 
answers contribute to addressing research objective 2: ‘Evaluate the potential for POs 
where they have not been constituted yet’. 
In this chapter, we compare the opinions provided by the three groups of respondents: 
existing POs, the EDA and FOs. The last group is assumed to have a broad overview of 
the sector and know about power relations in the value chain. Moreover, FOs are 
assumed to represent farmers’ interests and may play an important role in encouraging 
farmers to establish a PO.  
In the overviews in the next sections, opinions of POs are presented as ‘All POs’. 
Responses of the FOs are presented in several ways. Their general, overall view is 
indicated as ‘All FOs’ in the tables and figures below. Next, FO responses are classified 
according to the four categories defined in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4), in order to identify 
whether or not the opinions of the surveyed FOs differ between: 
a. MSs with and without POs; 
b. the EU15 and EUn13; 
c. MSs where a certain type of contractual arrangement predominates, namely a 
cooperative, mixed or private type (this is indicated as MS Cooperative — i.e. an MS 
where we find predominantly cooperative contractual arrangements — MS Mixed and 
MS Private); 
d. the group of Copa-Cogeca members and members of other FOs. 
In the following sections, we report on the outcomes of the survey following its structure 
(see Appendices 2 and 3 for the questionnaires). Section 6.2 addresses in how many 
organisations dairy farmers cooperate or are united. This is to get an insight into the 
level of organisation. Section 6.3 reports on the views of existing POs, FOs and EDA 
members on what may be important reasons for low numbers of POs. Section 6.4 
presents the motivation for possibly joining or establishing a PO. Finally, section 6.5 
discusses the respondents’ opinions on the terms of contracts. 
 
6.2 Cooperation between farmers and other stakeholders 
This section reports on the form of cooperation (if any) between farmers and other 
stakeholders in the milk sector. The results indicate how the sector is organised. The 
presence of different forms of FO and cooperation among them and with other actors in 
the value chain might explain farmers’ attitudes towards establishing POs. The 
assumption is that POs are more likely to be established in an MS where the sector has a 
more positive attitude towards cooperation.  
Question 2 in the FO and EDA surveys (see Appendices 2 and 3) refers to five types of 
organisations: FOs, POs, trade unions, cooperatives and milk collection organisations. 
Farmers can be members of more than one of these. Table 6.1 shows the number of 
forms of cooperation of which farmers are members according to the electronic surveys. 
The results show that EDA and (all) FO respondents count on average 3.0 and 2.4 forms 
of cooperation respectively. FO respondents in MSs with POs estimate that farmers are 
involved in a higher number of organisations than those in MS without POs. This suggests 
that in MSs with POs farmers would be more organised. Looking at FOs in MSs 
differentiated by predominant contractual arrangement, the conclusion is that the level of 
organisation seems highest in MSs with mixed contractual arrangements and lowest in 
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MSs with cooperatives dominating. The interpretation of the number of organisations is 
ambiguous, though: a high number of organisations can signal a strong interest in joining 
forces in the sector. However, it can also signal that they have few shared and common 
interests, resulting in many organisations with different focuses. Hence, a clear view on 
the link between the structure and governance of the chain and the attitude towards 
cooperation would need further analyses. 
 
Table 6.1 Average number of organisations of which farmers are members, 
mentioned by FOs respondents, by category of FOs 
Category Average number of organisations per MS 
EDA 3.0 
All FOs 2.4 
MSs with POs 2.8 
MSs without POs 1.9 
EU15 2.5 
EUn13 2.2 
MS Cooperative 1.9 
MS Private 2.5 
MS Mixed 2.6 
Copa-Cogeca 2.2 
Other FOs 2.8 
Source: Electronic survey FOs, question 2, and Electronic survey EDA, question 2. 
 
The majority of respondents most often mention cooperatives as the dominant type of 
organisation for farmers working together in the milk sector. FOs rank second (see Figure 
6.1). Differences exist between categories of MS. Respondents in MSs with POs mention 
FOs, producer groups and trade unions more often than MSs without POs. FOs in MSs 
with private contractual arrangements also mention producer groups more often than 
FOs in mixed and cooperative oriented MS.  
 
Figure 6.1 Organisations for cooperation among farmers in the milk sector  
 
Source: Electronic survey FOs, question 2, and Electronic survey FOs, question 2. Detailed information in 
Appendix 6, Table A6.1. 
 
6.3 Reasons for low number of POs 
The questionnaire lists several reasons for the low number of POs that have been 
established up to now. This section analyses the responses given by the POs, FOs and 
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EDA members. As mentioned before, the FOs will be sub-divided into four categories. 
Each reason will be discussed concisely and presented in a graph. 
 
The sector is already well organised 
Behind this statement is the thought that a ‘well-organised’ sector does not need an 
additional institution to improve the functioning of the milk and dairy market. In their 
responses to this statement, only 17% of ‘All POs’ agreed (‘largely’ and ‘fully’) which is 
quite a difference from the opinions of EDA members and ‘All FOs’, of which 44% and 
33% agreed respectively. Existing POs are apparently less confident that current 
organisations and contractual arrangements can manage the milk and dairy market in 
such a way that farmers receive cost-effective and stable prices (the major motivations 
for establishing a PO; see Section 5.4). The FOs in the EUn13 have a similar opinion to 
the POs, indicating that only 12% agree with this statement and 64% do not agree at all. 
The most positive responses came from FOs based in MSs with cooperatives: 72% agree 
largely or fully. The differences between the other FO categories are rather small. 
 
Figure 6.2 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘The sector is already 
well organised’ as a reason for not establishing a PO  
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
The respondents in the in-depth interviews (FOs) confirm the survey outcomes for this 
group, suggesting that there is no need for POs, as the agricultural sector in general and 
the milk sector in particular are well organised (IDIF). FO respondents comment that, 
given the already high level of organisation of the sector, another PO would probably 
have difficulties in finding purchasers. Still, respondents of FOs also recognise that the 
Milk Package provisions might contribute to more concentration of supply and could 
increase the bargaining power of their dairy farmers. The Milk Package is in this respect 
considered a positive policy, although not (much) applied in their countries (IDIF). 
Several FOs mentioned the presence of a processing cooperative with a large market 
share as an important factor restricting the establishment of a PO (IDIF). The latter 
suggests that the position of processing firms plays an important role in the 
establishment of a PO. This is addressed in the next statement.  
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The value chain functions properly 
This statement is confirmed by about one-third of the EDA members, with another 44% of 
the EDA respondents indicating partial agreement. The opinions of the processing industry 
contrast with FOs and POs: a significant proportion of POs and FOs respondents 
completely disagree with this statement. This is the case in both the EU15 and EUn13. 
However, note that it is especially in MSs with predominantly private and mixed contracts 
that FOs disagree with the statement that the value chains functions well. 
 
Figure 6.3 Opinions on the statement ‘The supply chain is already functioning 
properly’ as a reason for not establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
Insufficient organisation in the sector 
This reason for not having established a PO is more or less the opposite of the first 
statement discussed. Insufficient organisation of the sector would imply that farmers do 
not see the benefit of working together, and consider other farmers more competitors 
than a group having similar interests to their own which can be better defended by 
working together. This statement claims that, because of the weak organisation of the 
sector, it would be difficult to establish POs. One would expect answers that are consistent 
with how respondents reacted to the statement that the sector is well organised. 
However, some divergences in the responses can be found for EDA members, FOs in the 
EU15 and respondents in cooperative-oriented MSs. More respondents disagree with the 
reason ‘insufficient organisation’ than agree with the reason ‘well organised’ for not having 
established a PO. Overall, however, the respondents answered fairly consistently to both 
statements. 
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Figure 6.4 Opinions on the statement ‘Insufficient organisation in the sector’ as 
a reason for not establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
According to an Italian FO, better organisation between producers and trade unions is 
needed to encourage aggregation of supply and thereby ensure better and stable prices. 
This FO also suggests that the experiences of the fruit and vegetable sector should be 
used as a successful example (IDIF). 
 
Benefits of PO do not outweigh the costs 
Establishing, registering and managing a PO imply costs. The majority of the respondents 
of all three groups surveyed do not agree with this statement, indicating that they 
acknowledge the benefits of starting a PO despite the initial investments and operating 
costs. 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
All POs
EDA
All FOs
MS with POs
MS without POs
EU15
EUn13
MS Cooperative
MS Private
MS Mixed
Copa-Cogeca
Other FOs
F
a
rm
e
r 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
% of respondents in category
N.A. Not at all Partly Largely Fully
65 
Figure 6.5 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘The benefits to 
participate in a PO will not outweigh the costs’ as a reason for not establishing 
a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
Insufficient willingness to cooperate 
If farmers do not have a positive attitude towards cooperation in general, it might be 
difficult to get them to be enthusiastic about creating a PO. Only a small proportion of 
the interviewees answered that they do not agree at all with the statement (Figure 6.6). 
To put it differently: the majority of those who answered agree partly, largely or fully 
with this statement and find that insufficient willingness to cooperate is an important 
obstacle to starting up a PO. The EDA and MS Cooperative respondents have a slightly 
different opinion, indicating that they estimate that farmers’ unwillingness to cooperate is 
only partly a reason why few or no POs are established.  
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Figure 6.6 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Insufficient willingness 
of farmers to cooperate’ as a reason for not establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
The survey shows that respondents from the EUn13 agree with this statement. This is 
confirmed by several open interviews in this region. For instance, the interviewed 
Bulgarian FO stated that the farmers in its country are problematic team players with 
little willingness to cooperate. The intervention of an FO that is very proactive in 
explaining the benefits of a PO may contribute to a more cooperative attitude among 
farmers (IDIF). Respondents from Lithuania and Poland also highlight unwillingness to 
cooperate as an important obstacle to setting up POs in their countries (IDIF). Several 
FOs support the opinion that establishing well-functioning POs needs significant support 
from third parties, other than farmers (IDIF). 
 
Farmers prefer direct contact with purchasers 
The background of this statement is that farmers would prefer to directly negotiate with 
milk processors in order to get the best deal. Delegating the contractual and delivery 
arrangements to a PO might lead to a focus on the ‘average’, which leaves the best-
performing dairy farmers dissatisfied. Therefore, farmers would prefer individual and 
direct contact with purchasers of their milk in order to be remunerated for the quality of 
their milk.  
This reason for not needing to establish a PO is hard to evaluate, as a significant 
proportion (68% N.A.) did not express their opinion (see Figure 6.7). Some remarkable 
difference between the three groups can be observed, If we correct the data for the non-
responses and will analyse only the completed answers. Then, over 50% of the EDA 
respondents (50% of the six remaining observations) and ‘All FOs’ (56% of 18 
observations) agree fully or largely with this statement as a reason for not establishing 
POs. On the other hand, 70% (of 35 observations) of ‘All POs’ disagree with this 
statement and in fact argue that collective arrangements with purchasers are preferred 
to individual contacts.  
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Figure 6.7 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Farmers prefer to have 
direct contact with purchasers’ as a reason for not establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
Insufficient information and training 
Many farmers would not know about the option of establishing a PO and the possible 
benefits a PO may provide. This statement addresses to what extent the ‘lack of 
information’ is an obstacle to starting a PO.  
 
Figure 6.8 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Insufficient information 
and training’ as a reason for not establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
With a score of 40-42%, both PO and FO respondents agree (largely and/or fully) with 
the statement that insufficient information to and training of farmers is hindering the 
establishment of (more) POs (see Figure 6.8). A slightly higher level of agreement with 
this statement can be observed in MSs with POs, the EU15, MS Mixed, MS Private and 
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the ‘Other FOs’. Note that the EDA members included in the survey do not find that a 
lack of information and training is an important reason for not having started a PO. 
 
Lack of success stories 
Dairy farmers may want to have a successful example to convince them that starting a 
PO would be beneficial for them. The lack of success stories, then, could be an important 
reason for not having established a PO. According to the majority of the respondents of 
‘All POs’ and of ‘All FOs’, this is indeed the case. FOs in the EUn13 and in MSs with 
predominantly private contracts agree with this statement even more than FOs overall. 
Dairy processors have a different opinion (although a third of the interviewees did not 
answer the question), indicating a balanced view; half of those dairy processors who 
answered the question estimate that a lack of success stories is an important factor 
explaining why there are little POs, whereas the other half disagreed with this statement.  
A Lithuanian FO suggested presenting the advantages of POs with success stories from 
other MSs (IDIF). 
 
Figure 6.9 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Lack of success stories’ 
as a reason for not establishing a PO 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
Recent milk price developments do not encourage cooperation 
This statement aims to test if there is a link between the recent milk price developments 
— which show considerable fluctuation — and the role of a PO in obtaining better and 
more stable prices. The assumption is that, in periods of high prices, farmers have no 
incentive to form a PO because they are satisfied with the current situation, whereas, in 
periods of low prices, the bargaining power of farmers is limited by a surplus of supply, 
and a PO might not be able to arrange better prices with milk processors. Basically, a 
perceived ‘too high’ or ‘too low’ milk price in comparison with a long-term market 
equilibrium price is an obstacle to starting a PO. 
In the responses to the statement, differences exist between the three types of 
organisations analysed. Only 11% of EDA respondents agree (largely or fully) with this 
statement, against 37% of ‘All POs’ and 51% of ‘All FOs’ (see Figure 6.10). Especially FOs 
in the EUn13 (76%) and in private-oriented and mixed MSs (55% and 68% respectively) 
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support this statement. The opinions of FOs in cooperative-oriented MSs are rather similar 
to those of the EDA members. 
The responses to this statement would need further discussion and clarification in order to 
understand what the respondents really mean. For instance, do they consider recent milk 
price levels too low compared with a long-term trend, and find that milk processors exert 
market power? Unfortunately, the survey does not provide further the background 
information that would be necessary for a useful evaluation of the responses. 
 
Figure 6.10 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Recent milk price 
evolution does not encourage cooperation among farmers’ 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
 
Conclusions on reasons why few or no POs are established in some MSs 
Possible obstacles to establishing a PO are reported in the paragraphs above. The survey 
responses do not seem to support the statements that (assumed) strong organisation of 
the sector and properly functioning value chains are important reasons for not creating a 
PO. The statement that ‘Benefits of POs do not outweigh the costs’ and hence would be 
an important reason for not creating a PO is endorsed by many FOs, but not by POs, 
indicating that the currently existing POs are convinced that starting a PO is financially 
beneficial although it requires some initial investments and operating costs. POs and FOs, 
however, do agree that insufficient willingness to cooperate, insufficient information and 
training, and lack of success stories are important obstacles to starting POs. Next, FOs 
have a rather strong view on the impacts of recent milk price developments as a reason 
for farmers not to engage in POs. This last reason, though, would need further 
clarification for an interpretation of the statement to be possible. 
The reporting of the FO respondents classifies FOs in several subcategories. A question is 
whether or not these subcategories provide insights showing systematic differences in 
answers between categories. In Appendix 6, Figure A6.1, the statements are presented 
by category. Overall, no systematic divergences between groups can be distinguished. In 
other words, no specific category answers most statements in a similar way that is 
distinctive from the answers of other categories.  
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6.4 Motivations to join or establish a PO 
This section analyses the reasons for joining a PO. The questions in the surveys of the 
POs and FOs on the one hand and the EDA on the other hand are slightly different, which 
makes comparing results somewhat complicated. Moreover, POs had to rank the reason 
with a priority and FOs and EDA had to indicate their extent of agreement with the 
statement. In order to allow comparison, we translated priority 1 (highest) as ‘fully’, 2 as 
‘largely’, 3 as ‘partly’ and the remainder as ‘not at all’ important. For EDA members, we 
used the same ranking as for FOs; however, some questions were different, as the 
interests of EDA members in the value chain are different from those of POs and FOs. 
 
Getting ‘better’ prices or lower costs 
‘Better’ prices depend on whether you are a seller or buyer. A better price for farmers 
(sellers) is interpreted as a higher price. For members of EDA (buyers), we asked about 
cost reduction as a motive for doing business with POs: lower costs for EDA members are 
interpreted as lower raw milk prices or reduced costs of procuring raw materials. 
 
Figure 6.11 Opinions of organisations on the statement on ‘Getting better 
prices’ for farmers and ‘Reduce cost’ for EDA 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
The surveys show two noteworthy results: 
1. The opinions of ‘All POs’ largely match those of ‘All FOs’, indicating that on average 
80% of these organisations have the opinion that better prices for their farmers are an 
important motivation for starting a PO. 
2. Over two-thirds of EDA members do not consider that reducing costs for the 
purchaser/processor is a major motivation of doing business with POs, and only 12% 
agrees with the statement. This means that the purchasers and processors do not 
have the opinion that working with POs contributes to reducing their costs. 
 
Stable prices 
Stable prices give farmers and processors some certainty on the returns and costs and 
hence can improve their production decisions. The responses to the question about 
whether or not stable prices are an important motivation for establishing a PO differs 
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among the three groups. Almost 46% of ‘All POs’ consider this important, while no EDA 
members agree fully or largely that it is important. In contrast, an overwhelming majority 
(86%) of ‘All FOs’ value stable prices as important. The opinions of categories of MSs 
differ little, with a majority of FOs supporting the statement. 
 
Figure 6.12 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Get more stable prices’ 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Assurance of milk collection and delivery 
Where farmers have the assurance that milk will be collected, processors have the 
guarantee that they will be delivered the raw materials they want. The surveys show that 
40% of ‘All POs’ and EDA members consider assuring milk collection and delivery an 
important reason for starting a PO (ranks 1 and 2, i.e. largely and fully). FOs in MSs 
without POs and cooperative-oriented MSs have similar scores, but generally FOs are 
more supportive of this statement than POs.  
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Figure 6.13 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Assure that milk of all 
members will be collected’ for producers or ‘Assurance of raw milk supply’ for 
processors 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Market information for production or processing decisions  
Market information is an important (rank 1 or 2) motivation for joining a PO for 22% of 
‘All POs’, far below the level of importance attributed to it by the FOs (63%). A similar 
percentage of the EDA members indicate that information is important for doing business 
with POs. One should take into account that better market information applies to their 
own enterprises for farmers and processors. The differences in valuation might be 
because members of POs and EDA have already access to market information: POs 
because they negotiate in the market, and EDA members for the same reason and also 
because they are further downstream in the value chain. 
Differences between the categories of country selections are also visible: MSs with POs 
(79%), private-oriented MSs (73%) and ‘Other FOs’ (79%) agree largely or fully with the 
statement that better market information is a reason for joining a PO. 
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Figure 6.14 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Better market 
information for taking production decisions’ for farmers or ‘ Better 
production/market information for taking processing decisions’ for the EDA 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Overall enhancement of producer position in the value chain 
The majority of ‘All FOs’ (70%) support the statement that the enhancement of the 
producer’s position in the supply chain is an important objective for joining a PO; this 
percentage is higher than the score for ‘All POs’ (52%). In the questionnaire for EDA 
members, we asked if enhancement of the processors’ position in value chains is a reason 
for ‘doing business with POs’; no respondents agreed with this statement. 
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Figure 6.15 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Overall enhancement of 
producers’ position in the supply chain’ for producers or ‘Overall enhancement 
of purchasers’/processors’ position in the supply chain’ for the EDA 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Some difference between the orientations of MS can be observed: compared with 70% of 
all FOs, only 61% of those in MSs without POs, 63% in the EU15 and 61% in cooperative-
oriented MSs have the opinion that joining a PO enhances a producer’s position in the 
value chain. 
One interviewed PO is negative about the impact of the Milk Package, stating that ‘we 
wanted to have better conditions for farmers, but now we only serve the processor and 
not the farmers’. The low bargaining power is perceived as troublesome. In Bulgaria, milk 
processors even establish farms, according to the FO respondent (IDIF). 
 
Communication among farmers or between farmers and purchasers 
Better communication as a motivation for establishing a PO is valued low by ‘All POs’ 
(22%). Maybe this is the result of their view that existing communication is already good. 
Over 40% of ‘All FOs’ agree with this motivation. FOs in MSs oriented towards private 
contractual arrangements indicate this as an important motive for joining a PO (73%). 
Communication between farmers and purchasers is indicated as important by one-third of 
the EDA members. 
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Figure 6.16 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Better communication 
among farmers’ for producers or ‘Better communication between farmers and 
purchasers/processors’ for the EDA 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
One interviewed FO emphasised the need for continuous improvement of milk quality and 
of production methods, to meet societal concerns such as climate change, energy 
consumption, biodiversity and animal health. The FO promotes a code of conduct that has 
to be obligatory for the whole sector after being tested in practice (IDIF). 
Another interviewed FO mentioned that strengthening the relationship between producers 
and processors is a motive for joining a PO. Well-informed and educated farmers are able 
to negotiate and understand the market requirements. Such farmers use the PO as a 
vehicle for improving their own and the processors’ positions (IDIF).  
 
Getting price discounts on inputs 
A comparison between the responses by ‘All POs’ and by ‘All FOs’ is hard to make, as two-
thirds of the ‘All POs’ did not fill in the question on getting price discounts on inputs. It 
could be that this topic is considered unimportant. The in-depth interviews indicate that 
focus is necessary and that suppliers compete with each other and are considered 
competent; hence, there is no need for a PO to actively intervene (IDIP). FOs in MSs 
oriented towards private contractual arrangements (73%) and in the EUn13 (60%) 
attribute more significance to price discounts of inputs than FOs in all MSs (42%). The 
EDA’s opinion was asked on whether or not ‘Better quality of the raw milk’ is a motive for 
working with POs; only one respondent out of nine agrees (Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6). 
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Figure 6.17 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Price discount by 
collective purchase of means of production’ 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, and Electronic survey FOs, question 5. Detailed information in 
Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Efficient use of means of production 
The POs survey is hard to compare with the results from the FOs questionnaire, as only 
one-third of the POs provided their opinion about this motive. Most likely, it is not one of 
their priorities, as those POs who provided their opinion also indicate. The EDA was asked 
for an opinion on the reason ‘More efficient milk collection’. None of the respondents 
agreed largely or fully (Electronic survey EDA, question 6). 
Out of the FOs, one-third agree largely or fully that making an efficient use of means of 
production is an important reason for joining a PO. In MSs with predominantly private 
contractual arrangements, that proportion is even 64%. 
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Figure 6.18 Opinions of organisations on the statement ‘Efficient use of means 
of production’ 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, and Electronic survey FOs, question 5. Detailed information in 
Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Establishment of a cooperative and more integration in the value chain 
Establishing a cooperative is not a focus of POs: 79% did not provide an answer. EDA 
members do not indicate doing business with POs as a step for more chain integration. 
Large proportions of FOs in the EUn13 (48%) and in MSs with predominantly private 
contractual arrangements (55%) agree fully or largely that a PO is an interim step for 
establishing a cooperative. The proportion is 23% in ‘All FOs’. 
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Figure 6.19 Opinions of organisations on the statement that a PO is an ‘Interim 
step for further constitution of a cooperative’ for POs, ‘Interim step for further 
establishment of a cooperative’ for FOs or ‘Interim step for more integration in 
the chain’ for the EDA 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
 
Conclusions 
A great majority of POs and FOs are of the opinion that better and more stable prices are 
important motivations for starting a PO. Over two-thirds of EDA members do not consider 
that reducing costs for the purchaser/processor is a major motivation for purchasing milk 
from POs, and none of the EDA members values finds ‘more stable prices’ for raw milk an 
important reason for having POs. Next, assuring milk collection and delivery are also 
important motivations for starting a PO according to POs and FOs, whereas it is mainly the 
FOs that take the view that access to (better) market information is an important 
motivation for joining a PO; POs and the EDA members do not support this view. Both FOs 
and POs indicate that enhancing the milk producer’s position in the supply chain is an 
important objective for joining a PO. POs do not consider getting price discounts on inputs 
or using means of production more efficiently important drivers of joining POs, but FOs 
indicate that these aspects may play a role.  
FOs are classified in several subcategories. A question is whether or not these 
subcategories provide insights showing systematic differences in answers between 
categories. In Appendix 6, Figure A6.1, the statements are presented by category. 
Overall, no systematic divergences between groups can be distinguished: it depends on 
the specific statement. 
 
6.5 Contracts 
This section reports on three questions with regard to contracts. The first two ask if the 
use of written contracts is common and, if so, whether the written contract is concluded 
in advance or not. The third question asks what terms are covered in contracts. This 
information is based on the views of FOs and the EDA. Of course, POs and not these 
organisations conclude contracts, but we consider that the views expressed reflect the 
observed practice in these countries.  
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With regard to the question whether written contracts are common, 39 out of 57 
respondents indicate that written contracts are common and 40 out of 57 FOs 
,respondents indicate a written contract is concluded in advance. Nevertheless, 49 FOs 
instead of 40 specified the terms that the contract covers, meaning that nine FOs did not 
conclude contracts in advance. The respondents indicated that on average 91% of the 
raw milk is delivered under contract conditions. Relatively low proportions — between 
40% and 65% of the milk delivered — are sold under contract in Bulgaria, Spain, Croatia, 
Italy and Romania. However, we have only one observation for each country (Electronic 
survey FOs). 
Eight out nine EDA members indicated that a written contract is concluded in advance for 
on average 87% of the milk deliveries (Electronic survey EDA). This proportion is close to 
the 91% mentioned by the FOs. 
Figure 6.20 depicts the terms covered by contracts for both FOs and the EDA. The 
surveyed FOs indicated that on average 4.5 terms are covered; the EDA average is 6.1. 
Quality and payment conditions are covered according to 94% (FOs) and 100% (EDA). 
Duration of the contract is covered according to 90% of the FOs and 75% of the EDA 
members. Quantity (63-82%) and price (69-75%) are also often covered in the contract.  
Overall, ‘All FOs’ and EDA have almost identical opinions on the terms covered in 
contracts. An exception is the low importance of ‘providing technical or economic advice’ 
for the FOs, whereas 50% of the EDA members find this important. Joint purchasing of 
inputs is not seen as an important element that should be covered by contract (Electronic 
survey FOs and Electronic survey EDA). 
 
Figure 6.20 Terms of contract covered (% of respondents) 
 
Source: Electronic survey FOs, question 9, and Electronic survey EDA, question 9. Detailed information in 
Appendix 6, Table A6.4. 
Note: 49 FO respondents and 8 EDA respondents. 
 
Some differences between the answers provided by the distinguished categories of MSs or 
FOs exist, even if at first sight the differences between the EDA and FOs are small. Figure 
6.21 presents the terms that at least 20 FOs indicated as important.  
The observed differences are: 
1. FOs in MSs with POs mention the following more often than FOs in MSs without POs: 
quality of milk, deliveries in specific periods and contract duration. They mention 
price less often. This suggests that the first group of items are important aspects of 
the cooperation between producers and processors. 
2. FOs in the EU15 mention the following more often than those in the EUn13: quality, 
deliveries in specific periods and duration of contract. Price, payment conditions and 
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delivery quantity are mentioned less often. More product specificity seems important 
in the EU15 compared with more basic contractual terms. The EU15 resembles MSs 
with POs in this regard. 
3. FOs in MSs with cooperative contract arrangements mention contract terms less often 
overall. On the other hand, FOs in MSs with private contract arrangement mention 
specific contract terms more often, such as price (twice as often as FOs in MSs with 
predominantly cooperative contract arrangements), quality, payment conditions and 
contract duration. 
4. The difference in mentioning a contract term between members of Copa-Cogeca and 
other FOs is small: Copa-Cogeca members more often (80%) mention price than 
other FOs (43%). 
 
Figure 6.21 Terms of contract, mentioned by at least 20 FOs, covered (% of 
respondents for categories of MSs or FOs) 
 
Source: Electronic survey FOs, question 9, and Electronic survey EDA, question 9. Detailed information in 
Appendix 6, Table A6.4. 
Note: % respondents that filled in contracts terms 
 
Processors are not obliged to implement bonus schemes and/or quality premiums. Some 
Bulgarian processors provide small bonuses, sufficient to encourage farmers. Contracts 
are valued positively; they provide transparency and stability and guarantee milk 
collection. In France, one respondent argued that no competition exist, as only one 
contract is available or nothing (IDIF). 
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7 Assessing the functioning of the Milk Package 
provisions  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the assessment of the functioning of the Milk Package provisions 
with respect to POs in the milk and milk product sector. Results from the surveys and in-
depth interviews among POs, FOs and the EDA, which were presented in the previous 
two chapters, are brought together and, based on the evaluation of them, responses to 
the research objectives are drafted. Furthermore, references to literature will be added 
as a base for reflection on the findings. Note that the nature of this chapter (evaluating 
survey results) leads to some overlap with the previous two chapters; some repetition, 
however, cannot be avoided in making arguments and drawing conclusions.  
Chapter 7 is structured as follows. Sections 7.2-7.5 focus on the first research objective 
(evaluate the functioning of existing POs and APOs formally recognised under the Milk 
Package; see also Chapter 1). This evaluation of the first research objective is 
decomposed into an assessment of the requirements and an assessment of the 
objectives of POs. Section 7.2 reports the findings, conclusions and recommendations 
with respect to the three requirements defined (producer initiative, maximum volume 
and minimal size criteria). Section 7.3 discusses the assessment of the functioning of POs 
with respect to the objective ‘ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to 
demand’ (quality, quantity). Section 7.4 presents the assessment of the functioning of 
POs with respect to the objective ‘concentration of supply and the placing on the market 
of the products produced by its members’. In Section 7.5 is discussed to what extent POs 
contribute to the objective ‘optimising production costs and stabilising producer prices’. 
The second research question (evaluate the potential for POs where they have not been 
constituted yet) will be dealt with in Section 7.6. Note that the drafting of 
recommendations (the third research objective) is left out at the request of the client. 
 
7.2 Requirements included in the Milk Package provisions 
POs should be formed on the initiative of the producers 
According to the legislation, a first requirement that POs recognised under the Milk 
Package shall satisfy (see Article 152 of Regulation EU1308/2013) is that ‘Member States 
shall recognise producer organisations, constituted by producers in the milk and milk 
products sector, which: (a) are formed on the initiative of the producers’. 
We interpret the requirement that POs should be initiated by dairy farmers as a 
safeguard to ensure that POs under the Milk Package shall promote the interests of their 
farmer members to the maximum extent possible and shall not incline to the interests of 
other stakeholders in the value chain. 
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Evidence 
 
Table 7.1 Summary of results found on initiation of POs 
Information source/survey 
question 
Summary of the information 
Who initiated the PO? As shown in Section 5.2, farmers have established 62% (39 
out of 63) of the POs included in the survey.  
Trade unions (being representatives of farmers or 
producers) were involved in establishing 17% (11 out of 63) 
of the POs considered in the analysis.  
One-fifth of all POs in the sample were established by 
another organisation, such as a processor or a milk-
collecting organisation. 
 
Assessment 
The survey results reveal that 62% (39 out of 63) of the POs included in the survey were 
established by dairy farmers. This means that 24 of the 63 POs (38%) were created by 
other organisations.  
As the results of the survey indicate, 17% of the respondent POs indicate that they were 
initiated by a trade union or FO. These results are highly affected by the survey results 
from Germany, where trade unions are considered to represent farmers’ interests. 
Hence, it can be argued that the interests of dairy farmers and their trade unions run in 
parallel. Following this reasoning, we could claim that initiation by or ‘assistance’ from 
trade unions does not necessarily introduce a bias against the interest of the dairy 
producers. 
About 20% of the POs (13 out of 63) were initiated by other organisations, such as a 
processor or a milk-collecting organisation. In these cases, one may claim that the 
interests of the PO members are not central. There are obvious reasons why the interests 
of the dairy farmers and the other organisation could be in conflict, such as dairy farmers 
having an interest in a high milk price and dairy processors preferring low prices. On the 
other hand, dairy farmers and processors may also find shared interests in pursuing 
some of the objectives mentioned in the Milk Package of the CMO. Examples are the 
concerns that supply should adjust to demand, the value chain should strive for high-
quality products and resource use should be optimised. Given this, it may very well be 
possible that POs established by other organisations than dairy farmers can successfully 
achieve one of the objectives of the Milk Package. Therefore, whether or not the 
involvement of an organisation that is not a trade or farmers’ union could hinder the 
functioning of the PO will depend on the specific case, that is, which specific objective the 
PO finds most important and how this is achieved.  
When other parties than milk producers initiate a PO, it is important to have insight into 
the governance structure of the PO. If the initiating body is also involved in the 
governance of the PO after its start, its interests are expected to be represented in the 
PO management structure too. If a third organisation (e.g. a trade union or FO) initiates 
a PO, but lets the dairy producer members be the managers, there is no reason to expect 
that such a PO would defend farmers’ interests less than POs initiated by farmers. Our 
survey results show that respondents find that initiating a PO involves significant start-up 
costs and requires organisational capacity, which can be a barrier to entry. Other 
organisations that have the organisational capacity could play a facilitating role during 
the start-up phase of a PO, providing help and assistance with knowledge and services. 
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Again, whether the involvement of third organisations hampers the functioning of POs or 
not will depend on the specific case at stake.  
The in-depth interviews confirmed the problems that dairy farmers face in establishing a 
PO and the administrative burden associated with this. Negotiating with the authorities 
and complying with the Regulation were also sometimes indicated to be difficult hurdles 
to take when establishing a PO (Sections 5.2 and 6.2). In addition, farmers indicated that 
some FOs also continue to support the PO after it has been created, for instance with 
administration services. These types of findings are in line with Brusselaers et al. (2014), 
who show that many countries in Europe provide support for setting up (agricultural) 
cooperatives.  
Conclusion 
The requirement that POs recognised under the Milk Package should be initiated by 
producers is not met in about 40% of the cases that were present in the sample. In 20% 
of the cases (13 out of 63), the PO was established by another organisation, such as a 
processor or a milk-collecting organisation, potentially leading to conflicts of interest 
between dairy producers and the initiating organisation. Conflicting interest are most 
likely to hindering the PO from achieving one or more of the Milk Package objectives, but 
the survey does not provide evidence that the objectives of the regulation are not 
achieved because of conflicting interests. 
 
Restriction on volume of raw milk covered by contractual negotiations 
Another set of requirements that POs recognised under the Milk Package should meet 
concerns the maximum volume of raw milk covered by collective negotiations on behalf 
of the farmers. These requirements specify that (Article 149 of Regulation EU 
1308/2013): 
1. the volume of raw milk covered by such negotiations does not exceed 3.5% of total 
Union production,  
2. the volume of raw milk covered by such negotiations which is produced in any 
particular Member State does not exceed 33% of the total national production of that 
Member State, and 
the volume of raw milk covered by such negotiations which is delivered in any 
particular Member State does not exceed 33% of the total national production of that 
Member State. 
Evidence 
Table 7.2 summarises the survey results found from the POs included in the study with 
respect to the volume of milk they represent; see column ‘Maximum marketable milk 
production of surveyed POs’. The volume of milk delivered under collective negotiations 
(see column ‘Maximum deliveries under collective negotiations’) is also presented. Note 
that this amount can be less than the total amount of milk produced by the POs, since 
not all POs deliver their milk under collective negotiations. The table also specifies the 
maximum amount of raw milk that is allowed to be covered by collective negotiations, 
following the criteria of the legislation and taking into account EU and MS milk 
productions as realised in 2015 (see column ‘Maximum amount of milk per MS that can 
be covered by collective negotiation’). 
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Table 7.2 Cow milk production, maximum amount per PO, observed maximum 
marketable production and observed maximum deliveries under contract (in 
1,000 tonnes) 
MS 
Cow milk production 
2015 per MSa 
Maximum milk 
production per MS 
that can be covered 
by collective 
negotiationb 
Maximum 
marketable milk 
production of 
surveyed POs in 
2015c 
Maximum deliveries 
under collective 
negotiations of 
surveyed POs in 
2015d 
DE 32,381 5,594 750 219 
FR 25,800 5,594 317 30 
IT 11,500 3,795 199 140 
ES 6,780 2,237 517 240 
BE 3,710 1,224 1,250 N.A. 
RO 4,101 1,353 79 79 
BG 1,103 364 4 4 
HR 712 235 16 N.A. 
UK 15,088 4,979 1,613 796 
CZ 2,994 988 900 476 
PT 2,000 660 N.A. N.A. 
EU 159,825  
 
 
a Source: Commission Communication (1) (2016/C 125/02). 
b Maximum amount is the lower of 3.5% of EU production and 33% of the MS deliveries (double ceiling); see 
Article 149 of Regulation EU 1308/2013. 
c Source: Electronic survey POs, question 7. 
d Source: Electronic survey POs, question 21. It has to be noted that the majority of the answers are N.A. 
 
Assessment 
Note that from the legislation it follows that the maximum amount of raw milk delivered 
under collective negotiations per PO is the lower of 3.5% of the EU production and 33% 
of the MS production (double ceiling). The criterion of a maximum proportion of 3.5% of 
EU milk production is relevant for EU MSs with a large dairy production, notably Germany 
and France. For all other EU28 MSs represented in Table 7.1, the maximum proportion of 
33% of domestic production is the effectively restricting criterion.  
Table 7.2 shows that the (only) PO in Belgium (included in the survey) could market a 
production level that exceeds the maximum amount allowed according to the criteria. 
What counts is the volume collectively negotiated and delivered. Whether or not this 
latter volume is below the country ceiling cannot be checked, as the information on the 
volume delivered was not provided by the survey respondent. 
Conclusion 
The requirements in the legislation restricting the maximum volume of raw milk covered 
by contractual negotiations have been met for all the cases analysed. Given this, there is 
no evidence that the maximum requirements are constraining POs from exercising their 
bargaining power.  
 
Minimum criteria set by MSs 
Another requirement that POs recognised under the Milk Package should satisfy is to 
meet the minimum criteria set by the MSs (see Article 161 of Regulation EU1308/2013).  
Here MSs have the freedom to make their own choice. They may define a minimum 
condition in terms of a minimum number of members, a minimum volume of marketable 
production or a combination of the two.  
Evidence 
Table 7.3 provides the evidence found from the analysis. It provides the minimum 
criteria by MS and shows how this compares to the POs that are analysed. 
85 
 
Table 7.3 The minimum criteria as defined by the MSs and observed values in 
the survey 
MS 
Criterion: 
minimum number 
of farmers 
Lowest number of 
members of 
surveyed POs 
Minimum 
marketable 
production (1 000 
tonnes)a 
Lowest marketed 
production of 
surveyed POs (1,000 
tonnes)a 
DE 5 14 –c  
FR 200 65 Or 60 29b 
IT 5 28 3 14 
ES –  200 240b 
BE 40/20 64 –  
RO 5 114 0.035 79 
BG 5 8 –  
HR 7 26 3 4 
UK 10 1,050 6 1,613 
CZ 10 42 –  
PT 12 N.A.   
Sources: EC (2016) and Electronic survey POs. 
a Cumulative with the requirement for number of farmers, unless indicated otherwise. 
b In France and Spain, one PO in each country indicates a lower amount of marketable milk: on average below 1 
tonne per member. These observations are not included in this table, as such low volumes seem to be not 
realistic. We cannot check this with the source, as the electronic survey was filled in anonymously.  
c ’-‘ not a criterion, if not a criterion observed value will be not mentioned (blanc) 
 
Table 7.3 (as well as Table 3.1) shows there is a considerable variation in the minimum 
criteria specified by the MSs. In 8 out of the 11 MSs where POs responded to the survey, 
the number of farmers needed to start a PO was 12 or fewer. For Belgium, the number is 
40 in Flanders or 20 in Wallonia. In France, POs should have at least 200 farmers, which 
is out of line with the other MSs. In addition, with respect to the minimum marketable 
production a PO should have, France has a high minimum requirement, namely 60,000 
tonnes, and Spain’s is even higher. Based on the figures in Section 2.2, a specialist dairy 
farm in France produces 356 tonnes and one in Spain produces 339 tonnes. Given the 
minimum marketable production required, in France around 170 specialist dairy farmers 
could combine to supply that amount and in Spain a PO would require 590 specialist 
dairy farmers. In both countries, the numbers of specialist dairy farmers required to 
establish a PO are rather high, although in France specific legislation for PDO/PGI refers 
to lower requirements. Given the relative high minimum criteria applied in Spain and that 
it is often more difficult to organise a large group of farmers than a small one (organising 
large groups may imply more transaction costs than small groups), these minimum 
criteria in Spain could possibly act as a barrier to creating POs. Table 7.3 also shows that 
in Spain one PO did not reach the minimum marketable production of 200,000 tonnes. 
This suggests that the minimum criteria are not strictly enforced in this MSs. 
The UK is a special example, as the amount of milk delivery of the only PO in the UK that 
was included in the survey exceeded the minimum volume required (6,000 tonnes) by far 
and is even higher than the minimum requirements in France and Spain. This example 
shows that a PO could deliver an amount equal to the requirement set in France and/or 
Spain, but, taking into account the average size in many (other) countries, no POs would 
be established if the requirements for France or Spain applied throughout the EU. 
Assessment 
In the 11 MS with established POs, the minimum criteria are generally rather low, except 
for France and Spain, where the minimum number of members of a PO (France) or the 
minimum marketable production of the PO (Spain) is relatively high. Creating large POs 
satisfying relative high minimum criteria, such as apply in Spain and France, is not 
impossible (see evidence from the UK), but realising this solely by farmers’ initiative is 
likely to be difficult, as it requires considerable organisational skills and capacity. 
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Conclusion 
The criteria for recognising a PO differ significantly between MSs, in terms of both the 
minimum number of members (between 5 and 200) and the minimum marketable 
production (between 35 tonnes and 200,000 tonnes) required. This wide range is difficult 
to justify on the basis of only structural differences between MSs. MSs that define high 
minimum size requirements seem to favour large-scale POs. From studies on POs in 
other agricultural sectors, it is known that collective action organisations such as POs 
often start as small organisations because trust has to build up and experience needs to 
be gained (Bijman, 2015; Bijman et al., 2012). High minimum criteria can operate as a 
barrier to starting a PO, even though they may not be the only factor explaining small 
numbers of POs. 
 
7.3 Objective 1: production is planned and adjusted to demand 
In this and the following two sections, we discuss to what extent POs contribute to the 
three key objectives of the Milk Package regulation. In order to assess the performance 
of a PO with respect to each of the three objectives, it should be emphasised that POs 
have indicated that they do not always pursue each of the three objectives in the same 
way: POs sometimes evaluate the importance of the Milk Package regulation differently. 
If a PO in the survey indicates an objective to be important, we interpret this as the 
objective the PO pursues. The degree to which the PO thinks the objective is realised 
provides a proxy of the performance of the PO in this respect. 
The first objective to be discussed is the first specific aim mentioned in the Regulation: 
‘(i) ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of 
quality and quantity’. 
The survey did not include a question addressing to what extent this objective was 
achieved. Therefore, we deduce from the answers to the survey questions those that 
may indicate that establishing the PO has contributed to improved matching of 
production and demand, in terms of both quantity and quality. For this, we need to link 
relevant survey questions to this objective; that is, to identify which questions — or parts 
of questions — may give insights into how far the objective has been achieved by the PO. 
We use the following reasoning for linking survey questions to this Milk Package 
objective. 
Reasoning 
In order to match supply and demand, coordination is necessary between the supplier — 
in this case the milk producer — and the user/purchaser — the milk processor. 
Coordination includes information exchange on supply and demand volumes between the 
two actors, and the market price that results. The PO, as a representative of the milk 
producer, may focus on this information exchange and use the market information in 
negotiating with the dairy industry on volumes to be delivered and prices. The more 
farmers, and hence the greater the volume of production, a PO represents, the better 
supply and demand can be coordinated, in terms of both quantities and milk quality. At 
the same time, a dairy processor would prefer to make arrangements with a small 
number of suppliers rather than with many, in order to reduce transaction costs with its 
suppliers. Given this reasoning of how POs could contribute to improved matching of 
supply and demand, survey questions on market information, contractual negotiations 
and size (i.e. marketable milk production) may help to draw conclusions on how POs 
contribute to this aim of the Regulation.  
Evidence and assessment 
First, we look at the motivations of the established POs. Section 5.4 has shown that POs’ 
main motivations are to obtain better and/or more stable prices. Only about one-fifth of 
the POs indicate that ‘Better market information for taking production decisions’ has been 
an important motive for the PO, with POs in Italy and Spain indicating a relatively high 
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priority for this reason to start a PO. Two-thirds of the POs that indicated this as 
important for them were satisfied with the extent to which this objective was realised 
(see Figure 5.7).  
Second, survey results indicate that PO negotiation activities focus on prices, payment 
conditions and delivery volumes (Section 5.5). In addition, over 70% of all respondent 
POs claim that the contracts negotiated are binding on all members. In most cases 
(65%), the contracts include a fixed proportion of production to be delivered. This holds 
especially for Germany and France. At the same time, a significant number of POs (30%) 
observed that producers negotiated and concluded individual contracts without 
interference by the PO, especially in Spain. The survey results also indicate that quality is 
not a big issue in the contractual negotiations for most of the POs, although it is an 
important criterion for becoming a PO member (Section 5.7), and is of course part of 
contracts (Section 6.4). Note that, in Italy, POs indicate that quality (more specifically: 
quality control) has their major attention, which may suggest that quality is considered a 
key attribute of the produce to balance the market. The surveys also indicate that 
especially in some of the new MSs (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania) POs can play an important 
role in improving the quality of milk produced by including quality issues in their 
negotiation strategies (price premiums for higher-quality milk). 
Third, the sizes of POs are very different both within and between MSs, and the total 
volumes delivered under negotiation contracts also differ quite a lot. Moreover, the 63 
POs covered in the survey produce 10.2 million tonnes of milk, which is a mere 7% of the 
EU’s total production level. Hence, it is not very likely that the negotiated contracts of 
these POs (of whose production again only 35% is delivered under the negotiated 
contracts) affect the EU milk and dairy market substantially. However, with raw milk 
being a high-volume product, there may be some aspects of spatial competition, implying 
that POs can play a role at local level even though at the level of the EU market as a 
whole their ability to create countervailing market power would be limited. In addition, 
POs may organise milk farmers in a region, supplying a local or regional milk processor 
that (partly) produces niche products. In such a case, the establishment of the PO and 
the outcome of the contractual negotiation process may contribute to the improved 
balancing of supply and demand.  
Conclusions 
Quite a number of the POs in the sample find better market information of paramount 
importance, and many do negotiate how much to deliver (which is, in itself, the result of 
matching demand and supply). Thus, POs seem to act as a coordinating body that helps 
match supply and demand. At the same time, though, POs do not seem to control the 
volumes delivered very strictly: a significant number of the contracts negotiated are not 
binding and in addition many PO members sell to purchasers independent of POs’ 
contracts. POs’ role in controlling quality is also modest in most countries, as the existing 
quality assurance system is generally more than adequate to guarantee high-quality milk 
deliveries. Still, POs do play an important role in either maintaining or improving the 
quality of the produce in niche markets (e.g. Italy) and in several new MSs.  
 
7.4 Objective 2: concentration of supply and placing on the market  
According to the Regulation, a second objective that a PO under the Milk Package can 
choose to achieve is to contribute to the ‘(ii) concentration of supply and the placing on 
the market of the products produced by its members’.  
We interpret this objective as being related to the concentration of supply, with the aim 
of increasing the bargaining power of milk producers or reducing transaction costs in the 
value chain. Given this, concentration is not a goal in itself, but rather instrumental in 
strengthening the position of milk producers in the value chain. The objective also refers 
to the placing of products on the market. We interpret this to refer to the selling of the 
products of the members of the PO to the next stage in the value chain (e.g. the 
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assurance that the milk is collected) as well as the delivery conditions. One of these 
conditions refers to price. However, issues linked to the level and stability of the price 
that POs receive for products are discussed under the heading of the third objective. 
Reasoning 
POs’ contribution to the concentration of supply is a direct function of the number of PO 
members, as well as of the amount of raw milk produced per member (farm). 
Concentration is a relative concept: it relates not only to the amount of raw milk a PO 
delivers, but also to how this amount relates to the structure of the market and its 
regional definition. For example, if a PO delivers to more than one processor/buyer, this 
shows that POs have the opportunity to choose between multiple buyers, which suggests 
that POs would have at least some bargaining power. In addition, it is interesting to see 
how the total marketable output of POs in an MS relates to the maximum amount 
allowed according to the definition in the Regulation. The latter indicator refers to the 
concentration as this is achieved not by individual POs, but rather by the set of all 
established POs. Thus, it provides an indicator of the extent to which all POs together 
concentrate supply. In dairy, an activity that is spatially dispersed in the EU, the 
concentration of supply potentially influences competitiveness and producer bargaining 
power at regional, national and even EU level. 
The placing of the produce on the market has several aspects. One is the assurance that 
members of a PO have that their produce will be collected and sold. Here it is not only 
the assurance of milk collection that counts, but also the delivery conditions associated 
with it; indeed, accepting a very low price may guarantee that purchasers are interested 
in buying the milk of a PO, but is not likely to satisfy members of a PO that would like to, 
at the same time, receive a competitive price (e.g. a price that is at least as high as 
farmers receive who are not organised by POs).  
Another aspect of collectively placing raw milk is that producers can focus on farm 
activities and do not need to spend time on marketing activities. In the literature on 
agricultural cooperatives, the opportunity for farmers to specialise in farming activities is 
considered a classical benefit of marketing cooperatives (Bonus, 1986). Being responsible 
for production and marketing activities means more dispersed management focus. Brush 
and Karnani show that focus through specialisation increases productivity and, hence, 
income (Brush and Karnani, 1996).  
Evidence and assessment 
As presented in Chapter 3 and discussed in Section 7.2, the number of members of the 
surveyed POs ranges from 14 to 1 050 and the minimum marketable production ranges 
from 4,000 to 1.6 million tonnes. On average, the surveyed POs had 674 members and 
hence a concentration of the production of a similar number of farmers (Section 2.4). 
POs contribute to the concentration of supply into the market, in particular in the UK and 
Spain. An indicator of the relative degree of concentration is how the collectively 
negotiated volumes of POs relate to the maximum amount allowed according to the 
criteria set in the legislation. In the Czech Republic, the deliveries under collective 
negotiations represent 16% of the total milk production. For the UK, Spain, Romania, 
Germany, Italy, France and Bulgaria the corresponding market shares of the surveyed 
POs in the domestic market are respectively 5%, 4%, 2%, 1%, 1%, 0% and 0%. 
Therefore, in all MSs with POs that were in the sample, the aggregate shares in the 
domestic milk supply for all surveyed POs are rather modest. On the other hand, in 
Belgium and the Czech Republic the market share of all POs in total domestic milk 
production could increase to 34% and 30% respectively if POs delivered the maximum 
marketable amount allowed under collective negotiations.  
As regards the purchasers of the raw milk from POs, processors are the main type (29 
out of 63), followed by traders (18) and cooperatives (8). In the overall sample, the 
average PO delivers to 4.4 purchasers, with a significant variation between MSs: for 
instance, German POs deliver on average to 1.9 buyers, and Italian POs to 20.4 buyers. 
This shows that POs can deliver their milk to alternative purchasers, which indicates that 
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POs do not market their milk towards only one buyer and suggests that they potentially 
have some bargaining power. As has also been pointed out in Section 7.2, the sizes of 
POs are very different both within and between MSs, and the total volumes delivered 
under contracts negotiated also differ quite a lot. The roughly 60 POs covered in the 
survey produce 10.2 million tonnes of milk, which is a mere 7% of the EU’s total 
production. As was noted before, it is not very likely that the negotiated contracts of 
these POs (of whose production again only 35% is delivered under the negotiated 
contracts) affect the EU milk and dairy market substantially. However, this does not 
preclude the possibility that POs may organise milk farmers in a region, supplying a local 
or regional milk processor that (partly) produces niche products (spatial competition).  
With respect to the placing on the market, several questions of the survey have been 
used to come to a judgement. The first question considered is the assurance that all milk 
is collected. This is linked to the questions of whether POs were active in organising the 
milk supply and negotiating delivery volumes. The questions about to whom POs sell 
their produce, and whether they sell to more than one buyer, have also been considered. 
Fifty per cent of the POs surveyed ranked the assurance of the milk being collected as an 
important issue (in their top three priorities). Almost two-thirds of all POs participating in 
the survey agree largely or fully that this objective has been achieved. For the POs that 
indicated this motive as top or second priority, as many as 95% indicated that this 
objective is largely or fully achieved. From the survey, it does not appear that the POs 
take an active role in organising milk supply, although 60% of POs indicated that 
negotiating the volume of milk with processors, traders and cooperatives is an important 
activity, especially in France.  
To evaluate the functioning of POs with respect to this objective, two questions from the 
survey were considered in particular: (1) the extent to which the POs have been able to 
assure the collection and processing of their members’ milk and (2) the enhancement of 
the position of producers in the value chain. The latter is a proxy for the performance of 
POs with respect to non-price objectives (the price aspects will be dealt with in Section 
7.5). Of the POs that indicated as important the assurance that milk is collected (i.e. 
ranked it with a priority score of 1 or 2), 95% indicated that this objective is largely or 
fully achieved. More than 60% of the POs in the survey ranked enhancement of the 
position of producers in the supply among the top three priorities. However only 23% of 
the POs agree that this objective is achieved largely or fully. More specifically, a mere 
40% of those POs that ranked ‘enhancement in the value chain’ as priority 1 or 2 agree 
that this objective is largely or fully achieved. 
Conclusion 
The evidence of the surveyed POs suggests they contribute to the concentration of milk 
supply to a limited extent. The degree of concentration of milk supply varies greatly 
between MSs. In only two MSs, the aggregate amount of milk produced by PO members 
was similar to the maximum amount of milk that is allowed to be covered by collective 
negotiations. In all other MSs where POs were active, this amount was much lower. At 
aggregate EU28 level, the market share of POs in the milk supply is limited (for the 
surveyed POs it amounted to 7%). Whereas POs are unlikely to influence the aggregate 
EU dairy market, the concentration of supply may have impacts at national and regional 
levels, since concentration can also occur at those levels (e.g. spatial competition).  
According to their self-assessment, the surveyed POs have been successful to different 
degrees in assuring that the milk of its members is collected and processed and in 
enhancing the position of producers in the value chain. Of the POs indicating that assured 
milk collection was an important reason for establishing them, almost all indicated that 
this objective was achieved. This is a very high score, indicating successful functioning of 
the surveyed POs in this respect. However, to draw a more firm conclusion it would be 
necessary to compare the assurance of milk being collected for farmers that are 
members of a PO and farmers that are not. With respect to improving the position of 
producers in the value chain, a mere 40% of the POs found this objective important and 
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indicated that their position was indeed strengthened. Still, this implies that a majority of 
POs are not satisfied with their achievements in this regard.  
 
7.5 Objective 3: optimising production costs and stabilising producer 
prices 
According to the Regulation, a third objective for a PO under the Milk Package is ‘(iii) 
optimising production costs and stabilising producer prices’.  
We interpret this objective as including all aspects of POs that contribute to the 
rationalisation and increase of resource efficiency in milk production. All the aspects 
related to the producer price that the POs achieve are also interpreted to be captured 
under this objective, even though it is recognised that the level of the price that is 
achieved could also be linked to the previous objective. 
Reasoning 
Input costs 
Producer collaboration can contribute to the optimisation of costs in various respects. 
Producers can share knowledge with each other, identify best practices (benchmarks) 
and learn from that, resulting in increased production efficiency. Producers can also 
collaborate by sharing the use of certain means of production (e.g. machinery), which 
may allow them to reduce capital costs per kilogram of milk produced. Producers may, by 
joining or initiating a PO, concentrate demand and use their bargaining power to 
negotiate price reductions for inputs. Thus, collaboration within and between different 
stages of the dairy value chain can contribute to achieving efficiency gains as well, 
implementing innovations and tailoring actions at different levels of the value chain (e.g. 
commitments to deliver a certain volume of milk, which matches the sourcing objectives 
of processing industries; application of quality standards along the value chain). This also 
includes (contractual) agreements about the application of a milk-pricing formula and the 
distribution of (price volatility) risk along the different stages of the value chain. 
Producer price stabilisation 
With respect to the level and stabilisation of producer prices, POs may be able to bargain 
a better price and better delivery conditions, including more stable prices. The extent to 
which this might be feasible will, on the one hand, depend on the bargaining power of a 
PO (which in turn is likely to depend on issues such as the concentration of supply and 
the members of a PO being obliged to channel their produce exclusively through the PO 
to the market). On the other hand, it will depend on the space for manoeuvre in the 
supply chain, or more specifically on the extent to which there are rents in the value 
chain because of imperfect competition in the downstream part of the dairy value chain. 
In the latter case, POs can contribute to the rebalancing of market power and push for a 
more competitive equilibrium (potentially including a better milk price and a larger 
amount of milk collected). The extent to which imperfect competition plays a role is 
difficult to assess, however, although there are indicators which are at least informative 
about this, such as the structure of the dairy industry (e.g. cooperative versus private; 
dairy-processing firm size distribution), the market asymmetry between different stages 
of the value chain (e.g. number of dairy producers per processor or its reciprocal, the 
number of dairy processors or buyers of raw milk per farmer). If the value chain is fully 
competitive, it is likely to be difficult for POs to make improvements for their members 
and those might well be achieved at the expense of other stages of the value chain. 
POs can negotiate reductions in price fluctuations with the downstream stages of the 
value chain. With respect to price variability, the duration of contracts and conditions 
with respect to price are particularly important: from a farmers’ perspective, long-term 
contracts provide more certainty about prices paid but there may be a trade-off with not 
benefiting from price increases. Processors and traders may have access to futures 
markets (hedging of price and exchange-rate risks) and have a wide portfolio of clients 
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and products that allows a certain degree of smoothing of price fluctuations. In addition, 
the downstream stages of the value chain may have access to private and public storage 
facilities that they can exploit to manage price volatility, options that primary producers 
do not have.  
In the following, we first look at the evidence from the surveys (both electronic and in-
depth interviews) that address the input cost optimisation sub-objective. In Section 5.4, 
the answers to questions on price discounts with respect to input purchases are 
discussed. The question on the organisation of advice by POs (see Section 5.5) and joint 
input purchasing (see also Section 5.5) are also relevant in addressing the producer cost 
optimisation sub-objective. In Section 6.2, further questions are asked about efficient 
use of the means of production. With respect to the milk price, the questions regarding 
getting better prices (see Section 5.4), getting stable prices (Section 5.4), negotiating 
milk prices (Section 5.5) and negotiating payment conditions (Section 5.5) are 
particularly relevant. The cross-linkages with other objectives and requirements are also 
considered. 
Evidence and assessment 
Input costs 
Only one-third of the POs included in the survey answered the question regarding 
negotiating input price discounts and only 50% of these (or 17% of all POs) found getting 
input price discounts an important objective. Almost a quarter of those who gave a high 
priority to input discounts indicated that the PO helped to achieve this objective. The 
question on improving the efficient use of means of production by means of a PO also got 
a poor response: only one-third filled in this question, and about 30% of them gave high 
priority to it (13% of all POs). Of those who gave a high priority to achieving efficient use 
of production means, 43% indicated that the objective was achieved. The answers to the 
survey question on organising advice showed that POs do not consider this an important 
activity: only 21% of the surveyed POs gave it a high priority (ranging from 1 to 3), with 
82% of the POs in Italy indicating the organisation of advice as of high importance. The 
latter might relate to the high proportion of PDO/PGI products, which require a special 
means of production and the application by farmers of several product-specific standards 
that go beyond the normal standards applying to dairy. Several FOs argued that 
improving the knowledge of farmers needs more emphasis in the Milk Package. Since a 
small reduction in costs can result in significantly higher incomes thanks to leverage 
effects, improving farmer’s capabilities is seen as important by these respondents. 
Intermediate inputs account for two-thirds of the total expenses (Hill and Bradley, 2015). 
Even small reductions in costs per kilogram of milk may have a positive impact on the 
farmers’ margin (IDIF). 
Conclusion 
Only a minority (fewer than 20%) of the interviewees found having a PO in order to 
achieving producer cost optimisation most important. Of those who indicated that this 
was important, only 25% claimed that the cost optimisation or input price reduction 
objective has been achieved largely or fully (hence 4% of ‘All POs’). 
Producer price stabilisation 
In contrast with the sub-objective of producer cost optimisation, the objectives of getting 
better and more stable prices were indicated as important reasons for members to join a 
PO. Some 95% of respondent POs indicated that improving the milk price level was 
considered to be the most important motive for joining a PO. As can be seen from Table 
7.2, however, on average less than 60% of the total milk produced by a PO is delivered 
under collective negotiations. Given the key importance of the milk price sub-objectives 
(price level and price variation), one would expect that the POs would try to sell a larger 
proportion of the total milk collected by them under collectively negotiated deliveries. 
The survey finds that getting stable prices is the second most important motive for 
joining a PO: 67% of the surveyed POs gave it a priority of 1 to 3. These findings are 
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confirmed by those for negotiating milk price, which was given a high priority too 
(ranging from 1 to 3) by 83% of the POs (in France, 100%). Further supporting evidence 
is provided by answers to the question on the negotiating of payment conditions. This 
activity is indicated as third most important: 59 (out of 63) POs gave it a priority of 1 to 
3. 
In order to assess the functioning of the POs with respect to the objectives of cost 
optimisation and milk price improvement and stabilisation, it is relevant to know not only 
how important PO members consider them to be, but also to what extent these 
objectives, especially the ones indicated to be important, are being achieved or not. Here 
one finds mixed and generally rather modest results. Almost a quarter of those POs 
which put a high priority on achieving input price discounts indicated that this objective 
has been achieved. Between 25% and 30% of the POs confirmed that a higher and more 
stable price has been largely or fully realised (Section 5.3).  
The success of a PO depends on the ability to manage and develop the PO and also on 
the level of the bargaining skills of the negotiators. About 40% of the POs (and also of 
the FOs) indicated that they had insufficient information and training (see also Figure 
6.8). Although this refers to POs in general, the interviews suggest that it could also 
indicate that PO representatives responsible for contract negotiations need better insights 
into market conditions (i.e. how prices are determined) and need to improve their 
negotiation abilities. Given the high priority expressed by the POs for improving milk 
prices and associated delivery conditions, support in this respect could be a welcome 
contribution to help improve the functioning of POs in terms of responding to market 
developments and negotiating a favourable price for their members. Nearly half of ‘All 
POs’ indicated that they lack PO success stories. Information on best practices and good 
examples among POs could contribute to their learning and improved operation 
(benchmarking), as well as having a spin-off effect for farmers who are not members of a 
PO or for regions where POs do not yet exist. 
Conclusion 
Improving the level of the producer price and stabilising it can be considered the key 
objectives of POs under the Milk Package, even though POs may also simultaneously 
pursue other goals. Between 25% and 30% of the POs claim that a higher and more 
stable price has been largely or fully realised. This suggests that there is ample room for 
improvement of the functioning of POs in this regard. 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that both the producer cost and producer price 
(level and stability) objectives have been analysed only to a limited extent. For example, 
no comparison of production costs, milk price levels and price fluctuations has been 
made between farmers in POs and outside POs (the counterfactual). Moreover, 
representatives (managers) of POs provided the answers to the survey questions; they 
may have a more different opinion from the POs’ members. 
 
7.6 The potential for POs where they have not been constituted yet 
Alongside assessing the functioning of existing POs in the context of the Milk Package, 
another research objective of this study is to evaluate the potential for POs where they 
have not been constituted yet. In order to consider the potential of POs, questions have 
been asked of existing POs and FOs that may have valuable experiences in tackling start-
up problems. The FOs usually have members in areas with and without POs, which may 
put them in a unique position to also provide useful reflections on what could be 
important obstacles for creating POs.  
Reasoning 
POs are organisations meant to favour producer interests. By doing that, they are to 
achieve gains for their members. At the same time, operating POs involves costs. A 
positive incentive to establish a PO requires that the benefits of initiating a PO outweigh 
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the costs. The costs can include membership fees, but also transaction costs and 
opportunity costs of the time spent and efforts made to manage the PO. Benefits can be 
derived from receiving a better and/or more stable milk price, being able to produce at 
lower costs, having assurance that the milk will be collected, and getting a price mark-up 
for a quality premium or niche market dairy product (all relative to not being a member 
of a PO). Costs may exceed benefits in time at certain points, for instance when 
investments are needed, with start-up costs usually closely related to the moment of 
initiating the PO, whereas the benefits might be more dispersed and are expected to 
develop positively over time.  
There might be uncertainty among producers about the benefits that can be realised by 
creating a PO. Producers may lack information and awareness about the factors 
explaining successful POs. Dairy farmers may also expect POs to solve their economic 
issues, which may lead to disappointment when this does not come true. Moreover, there 
is a social issue. POs require multiple producers to collaborate, which requires a certain 
degree of trust, solidarity and loyalty, which might not occur automatically or might 
develop only gradually. There might also be a cultural element here: past experiences in 
which cooperation failed may create insufficient willingness to cooperate at present. 
Evidence and assessment 
Chapter 6 discusses several reasons for the small number of POs. First, FOs claim that 
the small number of POs is linked to the fact that the dairy value chain is well organised. 
The argument is that in a well-functioning (competitive) value chain there are no or only 
small rents in the value chain, which would limit the gains a PO can achieve. In MSs 
where the contractual arrangements are predominantly cooperative (‘MS Cooperative’), 
70% of the FOs are of the opinion that POs do not add (much) to the already existing 
cooperatives, whereas in MSs with other contractual arrangements (‘MS Private’ or ‘MS 
Mixed’) fewer than 25% are of that opinion. This suggests that, according to FOs, POs 
are more likely to be initiated in countries or markets where cooperatives are less 
important. To put it another way, where cooperatives serve the interest of producers 
there seems to be less room for POs than where cooperatives are absent. This is, 
however, contrary to the conclusions of Bijman (2015), who has studied the cooperative 
structures in the European fruit and vegetable sector and found a relatively high number 
of POs in countries with a strong cooperative organisation. An alternative argument could 
therefore be that a well-organised sector enhances the establishment of POs. This is also 
the impression resulting from the in-depth interviews with POs and FOs. The explanatory 
factor here could be that the presence of cooperatives and a well-functioning market 
reflect the willingness and ability of producers to collaborate. One-third of the POs’ and 
FOs’ respondents agreed that insufficient willingness of farmers to cooperate is an 
important reason for the small number of POs in many EU countries.  
Next, the value added of POs turns out to be often not clear to potential members: only 
one-fifth of the surveyed POs agree that the benefits outweigh the cost (Section 6.2). 
The chance of not being successful (i.e. the risk of not achieving goals and the associated 
benefits) may discourage producers from developing any initiatives but those with a 
strong expectation of success. As is clear from Section 6.2, the lack of information and 
awareness may also contribute to a biased perspective on the costs and benefits of POs. 
Information deficits about POs and their potential, in particular what they can achieve 
(success stories), as well as about the access to support in establishing a PO, affect the 
(negative) attitude towards establishing a PO. 
Over 50% of the FOs agree with the statement that the lack of success stories is a 
reason for the small number of POs, and the majority of POs that provided an answer are 
also of that opinion (Section 6.2). Furthermore, ‘Getting better prices’ is considered an 
important motivation for establishing a PO (around 80% of the POs indicated this; 
Section 6.3.). Only one-quarter of the POs indicated that this objective has been realised. 
This implies that the majority of the surveyed POs disagreed, which means that, 
according to most interviewed POs, the PO has not achieved better prices for its farmers.  
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Answers to survey questions indicate that expectations in the sector about how the Milk 
Package could lead to a better farm income lack realism. The bottom line in several 
interviews is that farmers expect the PO to improve their (low) incomes. However, the 
respondents to the questionnaire (managers or representatives of POs, FOs and the EDA, 
hence not farmers) argue that establishing a PO is unlikely to solve the pressure on farm 
incomes, nor will the PO’s activities easily result in a higher share in the consumer’s 
expenditures, in particular not where markets are competitive. Respondents also made it 
clear that the Milk Package is not intended to be an industry or trade policy, as it does 
not provide subsidies or market intervention, nor does it aim to implement trade 
restrictions. POs offer an opportunity for collective bargaining as an exemption to 
competition law. As POS are instruments of producer self-organisation, producers need to 
make substantial efforts and enter into longer-term commitments if they would like to 
initiate and develop a PO.  
In a competitive market, no stakeholder can make excessive profits. Obtaining a higher 
profit by farmers can be realised by (1) increasing off-farm prices (but that would be at 
the expense of other stakeholders in the value chain), (2) reducing costs in the value 
chain or (3) adding more value to the products. With the increase in market orientation 
of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the increasing reliance of the EU on exporting 
products outside the EU, the competitive pressure has also increased. The gains from 
POs will then most likely have to come from the second and third options.  
Conclusion 
Based on the evidence obtained from the surveys, there are some hints of major reasons 
why most MSs have only a small number of POs. The analysis of the answers of existing 
POs and FOs indicates that often the value added by establishing a PO is not very clear; 
starting a PO implies costs (time and money) and the benefits might come over time but 
are not guaranteed. Success stories are lacking. Moreover, potential members of POs 
lack information about and awareness of how PO could work for their benefit. At the 
same time, respondents (mainly managers of POs, FOs and EDA) voice the view that 
farmers have high expectations of POs, namely that they will contribute to balanced 
markets and better milk prices. 
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8 Summary of major findings 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The assessment of the functioning of POs includes on the one hand an assessment of the 
general and MS-specific legal requirements that POs have to meet and to what extent 
they affect the functioning of POs, and on the other hand an assessment of the 
objectives that POs choose to pursue and their performance in achieving these 
objectives. Our surveys and interviews provided the building blocks for the assessment 
summarised below. 
 
8.2 Findings with respect to the legal requirements that POs have to 
satisfy 
Initiation of POs by producers 
As regards the requirement that POs recognised under the Milk Package shall be initiated 
by milk producers (farmers), our observation is that this requirement is not met in about 
40% of the cases in the sample. More than 20% (13 out of 63) of the POs included in the 
sample were established by another organisation, such as a processor or a milk-
collecting organisation, potentially leading to conflicts of interest between milk producers 
and the initiating organisation. Conflicts of interest may hinder the PO from achieving one 
or more of the Milk Package objectives, but the survey does not provide evidence that 
the objectives of the regulation are not achieved because of conflicting interests. 
Maximum volume of raw milk covered by contractual negotiations 
All the cases analysed meet the requirements in the legislation restricting the maximum 
volume of raw milk covered by contractual negotiations. Given this, there is no evidence 
that the maximum requirements are constraining POs from exercising their bargaining 
power.  
Criteria with respect to minimum number of members or minimum marketable 
production volume 
The criteria for recognising a PO differ across MSs. Wide ranges in the minimum number 
of members (between 5 and 200) and in the minimum marketable production (between 
35 and 200 000 tonnes) have been observed. These are difficult to justify only on the 
basis of structural differences between MSs. MSs that define high minimum size 
requirements seem to favour large-scale POs. From studies on POs in other agricultural 
sectors, it is known that collective action organisations such as POs often start as small 
organisations because trust has to build up and experience needs to be gained (Bijman, 
2015; Bijman et al., 2012). High minimum criteria can operate as a barrier to entry to 
the rise of POs, even though they may not be the only factor explaining small numbers of 
POs. 
 
8.3 Conclusions with respect to the objectives that POs pursue 
Objective i: Production is planned and adjusted to demand 
With respect to the objective that production is planned and adjusted to demand, no 
strong conclusions could be drawn from the results from the surveys. Quite a number of 
the POs in the sample find better market information of paramount importance, and 
many do negotiate how much to deliver (which is the result of matching demand and 
supply). In addition, the POs deliver all the milk contracted under Article 149 of the CMO 
to the processor, which may indicate that supply matches demand well. Meanwhile, 
though, POs do not seem to supervise the volumes delivered very strictly: a significant 
proportion of the contracts negotiated are not binding and, in addition, many PO 
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members do sell to purchasers outside the PO’s contracts. POs’ role in controlling quality 
is also modest in most countries, as the existing quality assurance system is generally 
more than adequate to guarantee high-quality milk delivery. Still, POs do play an 
important role in either maintaining or improving the quality of the produce in niche 
markets (e.g. Italy) and in several of the MSs that joined the EU in or after 2004 
(EUn13).  
Objective ii: Concentration of supply and placing on the market  
This objective of establishing POs is to bring together individual supplies in a collective 
selling milk to a processor to enhance farmers’ position in the supply chain. Every PO 
realises concentration of supply compared with the individual farmer. Yet at national level 
POs do so only to a limited extent. The survey shows that the degree of concentration of 
milk supply varies greatly between MSs. In only two MSs was the total marketable 
production of PO members similar to the maximum amount of milk that is allowed to be 
covered by collective negotiations. In all other MSs where POs were active, this amount 
was much lower, the 63 POs covered in the survey produce 10.2 million tonnes of milk, 
which is a mere 7% of the EU’s total milk supply. According to their self-assessment, the 
surveyed POs have been successful to different degrees in assuring that the milk of their 
members is collected and processed and in enhancing the position of producers in the 
value chain. Of the POs for which assured milk collection was an important reason for 
their establishment, almost all indicated that this objective was achieved. This is a very 
high score, indicating successful functioning of the surveyed POs in this respect. 
However, to draw a firmer conclusion it would be necessary to compare the assurance of 
milk being collected for farmers that are members of a PO and farmers that are not. With 
respect to the objective of improving the position of producers in the value chain, a mere 
40% of the POs found this objective important and indicated that their position was 
indeed strengthened. Still, this implies that a majority of POs are not satisfied with the 
achievements of POs in this regard.  
Objective iii: optimising production costs and stabilising producer prices 
Improving the level of and stabilising the producer price can be considered the key 
objectives of POs under the Milk Package, even though they may also simultaneously 
pursue other goals. Between 25% and 30% of the POs claim that a higher and more 
stable price has been largely or fully realised. This suggests that, alongside successes 
that are achieved, there is ample room for improvement in the functioning of POs in this 
regard. 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that both the producer cost and producer price 
(level and stability) objectives have been analysed only to a limited extent. For example, 
no comparison of production cost, producer milk price levels and milk price variation has 
been made for farmers in POs and those outside POs (the counterfactual). Moreover, the 
survey was done at a time when prices were low (spring 2016). This could have a 
bearing on the result.  
 
8.4 Conclusion with respect to the potential for POs where they have 
not been constituted yet 
Based on the evidence obtained from the surveys, there are some hints of major reasons 
for having only a small number of POs in most of the MSs. The analysis of the answers of 
existing POs and FOs indicates that often the value added by establishing a PO is not 
very clear, especially in countries where many farmers are member of a dairy 
cooperative. Starting a PO implies costs (time and money) and the benefits might come 
over time but are not guaranteed. Success stories are lacking, which might also be 
because the regulation is only recent and market circumstances (low prices due to 
oversupply) are difficult. Moreover, potential members of POs lack information about and 
awareness of how PO could work for their benefit. The historical connotations of 
collectives make farmers in most of the recently accessed MSs (EUn13) reluctant to get 
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organised. This is a special hurdle that supports of POs must surmount in putting forward 
possible gains from a PO. A policy recommendation for further promoting the use of POs 
is to reduce the information and awareness gap by targeted communications and 
information activities, including profiling success stories. Offering training (e.g. in 
bargaining techniques) to potential PO managers may also contribute to improving the 
competence of PO staff and hence the functioning and success of POs. 
 
8.5 Closing remarks 
The measures established by the Milk Package will apply until mid-2020. As part of a 
discussion on extending and/or adjusting the Milk Package, this raises the question of 
whether or not the legislation with respect to POs and APOs should be extended. This 
research has a limited scope and provides a preliminary assessment of POs, but 
nevertheless offers some relevant insights into answering this question. This research 
shows that POs partly contribute to the objectives for which they have been initiated. As 
it appears from the surveys, POs have not been successful in fully achieving all their 
objectives. Moreover, there are several MSs where POs have not caught on at the time of 
writing (mid-2016). This could be related to the start-up costs of a PO, but also to 
alternative organisational arrangements being available that are also able to address the 
needs of the producers. This latter possibility has not been addressed in this research. 
Although there are still a number of open questions, there is also evidence that POs have 
made a positive contribution to achieving one or more of the three objectives. For this 
reason, our recommendation is to extend the legal provision for POs and schedule a more 
in-depth evaluation, to help gain more definite insights into the functioning of POs. 
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Appendix 1 Questionnaire addressed to POs in the milk sector  
 
A. General information 
1. In what year was the PO constituted? Year ...... 
2. In what year was the PO recognised by the national authorities (under the Milk Package provisions)? Year............. 
3. Who took the initiative?  
□ Farmer(s) 
□ Trade union 
□ Milk collecting organisation  
□ Processor 
□ Other (please specify).......... 
4. Did you experience any difficulties linked to the recognition? If yes, why? 
□ No. 
□ Yes, because of................... 
5. Did you experience difficulties to find members? If yes, why? 
□ No. 
□ Yes, because of................... 
6. Did you experience difficulties with your milk purchasers? If yes, why? 
□ No. 
□ Yes, because of................... 
7. How many members had the PO and what was the marketable milk production per animal species (tonnes/year) 
on 1st December 2015? 
 Cow Ewe Goat Buffalo 
Members     
Tons/year     
 
8. How many PO members are located in areas with structural limitations and what is the approximate annual 
milk production (tonnes per year) in each? 
Area  Cow Ewe Goat Buffalo 
Mountain Area Members     
Tonnes/year     
Other Areas with 
Natural Constraints 
Members     
Tonnes/year     
Others(specify)....... Members     
Tonnes/year     
 
9. What kind of purchasers does the PO deliver the milk to, and how many? 
Purchasers If Yes, number of Purchasers 
□ Processor  
□ Trader  
□ Cooperative  
□ Others ............  
 
10. Is the main purchaser a milk processor? 
□ No, the main purchasers is not a milk processor. 
□ Yes, the main purchaser is a milk processor. 
If yes, could you indicate its geographical dimension? 
□ Local. 
□ Regional. 
□ National. 
□ International. 
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11. Does the PO belong to an APO (Association of Producer Organisations)? 
□ Yes  If yes, what is the name of the APO?.............. 
□ No  If not, do you see potential to constitute an APO?................  
12. What were the motivations for the constitution of the PO?  
Please rank the most important reasons: 1 is most important, 2= second, 3 = third and so on, no indication means not 
important or not applicable. 
Motivation Rank 
Get better prices.  
Get more stable prices.  
Assure that milk of all members will be collected.  
Better market information for taking production decisions  
Overall enhancement of producers' position in the supply chain  
Better communication with other milk producers  
Price discount by collective purchase of means of production.  
Efficient use of means of production   
Interim step for further constitution of a cooperative.  
Others, please specify ........  
 
13. To what extent are the following objectives accomplished? 
  Extent of realisation 
Objective Not 
applicable 
Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
Get better prices.      
Get more stable prices.      
Assure that milk of all members will be collected.      
Better market information for taking production 
decisions. 
     
Overall enhancement of producers' position in the supply 
chain. 
     
Better communication with other milk producers      
Price discount by collective purchase of means of 
production. 
     
Efficient use of means of production.      
Interim step for constitution of cooperative.      
Others.      
 
B. Activities 
14. What are the core activities of the PO? Please rank the most important reasons: 1 is most important, 2= second 
important, 3 = third important and so on, no indication means not important or not applicable. 
Activity Rank 
Negotiating milk price   
Negotiating payment conditions   
Negotiating delivery volumes   
Negotiating delivery conditions  
Negotiating delivery schedule  
Organising the milk collection  
Organising technical and/or economic advice  
Organisation of information/experience exchange  
Organising quality controls  
Organising joint inputs purchase   
Providing other services to farmers, please specify......  
Others (please specify)...  
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C. Contractual negotiations 
15. Since when is the PO negotiating contracts on behalf of the members? 
Since .........(year) 
16. Is PO’s negotiation result binding for the members? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
17. Would you consider obliging members in your PO to deliver a fixed share of their production through the 
PO? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
18. Are any members of the PO negotiating and delivering milk outside the PO (directly with the purchasers)? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
19. Does the PO conclude delivery contracts on behalf of the PO members? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
20. Do the PO members conclude individual contracts? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
21. What volume of raw milk (tonnes per year and per animal species, if applicable) was actually delivered under 
contracts negotiated by the PO, in the last three years ? 
Year Cow Ewe Goat Buffalo 
2013     
2014     
2015     
 
D. Organisation and governance 
22. What are the requirements to become a member of the PO? 
□ Payment of a fee 
□ Being established in a certain region 
□ Quantity to deliver 
□ Quality requirements 
□ Delivery to specific processor 
□ Method of production (e.g. Organic, pasture grazing, GMO-free feed,…)  
□ Membership of a trade Union 
□ Others.............. 
23. How are the voting rules? 
□ One farmer one vote? 
□ Votes are proportional to the milk deliveries 
□.Others ........... 
24. Who are on the board of the PO? 
□ Only farmers 
□ Farmers and non-farmers 
25. How many paid staff does the PO have? 
 ........ employees. 
26. Did you get any national financial support for establishing your PO?  
□ No. 
□ Yes. What was the amount of support? ...... EUR. 
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27. Did you get any EU financial support for establishing your PO?  
□ No. 
□ Yes. What was the amount of support? ...... EUR. 
28. Did you receive any other support from public authorities? 
□ No 
□ Yes 
□ If yes, from what authority......................... and which type of support did you get:............. 
29. Did you receive any support from private bodies (farmers' union, processor, etc.)? 
□ No. 
□ Yes.  
□ If yes, from what body....................... and which type of support did you get:............. 
 
30. To what extent are following statements on the management of the PO valid? 
 Extent of being valid 
 Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
Managing the PO is time consuming 
    
All members participate in the management of the PO 
    
The engagement of members in the PO is high 
    
Members easily come to an agreement  
    
The PO reduces the administrative burden for members 
    
 
E. Challenges and solutions 
31. What are the main actual benefits of belonging to the PO for your members? 
1........................... 
2........................... 
3........................... 
32. And what are the main drawbacks, if any? ......................... 
1........................... 
2........................... 
3........................... 
 
33. Would you consider evolving the PO into a processing cooperative 
 Yes  /  No 
□ No. 
□ Yes. 
If no, why? 
 
Reason Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
Too much investment needed 
    
Insufficient public financial support 
    
No entrepreneurial interest of the PO members 
    
Insufficient training 
    
Others (please specify)...... 
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If yes, what would be your motivation? 
Reason Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
Opportunity for business development 
    
Obtain better milk prices for your members 
    
Overall enhancement of producers' position in the supply chain 
    
Benefit from financial advantages available in your Member State 
    
Develop local specialities  
    
Others (please specify)...... 
    
 
34. Do you see potential for more POs in your country? 
□ No 
□ Yes.  
 
If yes, why is this possibility not fully exploited?  
Reason Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
The sector is already well organised 
    
The supply chain is already functioning properly 
    
Insufficient organisation in the sector 
    
The benefits to participate in a PO will not outweigh the costs 
    
Insufficient willingness for cooperation among farmers 
    
Farmers' preference to have direct contact with the purchasers     
Insufficient information / training 
    
Lack of success stories 
    
Recent milk price evolution doesn't encourage cooperation among 
farmers 
    
Others (please specify)...... 
    
 
35. Would you propose any change in the Milk Package provisions, notably in view of its potential prolongation 
beyond 2020? 
Aspect If relevant, which change  
Contractual relations  
Producer Organisations  
Collective negotiating   
Interbranch Organisations  
Regulation of supply for PDO/PGI cheese  
General remark on the Milk Package as a 
whole 
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36. Any remarks / additional information: ............................................... 
Thank you for filling in this questionnaire! 
It is possible that we will call you for additional information. In that case, we hope that you are willing to cooperate as well. 
 
Technical notes on the PO questionnaires 
Question 12: Some respondents did not fill in a priority order. Some ranked several motivations with the same 
number: e.g. 4 times the number 1 and 2 times the number 2, and no other rankings. In the analysis, we did not 
change this ranking. 
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire addressed to FOs 
 
1. Which forms of cooperation between farmers does the milk sector have? 
     ☐ Farmer organisation 
     ☐ Producer groups 
     ☐ Trade union 
     ☐ Cooperative 
     ☐ Milk collection organisations 
     ☐ Other,.......... 
 
2. What are the reasons for the low number or absence of recognised Producer Organisations (PO) in your country? 
Reason Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
The sector is already well organised 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The supply chain is already functioning properly 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insufficient organisation in the sector 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The benefits to participate in a PO will not outweigh the costs 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insufficient willingness for cooperation among farmers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insufficient information / training 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Lack of success stories 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Recent milk price evolution doesn't encourage cooperation among farmers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (please specify)...... 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
3. Do you see potential for POs and APOs in your country and why? 
     ☐ No, because of..................... 
     ☐ Yes, because of ................. 
 
4. Are you aware of ongoing/past initiatives to form POs 
     ☐ No 
     ☐ Yes, which ................. 
 
5. What might be reasons for farmers to join or form POs? 
Reasons Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
Get better prices. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Get more stable prices. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Assure that milk of all members will be collected. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Better market information for taking production decisions ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Overall enhancement of producers' position in the supply chain ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Better communication with other milk producers ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Price discount by collective purchase of means of production. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Efficient use of means of production  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Interim step for further establishment of a cooperative. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others, please specify ........ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
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6. Is the use of written contracts common?  
     ☐ No 
     ☐ Yes, for approximately .... % of the total milk deliveries. 
 
7. If so, is the written contract concluded in advance?       ☐ No       ☐ Yes 
 
8. If written contracts are used, which terms are covered? 
     ☐ Price of milk  
     ☐ Quality of milk 
     ☐ Payment conditions  
           ☐ Quantity of delivery  
     ☐ Other delivery conditions (please specify) ............. 
     ☐ Quantity of delivery in specific periods 
     ☐ Providing technical and/or economic advice 
     ☐ Purchase of inputs 
     ☐ Duration of contract 
     ☐ Others (please specify)...... 
 
9. Would you propose any change in the Milk Package provisions, notably in view of its potential prolongation beyond 
2020? 
Aspect If relevant, how  
Contractual relations  
Producer Organisations  
Collective negotiating   
Interbranch Organisations  
Regulation of supply for PDO/PGI cheese  
General remark on the Milk Package as a 
whole 
 
 
10 Any remarks / additional information: .......................... 
 
Thank you for filling in this questionnaire! 
It is possible that we will call you for additional information. In that case, we hope that you are willing to cooperate as well. 
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Appendix 3 Questionnaire addressed to the national members of EDA 
 
1. Country you represent: …….  
2. Which forms of cooperation between farmers does the milk sector have? (More answer possible) 
     ☐ Farmer organisation 
     ☐ Producer groups 
     ☐ Trade union 
     ☐ Cooperative 
     ☐ Milk collection organisations 
     ☐ Other,.......... 
 
3. What are the reasons for the low number or absence of recognised Producers Organisations (PO) in your country? 
Reason Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
The sector is already well organised 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The supply chain is already functioning properly 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insufficient organisation in the sector 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
The benefits to participate in a PO will not outweigh the costs 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insufficient willingness for cooperation among farmers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Farmers' preference to have direct contact with the purchasers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Insufficient information / training 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Lack of success stories 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Recent milk price evolution doesn't encourage cooperation among farmers 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others (please specify)...... 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
4. Do you see potential for Producers Organisations (POs) and Associations of Producers Organisations (APOs) in your 
country and why? 
     ☐ No, because of..................... 
     ☐ Yes, because of ................. 
 
5. Are you aware of ongoing/past initiatives to form POs 
     ☐ No 
     ☐ Yes, which ................. 
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6. What might be reasons for processors/purchasers to do business with POs? 
Reasons Not at all Partly Largely Fully 
Reduce costs ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Get more stable raw milk prices. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Assurance of raw milk supply  ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ 
Better production/market information for taking processing decisions. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Overall enhancement of purchasers’/processors’ position in the supply 
chain. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Better communication between farmers and purchasers/producers. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Better quality of the raw milk. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
More efficient milk collection. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Interim step for more integration in the chain ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Others........ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
 
7. Is the use of written contracts between farmer and processor/buyer common? 
     ☐ No 
     ☐ Yes, for approximately .... % of the total milk deliveries. 
 
8. If so, is the written contract concluded in advance?  ☐ No       ☐ Yes 
 
9. If written contracts are used, which terms are covered in the contract? (More answers possible) 
     ☐ Price of milk  
     ☐ Quality of milk 
     ☐ Payment conditions  
     ☐ Quantity of delivery  
     ☐ Other delivery conditions (please specify) ............. 
     ☐ Quantity of delivery in specific periods 
     ☐ Providing technical and/or economic advice 
     ☐ Purchase of inputs 
     ☐ Duration of contract 
     ☐ Others (please specify)...... 
 
10. Would you propose any change in the Milk Package provisions, notably in view of its potential prolongation beyond 
2020? 
Aspect If relevant, how  
Contractual relations  
Producers Organisation   
Collective negotiating   
Interbranch Organisations  
Regulation of supply for PDO/PGI cheese  
General remark on the Milk Package as a 
whole 
 
 
11 Any remarks / additional information: .......................... 
 
Thank you for filling in this questionnaire! 
It is possible that we will call you for additional information. In that case, we hope that you are willing to cooperate as well. 
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Appendix 4 Sample and response Farmer organisations 
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Austria 2 1 0 1 0 4 2 1 0 0 0 3 3 
Belgium 2 2 2 1 0 7 1 1 2 0 0 4 3 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 
Croatia 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 3 * 
Cyprus 4 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 
Czech Rep. 3 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Denmark 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 
Estonia 3 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Finland 2 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
France 3 2 1 1 0 7 1 1 1 0 2 5 1 
Germany 1 2 1 1 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 2 * 
Greece 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 * 
Hungary 3 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ireland 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Italy 3 1 1 1 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Latvia 6 1 0 1 0 8 6 0 0 0 0 6 * 
Lithuania 6 1 0 1 0 8 6 0 0 1 0 7 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 
Malta 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 
Netherlands 1 2 0 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 
Poland 6 0 0 1 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Portugal 1 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 
Romania 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 
Slovakia 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 * 
Slovenia 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 * 
Spain 3 1 2 0 0 6 2 1 0 0 0 3 2 
Sweden 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 
UK 3 0 0 1 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 3 2 
Total 61 18 8 22 10 119 38 8 4 2 5 57 33 
* no in-depth interview  
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Appendix 5 Detailed information on Electronic survey POs 
 
Table A5.1 Members of POs in type of area  
Type of area All DE FR IT ES Other 
Mountainous 1,967 851 62 484 424 146 
Natural constraints 2,577 449 100 142 1,650 236 
Other limitations 756 313 26 32 385 0 
Total with structural limitations 5,136 1,613 188 658 2,295 382 
No structural limitations 35,275 21,375 3,655 1,531 410 8,304 
Total 40,411 22,988 3,843 2,189 2,705 8,686 
 
Table A5.2 Cow milk production (1,000 tonnes) in type of area 
Type of area All DE FR IT ES Other 
Mountainous 481 159 21 85 70 147 
Natural constraints 1,017 213 52 64 632 57 
Other limitations 276 178 9 14 75 0 
Total with structural limitations 1,774 550 81 163 777 203 
No structural limitations 8,407 1,455 1,251 825 496 4,379 
Total 10,181 2,005 1,332 988 1,273 4,583 
 
 
Table A5.3 Number of POs by period of constitution 
Period All DE FR IT ES Other 
Before 2008 24 15 1 5 0 3 
Between 2008 and 2012 20 3 8 3 4 2 
After 2012 18 4 3 3 1 7 
N.A. 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 63 22 13 11 5 12 
 
Table A5.4 Number of POs by period of recognition 
Period All DE FR IT ES Other 
Before 2008 16 11 0 3 0 2 
Between 2008 and 2012 12 2 5 3 2 0 
After 2012 35 9 8 5 3 10 
N.A. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 63 22 13 11 5 12 
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Table A5.5 Motivation for constitution of POs 
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All 1 33 16 15 3 22 6 3 2 0 6 
2 16 13 6 11 11 8 6 5 1 1 
3 9 13 10 7 7 8 2 1 5 1 
>3 2 11 15 23 15 24 10 14 7 1 
N.A. 3 10 17 19 8 17 42 41 50 54 
Total 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
DE 1 15 2 2 0 9 2 0 0 0 2 
2 3 7 3 4 6 3 0 0 0 0 
3 4 6 3 1 1 3 1 1 0 1 
>3 0 5 8 11 3 9 1 2 1 0 
N.A. 0 2 6 6 3 5 20 19 21 19 
Total 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
FR 1 6 1 3 0 4 1 0 0 0 1 
2 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 3 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 
>3 0 3 2 6 6 8 3 3 1 0 
N.A. 1 2 5 5 1 2 10 10 12 12 
Total 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
IT 1 7 6 3 1 5 2 0 1 0 1 
2 2 0 1 4 3 3 5 4 1 0 
3 1 2 3 2 0 2 0 0 4 0 
>3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 
N.A. 1 3 4 3 3 4 5 4 5 10 
Total 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
ES 1 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
>3 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 
N.A. 0 1 0 2 0 3 3 3 4 4 
Total 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Others 1 4 6 5 2 3 1 3 1 0 2 
2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 
3 4 1 0 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 
>3 1 2 4 4 3 6 3 5 3 0 
N.A. 1 2 2 3 1 3 4 5 8 9 
Total 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Note: 1, most important motivation; 2, second; 3, third; >3 least important. Some POs filled in the same 
ranking for several motivations: therefore, the total for one ranking can be greater than the number of POs. 
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Table A5.6 Extent of realisation of the motivations for constitution of POs 
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All Not applicable 1 1 3 3 5 0 11 8 12 0 
Not at all 13 14 3 0 9 1 10 8 4 0 
Partly 27 25 2 21 24 3 4 5 2 0 
Largely 12 11 6 15 14 9 5 7 1 0 
Fully 4 3 37 12 3 8 1 1 2 3 
N.A. 6 9 12 12 8 6 32 34 42 60 
Total 63 63 63 63 63 27 63 63 63 63 
DE Not applicable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not at all 3 5 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 
Partly 9 8 0 6 11 1 0 0 0 0 
Largely 7 4 1 4 5 8 1 2 0 0 
Fully 2 1 16 7 2 8 0 0 0 1 
N.A. 1 4 4 5 2 5 20 19 22 21 
Total 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
FR Not applicable 0 0 1 0 1  3 3 4 0 
Not at all 6 5 0 0 5  5 4 2 0 
Partly 7 5 0 9 6  1 1 1 0 
Largely 0 2 3 3 1  0 0 0 0 
Fully 0 0 9 0 0  0 0 0 0 
N.A. 0 1 0 1 0  4 5 6 13 
Total 13 13 13 13 13  13 13 13 13 
IT Not applicable 0 0 2 3 2  3 2 5 0 
Not at all 2 1 0 0 0  3 2 0 0 
Partly 4 3 1 3 3  1 0 0 0 
Largely 2 3 0 1 3  2 3 0 0 
Fully 2 2 5 2 1  0 1 1 1 
N.A. 1 2 3 2 2  2 3 5 10 
Total 11 11 11 11 11  11 11 11 11 
ES Not applicable 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 2 0 
Not at all 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Partly 2 4 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Largely 1 0 1 3 2 1 0 1 1 0 
Fully 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N.A. 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 
Total 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Others Not applicable 0 1 0 0 1  2 1 1 0 
Not at all 2 2 1 0 2  1 1 2 0 
Partly 5 5 0 2 3  2 4 1 0 
Largely 2 2 1 4 3  2 1 0 0 
Fully 0 0 6 3 0  1 0 1 1 
N.A. 3 2 4 3 3  4 5 7 11 
Total 12 12 12 12 12  12 12 12 12 
a This question was translated and included in only the German and Spanish questionnaires. 
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Table A5.7 Motivation realised ‘fully’ or ‘largely’ for POs that indicated it in top 
two priorities for constitution 
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POs listing motivation as 
1 or 2 
49 29 21 14 33 14 9 7 1 7 
Accomplishment (largely 
or fully) 
14 8 20 9 13 4 3 3 1 3 
% realisation of 
motivations 
29 28 95 64 39 29 33 43 100 43 
 
Table A5.8 Importance of core activities of POs 
Region Ranking Negotiating Organising Others 
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All 1 42 10 10 8 3 8 5 3 9 3 1 3 
2 6 15 21 8 3 3 5 16 4 6 1 1 
3 4 12 7 11 7 7 3 11 2 2 3 0 
>3 2 7 9 12 13 14 13 12 16 8 5 3 
N.A. 9 19 16 24 37 31 37 21 32 44 53 56 
Total 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
DE 1 17 3 1 3 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 2 
2 2 5 6 5 1 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 
3 0 5 3 2 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
>3 0 3 3 2 1 3 0 3 3 1 0 1 
N.A. 3 6 9 10 17 15 21 11 16 21 22 19 
Total 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
FR 1 11 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 3 7 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
3 0 3 2 1 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 
>3 0 1 0 5 3 3 3 4 5 2 3 0 
N.A. 0 6 1 6 9 10 9 2 8 11 10 13 
Total 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
IT 1 4 3 2 2 1 3 3 1 5 1 1 0 
2 0 2 3 1 1 2 4 6 4 4 1 1 
3 4 4 2 3 3 3 2 0 1 0 2 0 
>3 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
N.A. 3 2 3 4 4 2 1 4 1 5 7 10 
Total 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
ES 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
>3 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 
N.A. 2 3 1 3 3 2 3 1 4 4 5 4 
Total 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Rest 1 8 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 
2 2 5 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 
3 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 4 1 1 1 0 
>3 1 1 4 3 5 6 7 3 7 4 2 1 
N.A. 1 2 2 1 4 2 3 3 3 3 9 10 
Total 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
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Table A5.9 Contractual negotiations 
Subject of contract Region Yes No N.A. total 
Negotiation binding for 
members 
All 46 9 8 63 
DE 20 0 2 22 
FR 10 3 0 13 
IT 6 1 4 11 
ES 4 1 0 5 
Rest 6 4 2 12 
Obliging PO members to 
deliver fixed proportion 
All 41 15 7 63 
DE 18 1 3 22 
FR 10 3 0 13 
IT 5 3 3 11 
ES 3 2 0 5 
Rest 5 6 1 12 
Do members deliver 
outside the PO? 
All 9 52 2 63 
DE 3 18 1 22 
FR 2 11 0 13 
IT 0 11 0 11 
ES 2 3 0 5 
Rest 2 9 1 12 
Does PO conclude 
delivery contract for 
members? 
All 37 22 4 63 
DE 20 1 1 22 
FR 2 11 0 13 
IT 6 4 1 11 
ES 2 3 0 5 
Rest 7 3 2 12 
Do members conclude 
individual contracts? 
All 18 43 2 63 
DE 3 19 0 22 
FR 5 8 0 13 
IT 0 11 0 11 
ES 5 0 0 5 
Rest 5 5 2 12 
 
Table A5.10 Requirements to become a member 
Requirement All DE FR IT ES Rest 
Payment of a fee 41 12 13 6 1 9 
Being established in a certain region 25 11 11 2 0 1 
Quantity to deliver 6 2 1 2 0 1 
Quality requirements 17 9 0 4 0 4 
Delivery to specific processor 17 6 9 0 0 2 
Method of production 6 3 1 2 0 0 
Membership of a trade union 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 11 5 1 5 0 0 
POs with no requirement or N.A. 7 2 0 0 4 1 
POs with 1 requirement 19 6 0 5 1 7 
POs with 2 requirements 13 3 5 2 0 3 
POs with 3 requirements 19 9 6 4 0 0 
POs with 4 and more requirements 5 2 2 0 0 1 
Total POs 63 22 13 11 5 12 
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Table A5.11 Managing the PO 
Statement Region Not at all Partly Largely Fully N.A. Total 
Managing the PO is time-
consuming 
All 5 24 17 15 2 63 
DE 4 13 4 1 0 22 
FR 0 1 7 4 1 13 
IT 0 5 1 4 1 11 
ES 0 1 1 3 0 5 
Rest 1 4 4 3 0 12 
All members participate in the 
management 
All 16 29 10 5 3 63 
DE 4 8 6 3 1 22 
FR 4 7 1 0 1 13 
IT 1 6 2 1 1 11 
ES 2 2 1 0 0 5 
Rest 5 6 0 1 0 12 
The engagement of members in the 
PO is high 
All 3 25 25 7 3 63 
DE 1 4 13 4 0 22 
FR 0 8 4 0 1 13 
IT 0 6 4 0 1 11 
ES 0 1 3 1 0 5 
Rest 2 6 1 2 1 12 
Members easily come to an 
agreement 
All 3 13 36 8 3 63 
DE 0 1 19 2 0 22 
FR 0 2 7 3 1 13 
IT 1 4 4 1 1 11 
ES 1 2 2 0 0 5 
Rest 1 4 4 2 1 12 
The PO reduces the administrative 
burden for members 
All 11 15 10 23 4 63 
DE 2 1 4 14 1 22 
FR 4 4 3 0 2 13 
IT 1 5 2 2 1 11 
ES 1 3 0 1 0 5 
Rest 3 2 1 6 0 12 
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Table A5.12 Reason for not developing into a cooperative 
Reason Region Not at all Partly Largely Fully N.A. Total 
Too much 
investment 
All 5 1 5 24 12 47 
DE 3 0 3 12 4 22 
FR 1 1 1 5 5 13 
IT 0 0 1 1 1 3 
ES 1 0 0 1 2 4 
Rest 0 0 0 5 0 5 
Insufficient public 
financial support 
All 7 4 6 15 15 47 
DE 6 3 1 6 6 22 
FR 1 1 2 4 5 13 
IT 0 0 1 1 1 3 
ES 0 0 0 1 3 4 
Rest 0 0 2 3 0 5 
No entrepreneurial 
interest 
All 5 9 10 11 12 47 
DE 3 3 3 8 5 22 
FR 0 1 5 2 5 13 
IT 0 2 0 0 1 3 
ES 0 2 0 1 1 4 
Rest 2 1 2 0 0 5 
Insufficient training All 9 7 9 7 15 47 
DE 5 3 3 4 7 22 
FR 2 2 2 2 5 13 
IT 1 1 0 0 1 3 
ES 0 1 1 0 2 4 
Rest 1 0 3 1 0 5 
Other All 
     
18 
DE 
     
6 
FR 
     
6 
IT 
     
3 
ES 
     
0 
Rest 
     
3 
Note: due to the low numbers other is not broken down 
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Table A5.13 Reason for potentials for more POs 
Reason Region 
Not at 
all 
Partly Largely Fully N.A. Yes 
Sector is well organised All 17 16 8 0 5 46 
DE 5 8 2 0 3 18 
FR 1 5 3 0 1 10 
IT 3 2 0 0 1 6 
Rest 8 1 3 0 0 12 
Supply chain functions 
properly 
All 13 13 8 1 11 46 
DE 3 6 5 0 4 18 
FR 1 4 2 0 3 10 
IT 1 2 0 1 2 6 
Rest 8 1 1 0 2 12 
Sector insufficiently 
organised 
All 5 11 9 10 11 46 
DE 3 7 1 1 6 18 
FR 2 2 2 2 2 10 
IT 0 0 4 1 1 6 
Rest 0 2 2 6 2 12 
Benefits lower than 
costs 
All 21 3 9 1 12 46 
DE 13 0 1 0 4 18 
FR 4 1 2 0 3 10 
IT 2 0 2 1 1 6 
Rest 2 2 4 0 4 12 
Unwillingness of farmers 
to cooperate 
All 4 15 14 2 11 46 
DE 2 7 5 0 4 18 
FR 1 2 2 1 4 10 
IT 0 3 2 0 1 6 
Rest 1 3 5 1 2 12 
Preference for direct 
contact with purchaser 
All 7 19 10 1 9 46 
DE 6 6 2 0 4 18 
FR 0 4 2 1 3 10 
IT 1 3 2 0 0 6 
Rest 0 6 4 0 2 12 
Insufficient 
information/training 
All 7 9 11 9 10 46 
DE 5 4 2 3 4 18 
FR 0 3 2 3 2 10 
IT 1 1 2 0 2 6 
Rest 1 1 5 3 2 12 
Lack of success stories All 7 7 16 5 11 46 
DE 6 5 2 1 4 18 
FR 0 1 4 1 4 10 
IT 0 1 4 0 1 6 
Rest 1 0 6 3 2 12 
Milk price hampers 
cooperation  
All 10 9 8 9 10 46 
DE 7 3 2 2 4 18 
FR 0 2 2 3 3 10 
IT 3 2 1 0 0 6 
Rest 0 2 3 4 3 12 
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Appendix 6 Detailed information on Electronic survey FOs and EDA 
 
Table A6.1 Cooperation between farmers in the milk sector 
Category 
Farmer 
organisation 
Producer 
group 
Trade 
union 
Cooperative 
Milk 
collection 
organisation 
Average 
number of 
cooperations 
Total 
number of 
informants 
EDA 8 5 2 8 4 3.0 9 
All FOs 35 21 13 49 17 2.4 57 
MS with POs 21 16 13 24 8 2.8 29 
MS without POs 14 5 0 25 9 1.9 28 
EU15 21 11 12 27 10 2.5 32 
EUn13 14 10 1 22 7 2.2 25 
MS Cooperative 10 4 1 15 4 1.9 18 
MS Private 8 8 1 10 0 2.5 11 
MS Mixed 17 9 11 24 13 2.6 28 
Copa-Cogeca 22 14 4 34 8 2.2 38 
Other FOs 13 7 9 15 9 2.8 19 
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Table A6.2 Reasons for low number of POs 
Reason Category Not at all Partly Largely Fully N.A. total 
Sector is well 
organised 
All POs 17 16 8 0 5 46 
EDA 1 2 1 3 2 9 
All FOs 23 13 12 7 2 57 
MS with POs 12 9 5 3 0 29 
MS without POs 11 4 7 4 2 28 
EU15 16 6 2 1 0 25 
EUn13 7 7 10 6 2 32 
MS Cooperative 2 2 9 4 1 18 
MS Private 6 4 0 0 1 11 
MS Mixed 15 7 3 3 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 14 10 9 4 1 38 
Other FOs 9 3 3 3 1 19 
Supply chain 
functions 
properly 
All POs 13 13 8 1 11 46 
EDA 0 4 2 1 2 9 
All FOs 30 13 10 2 2 57 
MS with POs 18 8 2 0 1 29 
MS without POs 12 5 8 2 1 28 
EU15 14 8 2 1 0 25 
EUn13 16 5 8 1 2 32 
MS Cooperative 7 2 8 1 0 18 
MS Private 7 3 0 0 1 11 
MS Mixed 16 8 2 1 1 28 
Copa-Cogeca 19 8 9 1 1 38 
Other FOs 11 5 1 1 1 19 
Sector 
insufficiently 
organised 
All POs 5 11 9 10 11 46 
EDA 6 0 1 0 2 9 
All FOs 20 13 11 10 3 57 
MS with POs 11 7 6 5 0 29 
MS without POs 9 6 5 5 3 28 
EU15 5 8 7 5 0 25 
EUn13 15 5 4 5 3 32 
MS Cooperative 10 2 2 1 3 18 
MS Private 3 4 2 2 0 11 
MS Mixed 7 7 7 7 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 13 10 8 6 1 38 
Other FOs 7 3 3 4 2 19 
Benefits lower 
than costs 
All POs 21 3 9 1 12 46 
EDA 3 1 2 0 3 9 
All FOs 16 14 13 7 7 57 
MS with POs 9 8 4 7 1 29 
MS without POs 7 6 9 0 6 28 
EU15 5 10 7 2 1 25 
EUn13 11 4 6 5 6 32 
MS Cooperative 5 4 3 1 5 18 
MS Private 2 4 2 2 1 11 
MS Mixed 9 6 8 4 1 28 
Copa-Cogeca 11 8 11 4 4 38 
Other FOs 5 6 2 3 3 19 
Unwillingness 
of farmers to 
cooperate 
All POs 4 15 14 2 11 46 
EDA 2 5 0 0 2 9 
All FOs 13 21 10 10 3 57 
MS with POs 8 9 6 6 0 29 
MS without POs 5 12 4 4 3 28 
EU15 4 10 5 6 0 25 
EUn13 9 11 5 4 3 32 
MS Cooperative 7 7 1 1 2 18 
MS Private 4 1 4 1 1 11 
MS Mixed 2 13 5 8 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 8 15 7 6 2 38 
Other FOs 5 6 3 4 1 19 
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Table A6.2 continued Reasons for low number of POs 
Reason Category Not at all Partly Largely Fully N.A. total 
Preference for 
direct contact with 
purchaser 
All POs 7 19 10 1 9 46 
EDA 0 3 3 0 3 9 
All FOs 2 6 8 2 39 57 
MS with POs 1 4 6 1 17 29 
MS without POs 1 2 2 1 22 28 
EU15 0 1 1 0 23 25 
EUn13 2 5 7 2 16 32 
MS Cooperative 1 3 2 1 11 18 
MS Private 0 0 1 0 10 11 
MS Mixed 1 3 5 1 18 28 
Copa-Cogeca 1 3 3 1 30 38 
Other FOs 1 3 5 1 9 19 
Insufficient 
information/training 
All POs 7 9 11 9 10 46 
EDA 3 2 1 0 3 9 
All FOs 9 21 17 7 3 57 
MS with POs 5 10 9 5 0 29 
MS without POs 4 11 8 2 3 28 
EU15 3 12 9 1 0 25 
EUn13 6 9 8 6 3 32 
MS Cooperative 4 7 3 1 3 18 
MS Private 2 3 6 0 0 11 
MS Mixed 3 11 8 6 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 7 17 10 2 2 38 
Other FOs 2 4 7 5 1 19 
Lack of success 
stories 
All POs 7 7 16 5 11 46 
EDA 3 1 1 1 3 9 
All FOs 10 14 15 16 2 57 
MS with POs 7 2 9 11 0 29 
MS without POs 3 12 6 5 2 28 
EU15 4 9 6 6 0 25 
EUn13 6 5 9 10 2 32 
MS Cooperative 5 4 5 2 2 18 
MS Private 3 2 4 2 0 11 
MS Mixed 2 8 6 12 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 8 13 10 6 1 38 
Other FOs 2 1 5 10 1 19 
Milk price hampers 
cooperation 
All POs 10 9 8 9 10 46 
EDA 4 1 1 0 3 9 
All FOs 15 10 13 16 3 57 
MS with POs 8 6 6 9 0 29 
MS without POs 7 4 7 7 3 28 
EU15 3 3 9 10 0 25 
EUn13 12 7 4 6 3 32 
MS Cooperative 8 4 3 1 2 18 
MS Private 3 1 2 4 1 11 
MS Mixed 4 5 8 11 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 11 7 8 10 2 38 
Other FOs 4 3 5 6 1 19 
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Table A6.3 Motivation for joining a PO 
Reason Category Not at all Partly Largely Fully N.A. total 
Better price All POs 33 16 9 2 3 63 
EDA 5 2 1 0 1 9 
All FOs 2 6 13 33 3 57 
MS with POs 0 2 7 20 0 29 
MS without POs 2 4 6 13 3 28 
EU15 0 3 6 16 0 25 
EUn13 2 3 7 17 3 32 
MS Cooperative 2 2 4 7 3 18 
MS Private 0 2 4 5 0 11 
MS Mixed 0 2 5 21 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 2 5 8 21 2 38 
Other FOs 0 1 5 12 1 19 
Stable prices All POs 16 13 13 11 10 63 
EDA 6 3 0 0 0 9 
All FOs 2 3 17 32 3 57 
MS with POs 0 1 8 20 0 29 
MS without POs 2 2 9 12 3 28 
EU15 1 0 7 17 0 25 
EUn13 1 3 10 15 3 32 
MS Cooperative 1 2 6 6 3 18 
MS Private 0 1 3 7 0 11 
MS Mixed 1 0 8 19 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 2 3 13 18 2 38 
Other FOs 0 0 4 14 1 19 
Assurance of 
collection/supply 
All POs 15 6 10 15 17 63 
EDA 2 3 4 0 0 9 
All FOs 6 12 14 22 3 57 
MS with POs 3 1 5 19 1 29 
MS without POs 3 11 9 3 2 28 
EU15 1 6 9 9 0 25 
EUn13 5 6 5 13 3 32 
MS Cooperative 3 5 4 4 2 18 
MS Private 1 2 1 6 1 11 
MS Mixed 2 5 9 12 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 4 11 11 10 2 38 
Other FOs 2 1 3 12 1 19 
Information for 
production/processing 
decisions 
All POs 3 11 7 23 19 63 
EDA 4 3 1 1 0 9 
All FOs 4 14 19 17 3 57 
MS with POs 1 4 10 14 0 29 
MS without POs 3 10 9 3 3 28 
EU15 1 7 10 7 0 25 
EUn13 3 7 9 10 3 32 
MS Cooperative 2 4 7 2 3 18 
MS Private 1 2 3 5 0 11 
MS Mixed 1 8 9 10 0 28 
Copa-Cogeca 3 12 12 9 2 38 
Other FOs 1 2 7 8 1 19 
Enhancement of 
position in supply 
chain 
All POs 22 11 7 15 8 63 
EDA 4 4 1 0 0 9 
All FOs 3 11 15 25 3 57 
MS with POs 0 5 5 18 1 29 
MS without POs 3 6 10 7 2 28 
EU15 1 4 6 14 0 25 
EUn13 2 7 9 11 3 32 
MS Cooperative 2 3 8 3 2 18 
MS Private 0 2 1 8 0 11 
MS Mixed 1 6 6 14 1 28 
Copa-Cogeca 3 9 11 14 1 38 
Other FOs 0 2 4 11 2 19 
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Table A6.3 continued Motivation for joining a PO 
Better communication All POs 6 8 8 24 17 63 
EDA 3 3 1 2 0 9 
All FOs 5 23 15 10 4 57 
MS with POs 1 11 7 9 1 29 
MS without POs 4 12 8 1 3 28 
EU15 2 9 10 4 0 25 
EUn13 3 14 5 6 4 32 
MS Cooperative 2 9 4 0 3 18 
MS Private 1 2 4 4 0 11 
MS Mixed 2 12 7 6 1 28 
Copa-Cogeca 4 17 10 5 2 38 
Other FOs 1 6 5 5 2 19 
Price discounts on 
inputs 
All POs 3 6 2 10 42 63 
EDA             
All FOs 9 19 14 10 5 57 
MS with POs 7 8 5 7 2 29 
MS without POs 2 11 9 3 3 28 
EU15 1 8 8 7 1 25 
EUn13 8 11 6 3 4 32 
MS Cooperative 2 7 6 1 2 18 
MS Private 2 0 4 4 1 11 
MS Mixed 5 12 4 5 2 28 
Copa-Cogeca 6 14 8 7 3 38 
Other FOs 3 5 6 3 2 19 
Efficient use of inputs All POs 2 5 1 14 41 63 
EDA             
All FOs 14 19 11 8 5 57 
MS with POs 8 7 6 7 1 29 
MS without POs 6 12 5 1 4 28 
EU15 5 8 6 5 1 25 
EUn13 9 11 5 3 4 32 
MS Cooperative 3 8 3 1 3 18 
MS Private 1 3 3 4 0 11 
MS Mixed 10 8 5 3 2 28 
Copa-Cogeca 9 13 8 5 3 38 
Other FOs 5 6 3 3 2 19 
Cooperative/integration 
chain 
All POs 0 1 5 7 50 63 
EDA 7 1 0 0 1 9 
All FOs 23 15 5 8 6 57 
MS with POs 13 7 1 6 2 29 
MS without POs 10 8 4 2 4 28 
EU15 7 5 5 7 1 25 
EUn13 16 10 0 1 5 32 
MS Cooperative 10 4 1 0 3 18 
MS Private 1 3 1 5 1 11 
MS Mixed 12 8 3 3 2 28 
Copa-Cogeca 15 10 5 4 4 38 
Other FOs 8 5 0 4 2 19 
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Table A6.4 Terms of contract covered 
Term covered FO EDA 
Price of milk  34 6 
Quality of milk 46 8 
Payment conditions  47 8 
Quantity of delivery  40 5 
Quantity of delivery in specific periods 23 3 
Providing technical/economic advice 6 4 
Purchase of inputs 4 1 
Duration of contract 44 6 
With specification 49 8 
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Figure A6.1 Reasons for low numbers of POs 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs question 34, Electronic survey FOs, question 3, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 3. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.2. 
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Figure A6.2 Reasons for farmers to join POs 
 
Source: Electronic survey POs, question 12, Electronic survey FOs, question 5, and Electronic survey EDA, 
question 6. Detailed information in Appendix 6, Table A6.3. 
Note: For POs, priority rank 1 (highest) is fully, 2 is largely, 3 is partly and >3 is not at all. 
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